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Scholars have highlighted the role of income distribution as a fundamental factor to 
understand consumption, health, adoption of technologies, social cohesion, democratic 
stability, and long term economic performance, among other phenomena. Moreover, 
reducing income inequality was included in the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals. However, less attention has been put on the link between differences 
in household incomes and other pressing sustainability challenges, such as those that 
depend on massive adoption of new technologies within network industry sectors: 
telecommunications, waste management, transport, energy and water. Does existent 
income inequality translate into adoption gaps within these sectors? Is inequality an 
obstacle for advancing the vision of an inter-connected and more sustainable world? This 
research explores these questions through seven stand-alone papers, which focus on 
adoption of broadband internet, municipal recycling and railway passenger transport. Part 
I of the thesis includes four papers based on publicly available data from traditional 
mainstream sources. Chapter 1 provides a systematic map of the peer-reviewed literature 
on the link between income inequality and adoption of the three selected network 
technologies. Chapter 2 looks at country-level panel data from OECD countries. Chapter 
3 analyses cross-sectional data in a broader world-wide sample. Chapter 4 compares 
borough-level recycling and income distribution in two European cities: London (United 
Kingdom) and Barcelona (Spain). Part II provides an in-depth analysis of two South 
American metropolitan areas: Santiago (Chile) and Medellín (Colombia). This part 
includes three papers (chapters 5, 6 and 7), each one focusing on a specific sector, that 
employ mixed-methods based on fieldwork conducted in both cities. The main 
contributions of the thesis are new evidence on the negative effect of income inequality 
on network technology adoption, and a discussion of the role of formal and informal 
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A specific technology, old or new, that if adopted entails a 
significant advance toward an already-defined 
understanding of sustainable development. 
 
Technology Adoption  
 
Introduction of a previously inexistent product or service 
into consumption by users. 
 
The rich Usually the top ten or one percent of the population in terms 










2SLS Two Stages Least Squares 
ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line 
BR between groups regression Between Groups Regression 
BRM Beta Regression Model 
CLP Chilean Peso 
COP Colombian Peso 
COP2525th  Conference of The Parties, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
EKC Environmental Kuznets Curve 
EPM Empresas Públicas de Medellín 
ETs Environmental Technologies 
EU  European Union 
FE Fixed Effects 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GDPpc Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
HBS household budget surveys Household Budget Surveys 
HTE Household Transport Expenditure 
ICTs Information and Communication Technologies 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INEQ Inequality 
IT10  Income Share of the Top 10 per cent of the 
population 
IVs Instrumental Variables 
LAs  Local Authorities 
LFA local fiscal autonomy  Local Fiscal Autonomy 
MAs metropolitan areas Metropolitan Areas 
MWM Municipal Waste Management 
NA national accounts  National Accounts 
NGOs Non Governmental Organisations 
NIE New Institutional Economics 
NTA Network technology adoption 
OECD Organisation for Cooperation and Economic 
Development 
OIE Old Institutional Economics 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PAYT Pay as You Throw 
PPP Private Public Partnership 
R&D Research and Development 
RE Random Effects 
SCRs Separate Collection Rates 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
SFR Service Financing Regime 
SIMBA  Sistema d'Indicadors Metropolitans de Barcelona 
SMEs Small Medium Enterprises 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
































   
There are two pieces of bread. 
You eat two. I eat none. 
Average consumption: one bread per person. 
 




Life is demand and supply, or supply and demand, that's what it all boils down to, but 
that's no way to live. A third leg is needed to keep the table from collapsing into the 
garbage pit of history, which in turn is permanently collapsing into the garbage pit of 










During October 2019, widespread protests in Latin America, the most income-unequal 
region of the world, illustrated the tensions between two existential challenges of our 
time: inequality and the Climate Crisis.  
 
During the first half of the month, a general uprising in Ecuador was sparked by a tax 
increase on fossil fuels and an agreement with the International Monetary Fund that 
involved applying austerity measures in the country. The face of the protesters was the 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, rising their traditional pikes 
towards the sky while marching to Quito. Ironically, taxes on fossil fuels are part of ‘what 
seems right’ to do about the Climate Crisis. In 2018, the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to William Nordhaus, one 
of the biggest advocates of carbon taxes. 2019 was also a year of intense global public 
debate about Global Warming and Climate Action. But in Ecuador – as it also happened 
in France –, attempts to implement taxes on fossil fuels were rejected by the people.  
 
By the second half of the month, another unexpected news, this time coming from Chile, 
was going to mix inequality and the Climate Crisis via social unrest. The 2019 United 
Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as COP25, was planned to occur during 
December in Santiago, Chile. However, on the 30th of October, the Chilean President 
Sebastian Piñera announced that his government was cancelling the event. The two weeks 
before this announcement saw what probably was the most massive protests in Chilean 
history. A country-wide uprising started with an increase of 3 cents of a dollar in the 
Santiago Metro fare. But, as later was written in canvasses all along the country, ‘it was 
not about 3 cents, it was about 30 years’. Secondary students called for massive fare 
evasions in the metro stations. The government answered by ordering police forces to 
custody main stations, and by closing them at the peak hour, during the evening of Friday 
the 18th. The result was instantaneous riots, and eight stations were set on fire. The new 
answer from authorities was to send the military to the streets, and to impose a curfew for 
the first time since the dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990).  
 
The riots in Chile rapidly turned into a massive movement that defied the presence of the 
military, and demanded not just the suspension of the Metro fare rise in Santiago, but to 
increase the minimum wage, the end of the privatised pension system, decent public 
health, nationalisation of privatised water rights, and a new constitution. According to – 
probably underestimated – police accounts, 4,2 million people marched after the two first 
weeks of protests, in a country where the president was elected in a second ballot by 3,8 
million voters. In one month, as denounced by Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, reiterated Human Rights violations were perpetrated by police and army forces 
deployed by Piñera. Truth and justice regarding these abuses became also part of the main 
demands from the people on the streets.  
 
Such is the social complexity involved in any serious talk about these two existential 
challenges of our time: inequality and the Climate Crisis. It would not be fair to say that 
the indigenous peoples in Ecuador are against environmental action. Their struggles to 
preserve natural ecosystems and defy extractive industries has led to set unprecedented 
legal environmental protections (Wolkmer and Venancio, 2017). But the mix of increased 
fossil fuel taxes, austerity, and deregulation agreed with the International Monetary Fund 
was seen as a danger for almost two decades of achievements in redistribution and 
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advance of social rights. The paradox in Chile is more baffling: Santiaguinos directed 
their rage against the public transport system that is the basis for their daily mobility, and 
which is the most viable low-carbon passenger transport alternative in one of the most 
polluted cities in Latin America.  
 
I began this research a couple of years before the start of this Latin American October. 
Yet, the protests, my subject of study and the results presented here share the same 
underlying question: is income inequality a barrier for Sustainable Development?  
 
Although the general sentiment around the world has been far from optimist over the 
almost four years that this research took to be completed, there is one notion of progress 
that has not disappeared. That notion has to do with an inevitable continuous process of 
worldwide technology adoption. In particular, as an urban planner, a vision that I wanted 
to interrogate was that of an interconnected world. Recent slogans, such as the ‘Smart 
Cities’ (Wiig, 2015) and the ‘Internet of Things’ (Atzori et al, 2010), have been ways to 
promote this vision. To these slogans, more pessimistic voices have opposed notions of a 
splintering urbanism, a social connective apartheid, which is a result of a finance-led 
process of urbanisation, infrastructure convergence and digitalisation (Graham and 
Marvin, 2002). Yet, notable discussions of our time, such as those sparked by data 
protection breaches and manipulation of the masses using Facebook during the Brexit 
vote in the UK, and the 2016 Presidential Elections in the US, are somehow based on the 
assumption that big data continuously flows through an invisible and ubiquitous network 
of interconnected infrastructure.  
 
My research questions have to do with this network of interconnected infrastructure, and 
the link between inequality and Sustainable Development: do existent inequalities 
translate into new network inequalities? Does inequality affect network technology 
adoption that is required for Climate Action? To what extent does poverty, access to 
money, and income concentration determine adoption of the network technologies that 
are both part of Climate Action and of that vision of an interconnected world? Who gets 
to be connected and who ends up being left behind by this vision?  
 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions through the following seven papers. Each 
chapter is a stand-alone paper that should be readable without reference to the others, but 
a common thread unites all the texts. The first part, composed of four papers, presents a 
critical review of the evidence, covering different countries and settings around the world. 
The chapters in this part use publicly available sources such as the World Bank and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The second part, 
formed of three papers, uses existent household surveys and primary qualitative data 
collection to develop a more in-depth perspective using two specific cases: the 
metropolitan areas of Santiago in Chile and Medellin in Colombia. Through the seven 
papers, the analysis is able to incorporate both the global and regional country-level 
perspective, and what happens within metropolitan areas.  
 
Given the limited amount of time and resources, I decided to concentrate on analysing 
three specific network industry sectors that conform the material basis of the 
‘interconnected world’: waste management, transport and telecommunications. More 
specifically, through the seven papers, the focus is put on the link between income 
inequality and adoption of recycling, rail passenger transport and broadband internet. 
These network technologies are, in the case of waste and transport, fundamental part of 
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Climate Action discourses. Recycling and rail passenger transport are part of existent 
Climate Action plans. For instance, Climate Neutral Europe 2050 (European 
Commission, 2018) aims to increase capacity of rail networks in order to provide an 
alternative to the use of private motorised vehicles. The same plan proposes to reinforce 
material recovery of waste in the form of recycling. These actions aim to advance towards 
the circular economy, which involves ‘the adoption of closing-the-loop production 
patterns within an economic system (…) to increase the efficiency of resource use, with 
special focus on urban and industrial waste, to achieve a better balance and harmony 
between economy, environment and society’ (Ghisellini et al., 2016:11). At a global level, 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) highlight similar measures (United Nations, 
2019). For instance, target 11.2 points to ‘By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, 
accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by 
expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable 
situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons’. Conversely, 
target 12.4 defines ‘By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, 
reduction, recycling and reuse’. 
 
Broadband internet is key for the digitalisation of all the other network industry sectors 
(Rifkin, 2014). Although broadband is not directly linked to Climate Action, information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) are increasingly the basis for the functioning of 
other sectors that have a fundamental environmental impact. Ideas such as the ‘Smart 
Cities’ or the ‘Internet of Things’ rely heavily on having ‘connected homes’, and 
convergence between different network industry sectors. Conversely, target 9.C of the 
SDGs points to ‘significantly increase access to information and communications 
technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least 
developed countries by 2020’.  
 
Before explaining the structure of the thesis, it is worth mentioning two overarching 
narratives that emerged from this research. On the one hand, an analysis of income 
inequality as a factor of technology adoption requires to integrate two dimensions: 
aggregated income distribution and individual income generation. The two are 
interconnected, and this research ends up discussing both. On the other hand, it became 
rapidly clear that the dominant demand-based view of technology adoption is not enough 
to explain the links to income inequality. Income inequality is not only related to how 
much money consumers have in their pockets, but is also a proxy of deeply rooted power 
balances that define the rules of the game. That is why every step of this research ended 
up being a constant interrogation of the problem of institutions as mediators between 
income inequality and network technology adoption.  
 
As a result of accounting for these two narratives, the two main contributions that I am 
able to make are robust empirical results on the effects of income inequality over the 
analysed technologies, and new theoretical perspectives on the institutional factors that 
shape this effect. These two contributions can be synthetized in one concept: the presence, 
in all sectors, of institutionally produced network disadvantage. By network disadvantage 
I mean supply-side barriers to adoption by users, regardless of their ability and 
willingness to pay. By institutionally produced, I refer to supply-side constraints that are 
enforced beyond any physical or technological restriction to expand and operate 
networks, but rather depend on formal and informal institutions that are sustained by 
balances of power between groups. On the basis of the findings from this research, 
especially from Chapters 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7, it is possible to claim that institutionally 
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produced network disadvantage affects mostly those in the 40 bottom per cent of the 
income distribution. 
 
A by-product of the different methodologies and theoretical debates included in this thesis 
is support for a novel perspective within development economics. During most of the 20th 
century, the main subjects of the problem of underdevelopment have been the poor. 
However, more recent contributions by economists such as Jose Gabriel Palma (2011), 
Thomas Piketty (2014) and Branko Milanovic (2010) on income and wealth 
concentration by the rich have substantially changed the lens to look at development 
issues. The necessary effect of looking at income distribution and institutions as 
explanatory factors of any development-related variable – in this case, network 
technology adoption – is that the problem is not only the poor, but also the rich. 
Institutions emerge as part of a relational phenomena, in which society needs to be looked 
at as a whole, without falling to the temptation of thinking that one specific group 
deserves to be the face of underdevelopment.  
 
Chapter 1 provides a theoretical framework and a systematic map of the peer-reviewed 
literature on the link between income inequality ad network technology adoption, 
focusing on the cases of internet, recycling and passenger transport. On the one hand, a 
theoretical framework is developed in order to analyse the link between income inequality 
and network technology adoption. This framework includes linking network industry 
sectors and development, explaining technology adoption within these sectors, and 
drawing possible connections to income inequality.  On the other hand, after a parametric 
search using the Scopus search engine, a hundred papers are analysed and discussed. Gaps 
in the research literature are identified, and theoretical links between income and network 
technology adoption are highlighted. 
 
Chapter 2 uses publicly available country-level data from OECD countries to propose an 
econometric panel data model to look at adoption of recycling, railway passenger 
transport and broadband internet. A novelty of this analysis is that, along with the often 
used Gini coefficient, I compare the use of income shares of different groups in each 
country. Instrumental variables are also included as a way to account for possible 
endogeneity and reverse causality issues raised by the literature review in Chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a world-wide analysis of one sector: transport. However, while 
Chapter 2 used measures of direct adoption of railway passenger transport, Chapter 3 
goes back to another variable that is significantly present in the transport literature 
covered in Chapter 1: household transport expenditure. Results from transport in Chapter 
2 contradict what the literature expects, and rises doubts about the rival nature of private 
motorised vehicles and public transport services. This analysis, based on diverse 
econometric models and instrumental variables applied to cross-sectional data, allows to 
complement and reinforce findings on transport from Chapter 2. Both in Chapters 2 and 
3, a strong case for supply-side links between income inequality and adoption of public 
versus private transport is made. 
 
Chapter 4 aims to provide a first exploratory approach to the effects of income inequality 
at a metropolitan scale. Almost purely based on quantitative data that is publicly available 
at borough level, it compares two widely studied European OECD cities with similar 
income distributions and recycling achievements: London in the UK and Barcelona in 
Spain. Econometric models are complemented by qualitative data from field visits. 
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Chapter 4 allows to understand that formal institutional factors, such as tax revenue and 
the way waste management services are financed, generate that those that participate in 
recycling are different in each case, according to their income. Institutional factors 
determine whether the most affluent communities are those more strongly involved in 
recycling, or if sustainable waste management is an effort that involves all. A strong case 
is made to defy the dominant idea in recycling studies, according to which income and 
separate collection rates are linked strictly through demand-based mechanisms.  
 
Chapter 5 is the first paper from Part II. In it, a mixed methods approach is used to 
compare adoption of household broadband internet in Medellin and Santiago. On the one 
hand, a logit binary outcome regression model is used on household data from both cities. 
On the other hand, semi-structured interviews are used to illustrate local and informal 
institutions that seem to be playing a role in how differently the link between income and 
adoption works. In Chapter 5, just as in the following 6 and 7, the theoretical discussion 
goes beyond what was covered by the systematic map of peer reviewed literature in 
Chapter 1. That means that specific theories within studies for each sector are discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on recycling in Medellin and Santiago. In this case, data availability 
constraints made it impossible to perform econometric analysis. However, an effort is 
made to provide a detailed understanding of aggregate recycling figures in both cities. 
Thanks to the possibility of having more space to develop a qualitative account of each 
case, institutional factors are explained as originated from long-term state building 
processes, in both cases as a result of violent national conflicts. In particular, recent 
constitutional processes, with constitutions written in 1980 in Chile and 1991 in 
Colombia, are key to understand how waste management regimes operate in each city.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 looks at public transport. Both cities have in common to structure their 
public transport systems on the basis of a trunk and feeder network that mixes metro lines 
with buses, all integrated through a unified fare. Just as in the case of Chapter 5, it is 
possible to use household data to include logit binary outcome models, which are 
complemented by qualitative analysis from semi-structured interviews. The presence of 
different informal institutions is discussed, and new elements are proposed as an addition 
to existent attempts to integrate institutional factors into transport economics.  
 
At the time of the submission of this thesis, Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 had been published, 
and Chapter 2 was under review after submitting a first major revision. To the anonymous 
peer reviewers, I owe a relevant part of the most interesting sector-specific discussions, 
and many learnings on how to better organise my ideas. Particularly Part II, which for me 
is the most theoretically appealing part of the thesis, has been an intense intellectual 
journey. I decided to organise chapters from Part II in the same order as I wrote them, to 
somehow reflect the conceptual steps made through the writing process. The main 
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1 The relationship between income and network 





Income inequality has been increasingly discussed within development economics. 
Scholars have highlighted the role of distribution of income among households as a 
fundamental factor to understand consumption, health, adoption of technologies, social 
cohesion, democratic stability, and long term economic performance, among other 
phenomena. Moreover, the Sustainable Development Goals included reducing income 
inequality as part of its multiple proposed dimensions of global sustainability. However, 
less attention has been put on the link between differences in household incomes and 
other pressing sustainability challenges, such as those that depend on massive adoption 
of new technologies within network industry sectors: telecommunications, waste 
management, transport, energy and water. Does existent income inequality translate into 
adoption gaps within these sectors? This research provides a systematic map of the peer-
reviewed literature on the link between income inequality and network technology 
adoption, focusing on the cases of internet, recycling and passenger transport. Gaps in the 
research literature are identified, and possible theoretical links between income and 













Although mentioned separately, both issues of inequality and network infrastructure are 
relevant part of the global vision proposed by the United Nation’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). On the one hand, a target within ‘Goal 10: Reduced 
Inequalities’ is ‘By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 
40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average’ (United Nations, 
2019). This target responds to recent seminal studies that have observed how most 
changes in overall income distribution are due to concentration by the top earners and 
deprivation of the bottom 40 per cent of the population (Palma, 2011, 2014).  On the other 
hand, a substantial part of the seventeen SDGs, and their respective targets, require 
changes and innovations within infrastructure networks. At least five goals actively 
involve network industries (i.e. transport, telecommunications, energy, water, waste 
management): ‘6: Clean Water and Sanitation’, ‘7: Affordable Clean Energy’, ‘9: 
Industry, innovation and infrastructure’, ’11: Sustainable Cities and Communities’, and 
’12: Responsible Consumption and Production’.  
 
In economics, access to and distribution of income are usually seen as conditions for 
technology adoption at the consumer level, and as a constraint to fiscal capacities to fund 
infrastructure. Thus, interesting questions emerge if these challenges in inequality and 
network infrastructure are combined. Some of these questions are: does income inequality 
produce network inequalities? Is inequality an obstacle for sustainable change within 
network industries? To what extent does income generation determine adoption of 
sustainable network technologies by households?  
 
This chapter provides a framework for the study of the relationship between income 
inequality and adoption of technologies within network industries – what I call ‘network 
technology adoption’ (NTA). It does so by generating a systematic map of peer-reviewed 
literature (Grant and Booth, 2009). The focus here is put on three sectors: 
telecommunications, waste management and transport (see Section 1.3.1 for the 
justification of this choice). On the basis of this review, it is possible to establish what 
aspects of the income-adoption link have been consistently analysed, as well as gaps in 
the research literature that can inform future studies. At the end of this paper, I summarise 
a number of theoretical links between income inequality and NTA that can be extracted 




1.2.1 Network Industry Sectors and Development  
 
The SDGs are one of the most recent steps in a long-standing effort to define global 
visions for human progress. It is worth noting that until the end of the 2000 decade, the 
mainstream economic views on both income inequality and infrastructure development 
came from the same origin: the international influence of the United States in the setting 
of a global development agenda after World War II, in the context of the Cold War. While 
acceptance of increasing income inequality as a ‘natural’ part of the path to economic 
development was promoted by Simon Kuznets (1955) in the 1950s – in order to promote 
free markets, as highlighted by Piketty (2014) –, infrastructure investment was crucial for 
the role of the Bretton Woods institutions proposed by John Maynard Keynes and Henry 
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Morgenthau in 1944 (Goldman, 2014). Particularly after the 1970 decade, support for 
privatisation and liberalisation of network industries, and the acceptance of income 
inequality as a given, were parts of the same mainstream development economics 
discourse. 
 
The global development agenda on network infrastructure has fundamentally been set by 
the influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Goldman, 
2014). Structural readjustment policies, promoted by these institutions, usually were 
associated with grants and loans that targeted infrastructure investment. During the last 
four decades, documents circulating within the World Bank show a continuous 
argumentation effort for supporting privatisation and liberalisation in all the network 
industry sectors, regardless of the decade or the country being intervened (see for instance 
Bobylev & Cukrowski, 2002 for Rusia; Rossotto et al, 2003 for the Middle East and North 
African countries; The World Bank, 2003 for Lebanon; The World Bank, 2011 for Ghana; 
The World Bank, 2013 for Ethiopia). A similar agenda can be found in documents by the 
IMF, which focus on transport, energy and telecommunications. The main agenda for the 
IMF has been how to facilitate the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure 
investment (Cerra et al, 2016; Komatsuzaki, 2016; Seneviratne and Sun, 2013; Ter-
Minassian, 2008). 
 
Moreover, privatisation, globalisation, and an increasing participation of transnational 
financial capital, brought a new challenge for infrastructure development: convergence 
between sectors. As highlighted by Graham and Marvin (1994) first signs of convergence 
were observed in the 1990s after privatisation of European network industries. These 
authors use the idea of the ‘convergence of urban infrastructure’ for describing ‘cross-
investment and convergence between previously separate infrastructure networks’ 
(Graham & Marvin 1994:239). According to this idea, the market that was opened by 
privatisations fundamentally attracted a group of investors which are in search for a 
diversified profitable investment portfolio. Private ‘distribution network operators’ 
configure an environment in which companies seek for coordination and economies of 
scale (Foxon et al, 2015). ‘Given their existing networks, knowledge and rights, the 
lucrative marketplaces in this area are very attractive to investors in search of diversified 
profits’ (Graham and Marvin, 1994:239).  
 
This idea is consistent with the treatment given to infrastructure by those working to 
promote involvement of the financial sector. For them, infrastructure is defined as a 
mixed investment portfolio that includes roads, urban infrastructure, major irrigation, 
waterways, electricity, telecom, ports, airports, urban electricity, and railways (Virmani, 
2004). While trying to advocate for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for investment, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) acknowledged this 
raising interaction between formerly separated networks and services, announcing that 
‘the various infrastructure systems themselves are interacting ever more closely with one 
another, engendering interdependencies and complementarities, as well as heightened 
vulnerability, and thereby posing new policy challenges such as interoperability and 
reliability’ (Stevens and Schieb, 2007:20). Thus, convergence involves a close interaction 
between network industries and financial capital, as well as the inter-dependence of 
different network technologies – the best example is the increasing dependence on 




It is worth noting how the abovementioned narrative of privatisation and liberalisation 
has become more nouanced in recent years, due to the relevance played by China. The 
irruption of the globally dominant Chinese state-led finance of infrastructure challenges 
the idea of a lack of agency by governments. Furthermore, via the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, China has integrated its own agenda with the one of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (Wilson, 2019). Parties that were totally separated during the Cold War are 
able now to compromise and share a global perspective on infrasturcutre. In addition, the 
liberal narrative on infrastructure development, specially strong in the 
telecommunications sector, also becomes more nuanced when authoritarian rule seems to 
be a strong factor behind adoption of new technologies that are associated to new visions 
such as the Internet of Things (Kshetri, 2017). 
 
It is in the context of this complexity where new pressures related to the Climate Crisis 
and social inequalities emerge. On the one hand, network industries are critical for the 
use of resources that must be taken in account in order to confront new environmental 
catastrophes and thermodynamic challenges. For instance, the notion of ‘Urban 
Metabolism’ (Golubiewski, 2012) has been used to conceptualise resource use in urban 
environments. Coming from this perspective, Newman (1999) explains that: 
‘Like all ecosystems, the city is a system, having inputs of energy and materials, 
the main environmental problems (and economic costs) are related to the growth 
of these inputs and managing the increased outputs. By looking at the city as a 
whole and by analyzing the pathways along which energy and materials including 
pollutants move, it is possible to begin to conceive of management systems and 
technologies which allow for the reintegration of natural processes, increasing the 
efficiency of resource use, the recycling of wastes as valuable materials and the 
conservation of (and even production of) energy’ (Newman, 1999:220). 
 
As it is evident, energy, transport, telecommunication, water and waste management 
networks – the network industry sectors – are critical for the possibilities of controlling 
the resource use of an increasingly urban world. In summary, convergence is not only a 
given by privatisation and financialisation, but also a key for Climate Action. 
 
On the other hand, the economy becomes more and more dependent on network 
infrastructure, as the world population continues its urbanisation, metropolitan areas grow 
larger and more populated, and urban service sectors base their business-models on 
telecommunications, energy and transport. Issues of connectedness and disconnectedness 
gain social and political relevance. In transport, ‘forced car ownership’ (Mattioli, 2017), 
‘transport disadvantage’ (Walks, 2018) and ‘immobility’ (Esson et al, 2016) emerge as 
ideas that reflect pressing concerns about equity in the sector. In telecommunications, 
literature and policies use the concept of ‘digital divide’ (Van Deursen and van Dijk, 
2019). The notion of ‘energy poverty’ is now in the centre of debates around electricity, 
gas and heating networks, both in developed and developing countries (Sovacool, 2012; 
Dubois and Meier, 2016). Contestation of privatisation of water utilities has led to new 
‘water wars’ all around the world (McDonald and Swyngedouw, 2019). In waste 
management, a social divide grows between informal scavenging activities and formal 
up-to-date recycling programs that seem to target the rich (Gregson and Crang, 2015; 
Millington and Lawhon, 2018). 
 
Calls for Climate Action require shifting how network industries are conceived, 
produced, governed, operated and updated. However, innovation to confront the Climate 
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Crisis will necessarily face the challenge of social and political pressures regarding equity 
and social justice within network industry sectors. These pressures add novel elements 
that should be considered to understand NTA. If the innovation literature long ago 
considered ability to pay as a driver of technology adoption, and therefore income 
distribution was sometimes discussed, there are new reasons to increase attention to 
inequality even further. Doing so when researching NTA, allows us to combine 
distributional and social-justice concerns, with the need for making network industries 
adapt and evolve.  
 
1.2.2 Technology adoption within network industries 
 
The history of network industries is intrinsically linked to the ‘natural monopoly’ as an 
economic concept. The origin of this link is the Industrial Revolution. Mosca (2008) 
explains that it is a ‘typical case of economic thought shaped by reality’, since ‘the public 
utilities and networks determined the theory’ (Mosca, 2008:346), especially during the 
19th century. In this context, John Stuart Mill provided a first modern definition of what 
natural monopolies are: ‘those which are created by circumstances, and not by law’ (Mill, 
1848:II.15.9 cited in Mosca, 2008:323). Since this beginning, network industries such as 
supply of gas and water were considered natural monopolies. Following Mill in the 
United Kingdom, Léon Walras stated in France that transport networks such as canals, 
railways and roads ‘make up a natural monopoly’ (Walras, [1875] 1936:232 cited in 
Mosca, 2008:324). 
 
Taking in consideration the evolution of the concept of natural monopoly, Mosca (2008) 
defines it as ‘a market structure in which there are barriers to entry created by a 
technology characterized by economies of scale (i.e. declining average costs) over the 
whole range of market demand. Such scale economies, due to the presence of high fixed 
start-up costs and low or zero variable costs, are considered to be the source of a market 
failure that requires government intervention’ (Mosca, 2008:321). From a more 
mainstream perspective, Joskow (2007) states that ‘the historical evolution of the natural 
monopoly doctrine reflects both a normative interest in identifying situations in which a 
single firm is necessary to achieve all economies of scale (…) as well as a positive interest 
in identifying the attributes of costs and demand that lead to market conditions that are 
“unsuitable for competition” to prevail and the associated normative performance 
implications for prices, costs and other attributes of social welfare’ (Joskow 2007:1239).  
 
In terms of the technological core of network industries, after an initial period of 
breakthrough innovation in the 19th century, during most of the 20th century, network 
industry sectors – with the exception of telecommunications after the 1990s –, were seen 
as virtually ‘technologically mature’ (Lo Schiavo et al, 2013), or at least saw a slow peace 
of innovation within their core business model. Furthermore, in her review of the history 
of the natural monopoly as an economic concept, Mosca claims that after 1890 ‘all of the 
concrete situations in which natural monopolies occur have already been pointed out, and 
nothing original was added in this respect by later economists’ (Mosca, 2008:327). New 
divergent positions emerged after the 1970s, associated to the debate between public or 
private ownership of public utilities (Chang and Singh, 1993). Most debates had to do 
with economies of scale, large sunk costs, and dominant policy views assuming that, even 
when pure competition was not possible, market forces were the best drivers of general 
welfare, and therefore they had to be introduced to the administration of natural 
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monopolies. The terms of the discussion were, however, re-editions of the original 
arguments by classical economists from more than one century ago (Mosca, 2008).  
 
One of the limitations of mainstream economic approaches to natural monopolies is that 
they tend to focus exclusively on government failure and justification for private 
participation (Chang and Singh, 1993) and on ways of attracting private capital to avoid 
enlarging government debt (Cerra et al, 2016). This has led to an almost exclusive focus 
on static efficiency during expansion and operation of networks that are based on 
relatively stable technologies. In contrast, there is a lack of well-developed theories to 
account for a more dynamic, open-ended and innovative view on infrastructure. Joskow 
(2007) mentions a pressing need for incorporating dynamic efficiencies into the economic 
theory about network industries: ‘It is clear that the social costs of delaying product and 
process innovations can be very significant. Both theoretical and empirical research has 
probably focused too much on static welfare effects associated with the impacts of 
regulation on prices and costs in the short run and too little research has focused on the 
effects of regulation on the adoption and diffusion of product and process innovations’ 
(Joskow, 2007:1329).  
 
The dominant notion of innovation and technology adoption in economics comes from 
the work by Joseph Schumpeter (2011[1934], 2013[1942]) and his idea of ‘creative 
destruction’ as the engine of capitalist development. This idea assumes that innovation 
occurs due to incentives to create a temporal monopoly through innovative practice 
(Fagerberg et al, 2005; Hatipoglu, 2012). For entrepreneurs, the reason to innovate is the 
profitability of the monopoly resulting from innovations: this profitability holds while 
one firm is the only one able to provide the novelty. These moments of innovation and 
temporal monopolies are the basis for the innovative impulse among entrepreneurs, and 
a fundamental factor determining profits in competitive markets. Based on this demand-
driven innovation process, the Bass model (see Figure 1) aggregates individual adoption 
in forms of diffusion curves (Cowan and Daim, 2011). This model and its adoption curves 
are the origin of popular notions of consumer segmentation between innovators, early 
adopters, early majorities, late majorities and laggards (Lee et al, 2013). 
 
 




The limitation for applying this analytical framework to innovation within network 
industries is that competition in the market is usually not how most network industry 
sectors work.  If a monopoly is already granted, as it is the case of natural monopolies, 
this basic Schumpeterian demand-based innovative impulse for producing a temporal 
monopoly can not be the explanation for innovation. 
 
It could be claimed that the exception to the absence of competition in the market among 
network industry sectors is telecommunications after the 1990s, particularly during 
adoption waves of mobile telephony and internet. According to the World Bank, the ‘first-
generation Information and Communication Technology (ICT) policies’ involved 
‘market competition, private participation, and light-touch regulation’ (The World Bank 
2016:25). This has led research on the sector to treat ICT adoption as a demand-driven 
phenomena (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2011; Gulati and Yates, 2012; Van Deursen and 
van Dijk, 2019). By assuming a universal presence of private global actors, market 
competition, and liberalised exchange between supply and demand, the paradox of the 
absence of the Schumpeterian innovative impulse is disregarded, and the focus keeps 
being put on the demand.  
 
However, even the World Bank itself has questioned the current effectiveness of ‘first-
generation’ (ICT) policies. In a recent World Development Report, it is said that these 
policies ‘led to near-universal access and affordability of mobile telephony, but have so 
far been less successful in spreading internet services. Much of the explanation lies in 
continued policy failures such as regulatory capture, troubled privatizations, inefficient 
spectrum management, excessive taxation of the sector, and monopoly control of 
international gateways’ (The World Bank, 2016:25). In other words, the natural 
monopoly condition of the telecommunications sector is back on the table. The supply-
side complexity of the incentive for technology adoption in network industries is thus 
applicable to all the sectors, including telecommunications.  
 
But, what does Network Technology Adoption (NTA) mean? As already mentioned, by 
this I refer to technology adoption within network industry sectors. However, the concept 
requires further specification to help approaching an empirical analysis. In economic 
terms, by adoption in network industries I refer to the consumption, at a household or 
individual level, of a distinct network service that is based on the introduction of a specific 
technology. While this definition allows to compare technology diffusion within network 
industries with the broad debate about adoption and diffusion (see for instance Fagerberg 
et al, 2005; Cowan and Daim, 2011; Lee et al, 2013), sector-based literature on access, 
adoption and appropriation has provided more complex models to understand this 
consumption phenomenon.  
 
The literature on the ‘digital divide’, for instance, distinguishes ‘three levels’ in a 
multifaceted model of Internet appropriation and access (Helsper & Reisdorf, 2017; Van 
Deursen and van Dijk, 2019), which include material access, personal capacities and 
outcomes of technology use. Moreover, an analogous notion is present in mobility 
studies. Three main layers have to be observed in order to understand the capacity of 
movement (Ohnmacht et al, 2009). The first one is access, which refers to what mobilities 
are possible according to place, time and other contextual constraints. Networks and 
territorial dynamics are, of course, central for access, which is constrained by options and 
conditions. Options are the means available, while conditions refer to accessibility due to 
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costs, logistics or other constraints. The second layer is competence, which includes skills 
and abilities that can be physical abilities, skills related to rules and regulations, and 
organisational skills. Finally, the third layer is appropriation, which is related to how 
individuals, groups, networks or institutions interpret and act on the basis of perceived or 
real access and skills. 
 
All these levels are interlinked in any technology adoption process by users. Furthermore, 
although NTA is a phenomenon that can be observed by data on the demand side, such 
as modal share, or intensity of use, it is always shaped by options and conditions in the 
supply side, such as stock of infrastructure, regulations, and prices. Adoption, regardless 
of the point of observation in the service production and consumption chain, is necessarily 
a two-sided phenomenon. However, the Schumpeterian approach to innovation, as well 
as the more classical approach to the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, are based on set views 
of what the supply side is. Put it simple, at the basis of this approach is an assumed view 
of what the nature, incentives and impulses of entrepreneurs are. These entrepreneurs are 
expected to generate economic development by aggregation through market interactions. 
More than excluding supply, demand-based approaches assume a properly functioning 
market for production, populated by these kind of entrepreneurs. In contrast, within 
network industries, those supply-side variables strongly depend on non-market 
interactions. Complex supply chains, as well as personal equipment required for using 
networks, might actually involve a role of competitive markets in NTA. However, the 
natural monopoly will still define, to different degrees, the functioning of any network 
industry sector, and therefore supply-side phenomena will significantly determine how 
NTA takes place.  
 
1.2.3 Network technology adoption and income inequality  
 
Thus, why does income inequality matter for NTA? From what is discussed in the two 
previous subsections, income inequality can be expected to influence NTA because of 
two types of phenomenon: demand-side and supply-side.  
 
On the demand side, income inequality can be associated to a number of factors that could 
condition adoption, such as ability and willingness to pay, aggregate demand for 
innovative products, user preferences, and definitions of the value of time. 
 
Firstly, as mentioned above, even if they involve natural monopolies over infrastructure, 
network industry sectors might involve the use of personal equipment that is purchased 
in related markets. NTA might strongly depend on equipment in hands of the end-user. 
Examples are private vehicles and fuel in transport, smartphones and computers in the 
telecommunication sector, household storage of recyclable materials in waste 
management, number of bathrooms or existence of gardens and pools in the case of water, 
and electric appliances in the case of energy. All these factors might depend on ability to 
pay and could strongly affect NTA.  
 
Secondly, especially given that income, education and social status are strongly inter-
related, income might be a proxy of consumer preferences that can be related to status-
seeking, or that are popular among people above a certain level of educational attainment.  
 
Thirdly, income distribution might affect perception of the opportunity cost of time. 
Perception of the value of time can affect NTA because adoption of some technologies 
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can be time-consuming in terms of learning how to use it – such as technology –, during 
use itself – such as waste separation –, or to restrain usage time – such as saving water or 
energy consumption. Furthermore, all these end-user equipment, consumer preferences 
and time-valuing do not only affect NTA in terms of use of a given technology, but also 
in terms of how they condition rival alternatives. For instance, purchase of private 
vehicles might not change how a trip on a train is experienced, but will certainly alter the 
rival alternative to that trip. 
 
Yet, income inequality might also have to do with supply-side phenomena affecting NTA. 
The demand-driven approach considers market interactions, by which income 
distribution is a variable that aggregates or isolates potential users, whatever the cause is. 
However, the demand-driven approach does not consider that income distribution in a 
society might not only shape consumer behaviour, but also be closely related to how 
governmental decisions are taken, and how institutions that define options and conditions 
are shaped. There are at least three examples of literature attempting to bridge income 
distribution and institutions: welfare state regimes, theories about the median voter, and 
emergent literature on income concentration. 
 
Firstly, in the Global North context, the Welfare State regimes approach (Esping-
Anderson 1990), integrates income distribution, institutions and public policies within a 
country. Social-democratic countries are supposedly more egalitarian, while liberal ones 
are less egalitarian, and conservative regimes are somewhere in the middle. For instance, 
Schaffrin & Reibling (2015) use these welfare state regimes to model differences in how 
poorer and richer households adopt energy technologies. They use Denmark, Austria and 
the UK as examples of the social-democratic, conservative and liberal regimes, 
respectively. Differences between regimes are expected to have impacts on how natural 
monopolies work, especially when they are related to provision of basic services. 
 
Secondly, institutional impacts of income inequality that are produced by the share of 
‘those in the middle’ are usually associated to the ‘median voter’ in democracies (Alesina 
et al, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Neckerman and Torche, 2007). The basic 
idea is that the presence of a large middle segment implies that politicians have the 
incentive to respond to the demands of the ‘median’ citizen, and therefore to provide 
better public goods. In this sense, public goods and universal services will more likely be 
produced and maintained when there is a larger group of voters in the middle of the 
distribution, with shared levels of income and thus also common interests. The opposite 
effect is expected to happen if there are more ‘distanced’ groups whose benefits are 
somehow in conflict. In such case, politicians will have the incentive to choose to favour 
one of the groups over the other.  
 
Finally, new literature has emerged in recent years regarding how income concentration 
affects the way in which institutions, democratic accountability, and long-term 
investment decisions operate (Milanovic, 2010; Piketty, 2014; Palma, 2011, 2014; 
Stiglitz, 2012). Palma (2014, 2011), for instance, claims that differences in long-term 
economic performance between countries are related to what the rich do with their share. 
Conversely, other authors such as Stiglitz (2012) and Milanovic (2010) claim that income 
concentration along with financialisation of the economy will most likely distort major 
investment decisions, leading to market failure. These distortions will affect regulations, 
ownership of natural monopolies, large-scale investment, and the institutional 




1.3 Material and Methods 
 
1.3.1 Selection of sectors 
 
With the aim of systematically exploring what the existent literature can say about the 
link between income inequality and network industries, three sectors were selected. These 
sectors are telecommunications, waste management and passenger transport. The specific 
network technologies that are explored are household broadband internet, municipal 
separate waste collection for recycling, and rail passenger transport, respectively. The 
criterion was to include technologies that are associated to Climate Action, that involve 
convergence between sectors – meaning growing functional inter-dependence –, and that 
are organised through a variety of institutional arrangements that involve diverse modes 
of monopoly and competition. 
 
Recycling and rail passenger transport are part of existent Climate Action plans. For 
instance, Climate Neutral Europe 2050 (European Commission, 2018) aims to increase 
capacity of rail networks in order to provide an alternative to the use of private motorised 
vehicles. The same plan proposes to reinforce material recovery of waste in the form of 
recycling, in order to contribute to the circular economy. At a global level, the SDGs point 
to similar measures (United Nations, 2019). For instance, target 11.2 points to ‘By 2030, 
provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, 
improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to 
the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and 
older persons’. Conversely, target 12.4 defines ‘By 2030, substantially reduce waste 
generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse’. 
 
Although broadband internet is not directly linked to Climate Action, it is included in this 
study because ICTs are increasingly the basis for the functioning of other sectors that 
have a fundamental environmental impact. Ideas such as the ‘Smart Cities’ (Wiig, 2015) 
or the ‘Internet of Things’ (Atzori et al, 2010) rely heavily on having ‘connected homes’, 
and convergence between different network industry sectors. Conversely, target 9.C of 
the SDGs points to ‘significantly increase access to information and communications 
technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least 
developed countries by 2020’.  
 
Moreover, while ICTs are increasingly crucial for other sectors, municipal recycling and 
rail passenger transport also involve convergences with other network industry sectors. 
For instance, municipal recycling requires to be logistically integrated to transport 
systems, both in terms of collection routes and some times using street space for storage. 
Similarly, rail passenger transport requires integration with the electric grid in order to 
operate.  
 
Finally, these three sectors and technologies represent a variety of institutional 
arrangements. As already mentioned, the telecommunications sector operates as a 
globalized and liberalized market. Rail passenger transport is usually in hands of 
operators that cover an entire country or region, with much higher sunk costs and entry 
barriers than the telecommunications sector. Recycling is usually in hands of municipal 
governments, some times involving local public enterprises, or some times contracting 
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out to national or global operators. Furthermore, all these sectors have different revenue 
models that might influence the way household income and adoption interact: while 
recycling tends to be funded by local taxes or central government grants, rail passenger 
transport tends to involve a mix of state subsidies and ticket charging, and internet is 
increasingly pre-paid, with a rare presence of subsidies. All these are institutional 
variations within natural monopolies: comprehending how they work is valuable for the 
study of the link between NTA and income.  
 
1.3.2 Methodology and data 
 
This paper provides a systematic map of peer-reviewed literature on the link between 
income inequality and NTA in the above specified sectors. In their categorisation of 
fourteen different types of literature reviews, Grant and Booth (2009) explain that a 
systematic map, also called mapping review, maps out and ‘categorise existing literature 
from which to commission further reviews and/or primary research by identifying gaps 
in research literature’. The ‘completeness of searching’ is ‘determined by time/scope 
constraints’, there is no ‘formal quality assessment’ of the empirical evidence, synthesis 
‘may be graphical and tabular’, and the analysis ‘characterizes quantity and quality of 
literature, perhaps by study design and other key features’, and ‘may identify need for 
primary or secondary research’ (Grant and Booth, 2009:94). 
 
Accordingly, a parametric inquiry was generated using the Scopus search engine on the 
5th of September 2019. The search included all disciplines, publication years, and articles 
written in English or providing an English abstract, with open access or access via journal 
subscriptions. The terms introduced in the category ‘Article title, Abstract, Keywords’ 
were a combination of ‘“income inequality” OR “income distribution”’, on the one hand, 
plus ‘AND’ followed by “internet OR broadband”’, ‘recycling’ or ‘transport’, on the 
other. The broad term ‘transport’ was used in order to have enough papers to analyse, 
since more specific ones such as ‘rail’ or ‘public transport’ provided a small number of 
results. The search generated 83 results for internet, 51 for recycling and 170 for transport. 
All titles and abstracts of these 304 papers were reviewed, discarding those which 
matched the words but their focus did not have to do with the topic.  
 
The papers that were included in the final dataset were only those that associated income 
distribution or inequality with one of the sectors, regardless of the direction of the 
relationship. Many papers only referred just to income or to one of the sectors, and 
therefore were discarded. For instance, the term ‘revenue recycling’ produced the 
inclusion of a number of papers that analysed income distribution and taxation, but had 
nothing to do with waste management. In the transport sector, papers that did not 
mentioned land passenger services – for instance, literature on freight, ports or airports – 
were discarded. After these filters, 26 papers remained for internet, 16 for recycling, and 
60 for transport. From these 102 papers, 100 were available for download and therefore 
were the basis for the analysis. 
 
These 100 papers were read and categories were created from the qualitative analysis of 
the texts. These categories are grouped in ‘approach’, ‘scope’, ‘methodology’ and 
‘results’. In terms of approach, categories included whether the papers were purely 
theoretical or included empirical verification, whether income was observed in terms of 
‘income generation’ or ‘distribution of’ income, how they measured income, definition 
of the main dependent and independent variables, and the treatment they gave to issues 
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of endogeneity and reverse causality. In terms of scope, categories included the countries 
or regions that were considered, if they reviewed specific cases within regions of 
countries, the observed unit of analysis, sample sizes, and timeframes. In addition, 
institution and city of affiliation of the first author, provided by the Scopus metadata, 
were grouped by country. In terms of methodology, 12 types were established, and, in the 
case of those studies that involved empirical quantitative inferential statistic analyses, 
additional specification categories were the type of regression used, and covariates or 
controls added in models. Finally, in terms of results, for the 51 papers that account for 
significance and sign of the income-adoption relationship, a detailed analysis was 
provided (see Section 1.4.5). 
 
Results are presented in the next section in an integrated narrative that focuses on four 
different issues, preceded by a general overview. The issues are approach to income, 
approach to adoption, methodologies, and empirical evidence. Results are presented using 









A first look at the analysed literature provides a series of overall characteristics in terms 
of evolution over time, as well as geographical origin of authors and cases. On the one 
hand, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, the first papers were published in 1991: they start by 
only covering transport. The first income-inequality-related study about recycling was 
published in 1997, while the first one about internet appeared in 2003. Within the 
analysed papers, whereas transport is the most studied sector by 2019, internet follows 
and recycling is the least covered. An interesting change occurs in transport during 2009 
and 2010, when the volume of publications related to income distribution and inequality 
increases. One could interpret this as a sign of impacts of the 2008/2009 financial crisis 
on transport – something that is not shown in the other sectors. 
 
In terms of territorial coverage of data and cases, 98 papers can be classified (Figure 4). 
The biggest group covers world-wide samples, counting 24 papers – never covering all 
countries, as it is usual in any field due to data availability –, followed by Europe and 
Asia, with 17 and 16 respectively. Studies covering US or Canada are equal in number to 
those covering Latin America and the Caribbean, while Africa follows close and the least 
covered region is Oceania, with all cases coming from Australia – as opposed to 
Melanesia, Micronesia or Polynesia. To summarise, 44 out of 80 papers that do not cover 
world-wide samples look at Europe, Australia, the US and Canada. In terms of sectors, 
the overall distribution is more or less replicated when it comes to transport, with a higher 
importance of Europe over world-wide samples, less presence of South America and 
more of Africa. In recycling, it is Asia that leads, followed by Europe and Latin America. 
In the case of Internet, 12 out of 25 papers cover world-wide samples, from which there 
are no studies focusing exclusively on European sets of countries. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 6 shows a world map with country of affiliation of first authors. 
Scholarship on the link between the three studied sectors and income inequality has 
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almost exclusively been produced in the Global North. First authors from Latin America, 
Africa and Asia mostly come from a few specific cases, such as Brazil, South Africa, 
India, China, Japan, and Korea. In summary, both authors and cases tend to focus on the 
world’s biggest economies. Countries included in world-wide samples also tend to be 
limited to OECD members, probably due to data availability constraints. The literature, 




Figure 2. Papers per year and sector. 
 





















Figure 4. Papers by territorial coverage of cases and samples. 
1.4.2 Approach to income: generation versus distribution 
 
For 100 of the papers, I was able to classify their approach to income. As seen in Figure 
5, overall, 53 of them focus on income generation, 43 focus on income distribution, and 
4 discuss both. Regarding specific sectors, distribution is slightly prevalent in internet 
studies, while generation is marginally more frequent in transport. In the case of 
recycling, however, the literature is strongly skewed towards generation instead of 
distribution: whereas 13 cover the former, there are only 3 papers studying the latter. It is 
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Figure 6. World Maps of country of affiliation of the first author, by sector. 
 
Table 1. Measures used in papers that look at income-related independent variables. 
Income or income-related  variable Internet Recycling Transport Total 
     
Income generation     
     
Household income 1 4 14 19 
GNI or GDP per capita 0 1 3 4 
     
Income distribution     
     
Gini index or Lorenz ratio 8 2 4 14 
Income groups 6 0 4 10 
Gini index + income groups 1 0 1 2 
Gini + Atkinson + Palma 1 0 0 1 
Gini + Palma + income groups 0 0 1 1 
Wage vs profit rate 0 1 0 1 
Urban vs rural incomes 1 0 0 1 
     
Other     
     
Policies 0 2 0 2 
Racial diversity 0 0 1 1 
Experience of violence 0 1 0 1 
Occurrence of crisis 0 0 1 1 
     
Total 18 11 29 58 
 
The causal link between income and NTA is explored in both directions. From 94 papers 
that can be classified, 58 use an income-related variable as an independent variable, while 
36 of them use it as the dependent variable. As it can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, measures 
of household income and the Gini index are the two most used variables, along with 
different groupings of households or individuals according to their income level. In 
several cases, the use of the Gini index to observe income inequality is complemented by 
other income distribution measures. A more recently-created indicator, the Palma ratio 
(Palma, 2014), is only used in two papers that include income distribution as an 
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independent variable to explain adoption in the internet and transport sectors, respectively 
(Asongu et al, 2019). There are also some variables that are loosely linked to income, 
such as increased inequality due to the occurrence of an economic crisis (Bakhat et al, 
2017), racial diversity in the South African context (Geyer and Quin, 2019), or likelihood 
of experiencing violence (Richardson et al, 2015). 
 
Table 2. Measures used in papers that look at income-related dependent variables 
Income or income-related variable Internet Recycling Transport Total 
     
Income generation     
     
Household income 3 1 3 7 
GNI or GDP per capita 0 1 4 5 
Employment outcome 0 0 1 1 
Hourly earnings 1 0 0 1 
Per capita income 1 0 0 1 
     
Income distribution     
     
Gini index 2 1 4 7 
Income groups 0 0 4 4 
Gini index +Theil 1 0 1 2 
Atkinson 0 0 1 1 
Theil 0 0 1 1 
Urban vs rural 0 0 1 1 
     
Other     
     
Poverty rate 0 0 2 2 
Disadvantage 0 0 1 1 
Extended family basic needs 0 1 0 1 
     
Total 8 5 23 36 
 
 
1.4.3 Approach to adoption 
 
The definition of adoption varies across sectors, as summarised in Tables 3 and 4. First, 
the highest level of convergence in the variable used can be found among the papers on 
internet. In this sector, the most used variable, regardless of the direction of the link being 
observed, is some measure of users per thousand people or percentage of population with 
access to internet, followed by measures of internet use among individuals. When internet 
is studied as the dependent variable, there are also papers that discuss service prices 
(Weiss et al, 2015; Choudrie et al, 2015). The latter is the only supply-side variable 
observed within internet studies, while all the rest are demand-side. There are a series of 
other more specific variables used to observe links to income in the sector, such as 
measures of capacities for using internet, and type of contents accessed. 
 
Second, in the case of recycling, the variables used can be divided into two groups 
according to their focus on demand or supply. On the one hand, demand-sided dependent 
variables are recycling rates, waste generation, and a diverse pool of measures of 
elasticity or willingness to adopt recycling. On the other hand, supply-oriented dependent 
variables are formalisation policies (Sharma et al, 1997), interventions by NGOs among 
communities that work on recycling (Andrianisa et al, 2018), or inclusion of a specific 






Table 3. Variables used in papers looking at adoption as dependent variable. 
Internet 18 
Users per m people or % with access 7 
Use of internet by person 4 
Mobile broadband price 2 
Users per m people or % with access, quality of service 1 
Composite scale of online reading activities 1 
Inclusiveness by education levels 1 
Internet searches 1 
Various 1 
Recycling 11 
Recycling rate  3 
Waste generation 2 
Willingness to participate 1 
Willingness to accept compensation 1 
Participation in productive activity 1 
Elasticity of recycling rate 1 
Price of recyclable waste 1 
Various 1 
Transport 30 
Share of trips 5 
Household expenditure 4 
Passenger kilometers or trips 3 
Elasticity of travel demand 2 
Vehicle stock 2 
Elasticity of fuel demand 2 
Per capita fuel demand 2 
Emission test failures 1 
Transport planning 1 
Transport fuel use 1 
Stock of public services 1 
Fuel prices 1 
Participation in voluntary programme 1 
Perception about public transport 1 




Table 4. Variables used in papers looking at adoption as independent variable. 
Internet 7 
Users per m people or % with access 4 
Access by individuals, activity online 2 
Indexes of skills 1 
Recycling 3 
Ngo intervention 1 
Policies 1 
Participation in productive activity 1 
Transport 22 
Total or per capita units of physical infrastructure 7 
Investment 3 
Measure of accessibility 2 
Policies 2 
Tax rate 2 
Vehicle electrification 1 
Motorisation rate 1 
Commuting expenses 1 
Transport subsidies 1 
Road pricing 1 
Passenger kilometers or trips 1 
Total 32 
 
Finally, the heterogeneity of definitions of adoption is notably higher in the transport 
sector. When analysed as outcome, 28 out of 30 papers use variables that focus on the 
demand-side. The most frequently used ones are share of trips, household transport 
expenditure, passenger kilometres or trips, and elasticity of both travel and fuel demand. 
Only a few supply-side indicators can be found as dependent variables, such as transport 
planning and stock of public infrastructure. In contrast, when looking to transport-related 
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indicators to account for independent variables, measures tend to be much more supply-
oriented: the ones that are repeated among papers are total or per capita units of physical 
infrastructure, investment, measures of accessibility, policies, and tax rates. Other less 
used measures are transport subsidies and road pricing, in the supply-side, and vehicle 
electrification, motorisation rate, commuting expenses and passenger kilometres or trips 




As shown in Figure 7, approaches within the literature are strongly empirical rather than 
theoretical. Theoretical studies are only 2 out of 26 in the case of internet, and 1 out of 16 
in the case of recycling. There are more of these sort of studies in the transport sector, in 
which 10 out of 58 papers focus on theoretical modelling. Theoretical works looking at 
the link between internet and income-related variables take the form of literature-based 
discussions that use some descriptive statistics (James, 2008; Bauer, 2018). In the case of 
recycling, the one paper that provides a purely theoretical approach is based on a Sraffian 
model to try to predict prices of waste or ‘secondary materials’ as a function of variables 
that include a wage vs profit rate (Hosoda, 2012). The pool of theoretical works in the 
transport sector is heterogeneous, including diverse simulation models, narrative 
literature discussions, and commentaries. 
 
 
Figure 7. Empirical versus theoretical approaches by sector. 
More specifically, types of methodologies can be clearly identified in 92 of the papers. 
Table 5 groups the classified papers among 12 types. As it can be seen in the table, 83 
papers use quantitative methods, while only 9 are qualitative in nature. Only one 
qualitative paper provides a review, van den Bergh (2008), covering empirical literature 
on sustainable consumption and environmental regulation of household behaviour. The 
most used quantitative statistical models are linear and binary outcome regression models 
without spatial autocorrelation. As shown in Figure 8, the unit of analysis varies, being 
countries, households and individuals the most analysed: these three categories cover 67 
out of 92 classifiable papers. The rest looks at sub-city areas, sub-national regions, types 
or groups within a country, and cities. The only paper that discusses different scales as 
units of analysis is the review by van den Bergh (2008).  
 
Finally, in terms of modelling strategies, as shown in Figure 9, only a few studies take in 
account issues of endogeneity. The most recurrent strategy is the use of instrumental 
variables: among papers that use them, 8 focus on the transport sector (Liddle, 2009; 
Anbarci et al, 2009; Hu, 2017; Reis, 2014; Santos et al, 2017; Bakhat et al, 2017; Mishra 


















internet (Chang and Just, 2009; Celbis and de Crombrugghe, 2018; Alam et al, 2018; 
Asongu et al, 2019; Liu, 2017), and 2 on recycling (Kagawa, 2005; Hosoda, 2012). 
 
 
Table 5. Methodologies used. 





Descriptive statistics 22 
Linear regression models on cross-sectional samples or pooled data (without spacial autocorrelation) 27 
Binary outcome regression models 10 
Panel regression models (FE, RE) 5 
Regression models with spatial autocorrelation 3 
Multi-level regression models 1 
Count and hurdle models 1 
Computable General Equilibrium models 3 
Simulations 3 
Other models (Engel functions, discriminant analysis, contingent valuation method, input-output, factor 
analysis, hierarchical cluster analysis, inter-group matrices) 8 
  
Qualitative  
Qualitative, anecdotal or commentaries 8 
Review 1 
  





Figure 8. Unit of analysis. 
 






























































1.4.5 Empirical evidence 
 
The empirical literature can be divided according to the direction of the observed link, 
and by whether papers focus on income generation or on income distribution. When 
significance is analysed, as it happens in 51 papers, all results confirm significance, with 
the exception of three papers that point to significance as conditional to the use of certain 
control variables, or limited to a specific income group (Ciegis et al, 2017; Ma et al, 
2019). 
 
1.4.5.1 Income generation as a factor for adoption 
 
First, when income generation is studied as independent variable, results tend to 
negatively link income to adoption of collective passenger transport modes, or positively 
to private modes and fuel demand. Crôtte et al (2009) associate a raise in minimum wages 
to higher private vehicle stock elasticity and also higher elasticity of travel demand within 
the metro network in Mexico City: in other words, with some additional income, metro 
users are keen to shift from trains to private vehicles. Lee et al (2018) find that vulnerable 
groups such as poor mothers show a higher share of trips made by active transportation 
modes in the state of California: they walk more and use more public transportation. Dahl 
(2012) finds that higher gross national income is linked to lower elasticity of gasoline 
demand, therefore richer countries will react less dramatically to increases of fuel prices 
for private transportation. Hájek and Siwek (2009) collect data from a survey in Zlin, 
Czech Republic, and find that the higher the income level, the lower perception of public 
transport as an alternative for commuting. Zhu et al (2018) find that the higher the 
household income, the lower the likelihood of using the metro for trips in Beijing.  Diaz 
Olvera et al (2015) analyse Douala, Cameroon, and observe mobility inequalities 
measured as trips made per person according to income: access to motorised vehicles in 
the context of poor public transport is part of the explanation for higher mobility among 
high earners.  
 
An interesting nuance in the ‘linear’ narrative regarding the link between income 
generation and public transportation has to do with forced car ownership. Mattioli et al, 
(2018) expect household income level to be positively linked to household transport 
expenditure and less vulnerability to fuel price rises in the United Kingdom. However, 
they also find that the poorest households spend disproportionate amounts on motoring, 
and that they are not able to reduce fuel expenditure when prices increase. Something 
similar can be found in the work by Zhao and Bai (2019:1), who find that ‘less proximity 
to basic public services results in a forced car ownership for rural households’ in China.  
 
In the case of recycling, when it is analysed as dependent variable, income generation is 
seen as positively linked to separate collection rates or material recovery, with the 
additional presence of the ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ hypothesis, which predicts an 
inverted U curve for environmental harmfulness as income grows (Mazzanti, 2008). Otto 
et al (2016) use a survey collected in Chile to state that personal willingness to participate 
in recycling programmes increases with household income. In his Sraffian model, Hosoda 
(2012) finds that higher wages to profit rates generate higher prices of secondary 
materials, and therefore promote recycling, depending of technological choices.  
 
Although the abovementioned are demand-side links, there are also mentions to supply-
side ones. An indirect one comes from Mazzanti (2008), who explains that gross national 
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income per capita was positively linked to waste generation per capita in Europe between 
1997 and 2001, due to lack of policy targets for waste prevention at source and 
recovery/recycling goals. This author attributes the lack of decoupling between income 
and waste generation to this absence of policies. Therefore, following an ‘inverted U’ 
hypothesis, he argues that, after a tipping point, if adequate policies are in place, waste 
generation should decrease and recycling to grow as income rises. Finally, a more direct 
supply-side link has to do with the likelihood of poor people to participate in informal 
recycling activities. Richardson et al (2015) study vulnerability to violence among people 
who use illicit drugs in Vancouver, and they find that they are more likely to participate 
in informal recycling and to be exposed to violence while doing so. Steuer et al (2018) 
analyse the case study of Beijing and state that adequate inclusive policies and 
institutional changes can both generate more income among informal recyclers and 
increase recycling rates in the city.  
 
In the internet sector, all the analysed empirical literature points towards a positive link 
between income generation and adoption. This literature is entirely demand-based, 
without mentions to supply-side factors. Martin and Robinson (2007), for instance, find 
higher likelihood of internet use among individuals from higher income level households, 
while Hilbert (2010) finds similar results for household internet access in five Latin 
American countries.  Gibson (2003) finds similar results at local area levels in New South 
Wales, Australia. Katz et al (2017) study parents and children in the United States and, 
again, conclude a positive link between household income generation and both access 
and quality of internet connection and use. Alam et al (2018) focus on mobile phone 
adoption, and find a strong positive link between household income and adoption in 
Bangladesh. Finally, Yang et al (2013) study internet use gaps among children from rural 
and urban schools in China, and they attribute existent gaps to differences in income 
generation among households.  
 
1.4.5.2 The effect of technology adoption on income generation 
 
The literature that explores the other direction in the relationship, that is to say, how does 
adoption affect income generation, is much more scarce. Whereas in the case of recycling 
there are no empirical papers analysing this link, in the case of internet there are two 
papers, both of which point to a significant and positive relationship. On the one hand, 
Kim (2003) studied the impact of unequal access to the internet on hourly earnings among 
workers in the United States, and found a positive link between internet access and 
information-seeking activity and utility maximisation. On the other hand, Celbis and de 
Crombrugghe (2018) studied regions in Turkey, and found that the number of ADSL lines 
per inhabitant is positively correlated to per capita income. 
 
In the case of transport, the analysed literature is more abundant. When NTA is looked 
as independent variable, the common narrative is that supply-side measures such as 
infrastructure provision are linked to higher income. Caruana-Galizia and Martí-
Henneberg (2013), and Caruana-Galizia (2013) analyse railway networks during the end 
of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th in Europe and India, respectively, and 
find that network density is positively linked to regional gross domestic product per 
capita. Barton and Gibbons (2017) analyse concentration of bus and subway stations in 
census areas of New York city and find that concentration of stops is linked to higher 
median household income in a cross-sectional sample, and railway stations show a similar 
link in longitudinal analyses. Mayeres et al (2005) argue that a supply-side policy of 
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marginal social cost pricing of transport instead of average cost pricing in the transport 
sector, can generate higher shares of public transport, shifts of trips from peak to non-
peak periods, to benefit the poor, and to increase overall social welfare. These authors 
state that the significance and size of the effect of adoption of different transport modes 
on household income can vary according to pricing, charging and taxing policies.  
 
1.4.5.3 Income distribution as a factor for adoption 
 
The empirical literature also analyses income inequality as a factor influencing adoption. 
However, studies are not equally abundant across sectors. While there are 9 studies 
covering internet and 6 covering transport, only one covers recycling. This lone paper in 
the waste management sector was written by Vieira and Matheus (2018) and analyses 
borough level data in Sao Paulo, finding that income inequality is positively linked to 
municipal solid waste generation per capita. The authors consider that higher income 
difference within a municipality means that, in order to have successful recycling policies 
that could reduce waste generation, a more diverse pool of policies must be put in place, 
according to the heterogeneity of sectors and income levels. They therefore expect less 
recycling in more unequal boroughs.  
 
In the transport sector, the view is split between those studies that see income inequality 
as positively or negatively affecting adoption of public transport. In this case, however, 
the relationship is less directly studied, in the sense that most dependent variables have 
to do with private motorisation. All of these empirical studies observe demand-based 
variables of adoption in the transport sector. For instance, Haque (1991, 1992) published 
two papers analysing household transport expenditure in Australia, stating that higher 
income inequality generates lower overall expenditure due to less aggregate ability to pay 
for private vehicles. In this sense, higher inequality should also lead to more people forced 
to use public transport. In an analysis of subplaces within Cape Town, South Africa, 
Geyer and Quin (2019) find that higher racial diversity, which is correlated to higher 
income inequality, is positively linked to a higher share of trips made on public 
transportation. 
 
The rest of the literature points to the opposite direction. Lenzen and Schaeffer (2004), 
for instance, analyse income distribution in Brazil and state that higher inequality leads 
to higher overall fuel consumption, which leads to expect income inequality to be 
associated to lower public transport ridership. Purwanto (2016) claims that income 
inequality leads to mobility inequality, in terms of trips and speed by users. This includes 
less mobility by users of public transportation. This author claims that ‘policies such as 
subsidizing public transport tickets with regard to the different income or socio-
professional groups should lead to reducing mobility inequality directly and also that of 
spatial segregation, such as the socio-spatial exclusion phenomenon, indirectly’ 
(Purwanto, 2016:119). Thus, measures reducing income inequality should lead to higher 
use of public transport.  
 
Works on the impacts of income inequality on internet adoption point to a negative effect. 
Tigre (2003) claimed that higher income inequality was correlated to lower penetration 
of internet among households in Brazil. On a study on Zimbabwe, Albania, Namibia and 
Venezuela, Udo et al (2006) claimed that income inequality was an obstacle to adoption 
of ICTs. Similar results were found by Fuchs (2009), Močnik and Širec (2010), and Gulati 
and Yates (2012), all using cross-sectional models to look at differences between world 
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samples of countries and density of internet connections. Using a different indicator, 
Weiss et al (2015) and Choudrie et al (2015) both claim that higher inequality is positively 
linked to higher mobile broadband prices across countries, which means less affordability 
for users. Asongu et al (2019) establish inequality thresholds at which information and 
telecommunication technologies promote inclusive education: beyond that threshold, 
fixed broadband subscriptions will no longer positively affect inclusive education.  
 
1.4.5.4 Adoption as a factor for income distribution 
 
Finally, the literature that explores possible effects of adoption on income distribution is 
the scarcest group within the analysed dataset. Again, there is only one paper on 
recycling. In this case, Sharma et al (1997) use the case of Mumbai to run a simulation 
showing that formalising informal recycling, taking the productive activity out from 
informal workers, generates higher income inequality. In the case of internet, there are 
two papers, that point to opposite links between adoption and income inequality. On the 
one hand, Santos et al (2017) use a panel of country level data to state that adoption of 
ICT has a positive effect on income inequality. On the other hand, Liu (2017) uses cross-
sectional data to state that internet diffusion reduces income inequality. 
 
Transport, however, offers a bigger group of studies. Most of them analyse supply-side 
variables. The only demand-side analysis is Santos et al (2017), which finds that 
passenger kilometres travelled at country level are associated to higher income inequality. 
The rest are supply-side oriented. For instance, Reaños and Sommerfeld (2018) analyses 
data on households from Germany and finds that, depending on the type of tax applied 
on fuel, the effects can be diverse on the income distribution. Furthermore, three papers 
focus on stock of infrastructure, finding negative effects on income inequality. Li and 
DaCosta (2013) analyse urban and rural areas in China, and find that the length of 
transportation routes by railways in operation reduces inequality. D'Onofrio and Giordani 
(2019) analyses provinces in Italy and find that transport infrastructure endowments have 
a negative impact on income inequality. Mishra and Agarwal (2019) analyse Asian 
countries and find that transport infrastructure reduces rural-urban income disparity.  
 
1.5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
1.5.1 From income to network inequalities: a causal link with diverse signs 
 
On the basis of the results from the systematic map of the peer-reviewed literature, 
especially from the empirical evidence, it is possible to set a series of theoretical links in 
order to guide hypotheses for further empirical research. When applied to recycling, 
broadband and rail passenger transport, 9 different links can be hypothesised according 
to the sector, the direction of the link, and whether the income variable is related to 
generation or distribution. These theoretical links are summarised in Figure 10. 
 
Yet, what can be said about the initial questions mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter? does income inequality produce network inequalities? Is inequality an obstacle 
for sustainable change within network industries? To what extent does income generation 
determine adoption of sustainable network technologies by households? Although 
thoroughly answering these questions would still require further research, we are now 





The existent literature indeed provides a basis to expect both income generation and 
income inequality to affect NTA. Evidence varies across the studied sectors and 
technologies. In the case of broadband internet, for instance, the literature points to a 
common conclusion: while income generation is expected to produce higher adoption 
among households, income inequality is expected to negatively affect aggregate adoption. 
In the case of recycling, in contrast, evidence is mixed, and research concentrates on 
income generation instead of inequality. Finally, although the transport sector provides 
abundant literature that confirms the significance of these links to adoption, the sign of 
the relationship varies.  
 
In terms of theory, the approach to empirical analyses is dominated by the mainstream 
Schumpeterian demand-based view on innovation and technology adoption. However, 
whereas there are no mentions to supply-side factors in the broadband adoption literature, 
a different story can be found in the waste management and transport industries. Part of 
the literature on transport, for instance, acknowledges the fact that political and 
institutional factors fundamentally shape adoption decisions in the supply-side. These 
factors have to do with infrastructure provision, pricing and taxation. The waste 
management sector, however, introduces a different sort of supply-side discussion. 
Although adoption of recycling requires government policies in a similar way than 
transport, the waste management sector is clearly influenced by a strong existence of 
informal activities in the supply-side. Although informal recyclers are not completely 
absent from the Global North, informality is most central for studying recycling in the 
Global South.  
 
Thus, on the basis of the existing peer-reviewed literature, it is possible to expect a causal 
link between income distribution and NTA. The causal mechanism is related to the role 
of ability to pay in the adoption of broadband internet, recycling and public transport. 
However, how this mechanism operates is mediated by supply-side factors. According to 
the review, while income and adoption tend to be linearly and positively linked in 
liberalised environments such as the telecommunications sector, supply-side settings can 
make the sign vary when institutional factors become more relevant, as in the waste 






Figure 10. Summary of theoretical income-adoption links based on the empirical literature. 
Moreover, something less explored is the reverse causality in the link between adoption 
and both income generation and income inequality. Whereas there is no evidence of an 
association between income and adoption of recycling by end-users in the waste 
management sector – some links are debated in terms of poor households working on 
income-generating informal recycling activities –, this link is documented in the cases of 
public transport – particularly rail passenger transport – and internet. This evidence has 
to be considered when looking at causality and endogeneity in the income-adoption link.  
1.5.2 Gaps  
 
Finally, some elements from the review can help to guide research in terms of gaps, 
possible biases and paradoxes. For instance, as discussed in Section 1.4.1, authors and 
cases are strongly concentrated in the Global North or, when looking at the Global South, 
to correspond to major economies such as China, India and Brazil. Consequently, it would 
be desirable to explore other cases from the South. Beyond this geographical bias, it must 
be noticed that, with a few exceptions, these countries from the Global North present 
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lower levels of income inequality compared to the Global South. It is plausible to expect 
the income-adoption link to work differently in a context of high inequality than in the 
most-studied and relatively less income-unequal Northern cases. The selection of case 
studies from highly-unequal South American countries, such as Colombia and Chile (as 
detailed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7) somehow account for this gap. 
 
Another possible issue is publication bias. As mentioned in Section 1.4.5, all the 51 
empirical studies that are analysed find the income-adoption link to be significant, 
although three papers condition significance to the use of certain controls or to the 
analysis of specific samples. Although the risk of this bias is always present in the very 
basis of any research process, an interesting partial mitigation to this risk can come from 
exploring more than one sector. As shown in Chapter 2, I find results on significance of 
income inequality to be different depending on the sector, and also on the way income 
distribution is measured. 
 
Chapter 2 is also useful to tackle three additional gaps. One is the scarce treatment of 
endogeneity issues in quantitative inferential analyses. In the regression analysis of 
OECD countries, presented in Chapter 2, the use of instrumental variables allows to 
discuss interesting reverse causality issues depending on the sectors. On the other hand, 
it was not possible to find integrated or comparative analyses across network industry 
sectors in the reviewed empirical literature. Chapter 2 also provides some elements in 
regard to this gap, since it explores recycling, rail passenger transport and broadband 
internet using the same sample and model. A third gap is the sole use of the Gini 
coefficient in most empirical analyses. In this sense, Chapter 2 complements the Gini 
with the Palma ratio and attention to income shares of different groups. 
 
Finally, many questions arise about the role of institutions (North, 1990; Khan, 1995; 
Chang, 2002) in the economics of network industries in general, and in the income-
adoption link in particular. This review allowed, first, to acknowledge the dominant 
demand-based view of technology adoption in the three analysed sectors. However, it 
also detected some evidence of the mediator role of supply-side factors. This evidence 
comes mostly from the transport and waste management sectors, in the form of policies, 
taxation, prices and informality in service provision. Such list points clearly to institutions 
as supply-side elements that need to be incorporated in order to advance in the 
comprehension of the link between income distribution and network technology adoption.  
 
Questions that remain unanswered are: are there other key institutional factors beyond 
policies, taxation, prices and informality? Is the issue of informality limited to network 
technology adoption in the waste management sector? Is the telecommunications sector 
free of these institutional factors, due to the universal diffusion of liberalisation policies? 
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A growing body of literature considers the problem of income distribution as a factor that 
might slow down or limit adoption of new technologies by consumers. However, less 
attention has been paid to network technology adoption, especially of old environmental 
technologies within public utilities that are relevant for Climate Action. In sectors such 
as energy, transport and waste, mass adoption of technologies that have long ago been 
available can be the answer for Sustainable Development. In this chapter I analyse the 
extent to which income inequality can affect adoption of municipal recycling, railway 
passenger transport and broadband internet. Using available panel data from OECD 
countries between 1996 and 2013, results show that the adoption rate is higher in 
countries with more egalitarian income distributions. In the case of recycling, there are 
no previous studies available linking income distribution and separate collection rates. In 
the case of transport, the observed association contradicts what could be expected by 
using theories from the existing literature. The link is found to be exogenous for recycling 
and railway passenger transport, although results are less robust for broadband internet.  
The chapter also looks at the relevance that the income share by specific groups has for 
each sector, and includes a theoretical discussion on possible explanations that can come 
from both consumer behaviour and institutional political economy. 
 
  
                                                
1 At the moment of submitting this thesis, a modified version of this paper was under review after one 
round of major revisions in the Journal of Cleaner Production, co-authored by N. Valenzuela-Levi and M. 
Abreu, titled ‘More unequal, less green? Evidence on the link between income inequality and mature 
environmental technology adoption in the OECD's waste and transport sectors’. The contribution of each 
author was declared as follows. Nicolás Valenzuela-Levi: Conceptualization, Methodology, Data curation, 
Writing-Original draft preparation, Visualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition. Maria 









The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are an effort to set the basis for a common 
world development (United Nations, 2019). Adopted by all the members of the United 
Nations in 2015, it includes 17 goals in a diverse range of social, economic and 
environmental issues. Yet, such an effort does not occur in a vacuum. An increasingly 
complex social context is coloured by growing attention to socio-economic inequalities, 
especially after the 2009 financial crisis (Milanovic, 2011; Palma, 2011, 2014; Stiglitz, 
2012; Piketty, 2014; Pikett and Wilkinson, 2015). The question about transformative 
change and these fundamental societal problems has sparked growing debates about the 
role of innovation policies in socio-technical systems and sustainable transitions (Schot 
and Kanger, 2018; Schot and Steinmueller, 2018; Giuliani, 2018). 
 
Renewed emphasis on addressing income distribution rather than simply poverty 
alleviation has brought an old debate about social justice back to centre stage of 
development. However, when it comes to the SDGs, income inequality does not only 
matter in terms of social justice, but also in terms of capacity for change. A question to 
be added is whether existent inequalities might affect possibilities for sustainable 
development. For instance, a relevant part of the targets set in the SDGs depend on 
adopting environmental technologies (ETs) and information and communication 
technologies (ICTs). When it comes to technology adoption in general, a growing body 
of post-financial-crisis literature has considered income inequality as a significant 
determinant (Tselios, 2011; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2011; Hatipoglu, 2012; Bernardino 
and Araujo, 2013; Castaño et al, 2015). More specifically, studies that have focused on 
the case of ETs, have found evidence that income inequalities could negatively affect 
adoption processes (Magnani, 2000; Vona and Patriarca, 2011; Andrich et al, 2013). 
Conversely, evidence from ICT studies finds inequality to be a significant obstacle for 
technology diffusion (Tigre, 2003; Udo et al, 2006; Fuchs, 2009; Močnik and Širec, 2010; 
Gulati and Yates, 2012; Weiss et al, 2015; Choudrie et al, 2015; Asongu et al, 2019).  
 
Nonetheless, something that might be counterintuitive is that ET adoption is not only 
relevant in the context of new technologies, but also in respect to older ones. Take for 
example district heating, a technology prevalent in the early 1900s, and later revived in 
1970s during large-scale social housing developments in many high-income countries. 
Adoption of district heating has been recently identified as a potential blueprint for 
efficient energy distribution (Bolton and Hannon, 2016; Burlinson et al, 2018). Similarly, 
recent policy agendas, such as Climate Neutral Europe 2050 launched in late 2018 by the 
European Commission, place the adoption of mature technologies at the centre of their 
strategy. The European plan notes that a strong increase in capacity of – many times more 
than 150 years-old – rail networks will be required to reach carbon emission goals 
(European Commission, 2018). The plan also relies heavily on older technologies that 
can be integrated into a circular economy, for instance, reinforcing material recovery of 
waste in the form of recycling, which has now been part of the European policy agenda 
for at least 40 years (Gaballah and Kanari, 2001).  
 
Just like the example of Climate Neutral Europe 2050 illustrates, while societies accept 
the notion of human-made Climate Change, network infrastructures such as rail 
(Turnheim and Geels, 2019) and waste management (Bugge et al, 2019) become 
absolutely critical for any attempt to govern the much needed change. In other words, 
‘infrastructure has become perhaps the political question of the Anthropocene’ 
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(Wakefield, 2018:1). However, the cases of district heating, rail transport or recycling 
services in European countries show that although infrastructures might be long ago 
available, it is also crucial to understand how people adopt these particular mature ETs, 
replacing existing less sustainable rival alternatives.  
 
This study focuses on the transport and recycling industries within OECD countries, as 
key examples of these mature environmental technologies that are crucial to govern the 
Anthropocene. It applies the same econometric model to these different industries, along 
with household broadband internet from the telecommunications sector.  While 
broadband adoption corresponds to the most typical notion of ‘new technologies’ that 
replace ‘old’ ones, in the cases of both transport and recycling, adoption is related to a 
‘big shift’ (Draper, 2013). In transport, modal shift in passenger kilometres from private 
motorised vehicles to railways is seen as a way of achieving more efficient passenger 
transport thanks to economies of scale and the use of electric power instead of fossil fuels 
(European Commission, 2018). In waste management, in-origin separation of waste by 
households is the basis for a shift from tons of materials being disposed in landfills to 
recovering them via composting and recycling (Abbott et al., 2011).  
 
Interestingly, in the case of both transport and recycling, scholars have long ago 
considered income generation as a key factor at a micro-level (see Section 2.2.2). Yet, 
when it comes to aggregate levels of adoption, studies in transport and recycling tend to 
neglect the effect of income distribution within each country. While in the case of the 
former only a few studies consider inequality and they do it focusing on private motorised 
transport instead of rail (Section 2.2.2.1), I was unable to find studies analysing the link 
between income distribution and recycling (Section 2.2.2.2). Our aim is, therefore, to 
interrogate the role that can be played by income inequality in the process of adoption of 
mature ETs among OECD countries. In contrast, as already mentioned, the literature on 
the impacts of income inequality on ICT adoption is much developed and converges in 
establishing that the inequality-adoption link is significant and negative (Tigre, 2003; 
Udo et al, 2006; Fuchs, 2009; Močnik and Širec, 2010; Gulati and Yates, 2012; Weiss et 
al, 2015; Choudrie et al, 2015; Asongu et al, 2019).  
 
In addition to exploring this link for three network industry sectors, I attempt to shade 
light on what happens beyond aggregate measures of income distribution, as it is the case 
of popular indicators such as the Gini coefficient. More than just the general income 
distribution, attention is paid to the income shares of specific groups within each country 
(Section 2.2.3). 
 
In this article I test hypotheses for the link between income inequality and adoption of 
mature ETs and ICTs on the basis of existent theories and empirical evidence from the 
literature on transport and recycling, as well as previous approaches to adoption of ‘new’ 
environmental technologies (Section 2.2.4). Through the use of a Random Effects 
regression model and instrumental variables (Section 2.3) on panel data from OECD 
countries (Section 2.4), I am able to find that income inequality is significantly, negatively 
and exogenously linked to adoption of both rail passenger transport and recycling 
(Section 2.5). In the case of rail transport, our findings contradict what would be expected 
by using theoretical approaches from existent studies in the transport sector. In the case 
of recycling, material recovery as an alternative to landfill disposal seems to follow 
similar dynamics to what has been observed regarding adoption of ‘new’ environmental 
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technologies. The results are less robust for household broadband, but point towards 
confirming the conclusions from previous studies.  
 
Furthermore, I find that adoption of mature environmental technology indeed seems to 
be sensitive to changes in the income shared by specific groups, depending on the sector. 
While railway passenger transport is sensitive to changes in shares of the bottom 40 per 
cent and the top 10 per cent, municipal recycling is more significantly sensitive to what 
happens in the top half of the bottom 40 per cent, and not affected at all by the share of 
the rich.  Household broadband internet, in turn, seems to be more sensitive to the shares 
of the middle of the income distribution spectrum. I provide a discussion section to 
interpret and analyse the relevance of these results (Section 2.6).  A fundamental question 
that should be clarified by further research on the link between income inequality and 
adoption of mature ETs is whether income distribution is reflecting the influences of 
changes in consumer behaviour on the demand-side, or being a proxy of institutional 
factors in the supply-side. Nonetheless, the evidence reinforces the need for considering 
income distribution when analysing adoption of ETs and ICTs.  
 
2.2 Literature and background 
 
2.2.1 Inequality and environmental technology adoption  
 
The most influential idea linking aggregate levels of income and environmental 
consequences of human activity is based on the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
hypothesis. In their seminal work about the environmental impacts of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, Grossman and Krueger (1991) were the first authors to propose 
that environmental degradation followed an inverted U shape relationship following 
economic development. The original Kuznets Curve theory, developed by Kuznets 
(1955) – and strongly criticised in recent times (Palma, 2011; Piketty, 2014) –, argues 
that there is a non-linear relationship between inequality and economic growth, with 
inequality first rising, and then falling, as an economy develops. Likewise, the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve theory argues that there is an inverted U relationship 
between economic growth and environmental degradation, with the level of pollution and 
other negative environmental outcomes first increasing with economic development (as 
more pollutants are emitted during the industrialisation process), and then decreasing as 
environmentally friendly technologies are introduced as a result of pressure from an 
increasingly environmentally aware and wealthy population.  
 
However, while considering differences in aggregate and levels of economic 
development, this idea does not consider how income is distributed within the observed 
society.  More or less in parallel to the work by Grossman and Krueger, some ecological 
economists warned that income inequality might generate market failures leading to 
higher environmental degradation. This position was first stated by Boyce (1994), who 
concentrates on ‘asymmetries in the power-weighted social decision rule’ derived from 
high income and wealth inequality. Boyce states that inequality leads to distortions of 
valuations of the costs and benefits of environmentally degrading activities. For instance, 
the ‘efficient level’ of environmental degradation in cases like air pollution, ‘is higher 
when those who breathe the dirty air are poor than when they are rich, for the simple 





Although Boyce’s propositions were theoretical and focused on environmental 
degradation in general, Magnani (2000) was later able to integrate the two approaches 
based on aggregate income and distribution, and focused her empirical work on 
environment-related R&D expenditure as a proxy of ET adoption. After looking at data 
from OECD countries, Magnani criticised the assumptions behind the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve hypothesis. Her main point is that it is not the mean national income but 
its distribution what will produce a virtuous path of sustainable growth. According to her, 
and arguing similarly to Boyce (1994), inequality produces a ‘gap between the country’s 
ability to pay for environmental protection and a country’s willingness to pay’ (Magnani, 
2000:431). Her empirical results then supported the idea of income inequality negatively 
affecting adoption of environmental technologies.  
 
A similar path has been followed by more recent studies, benefiting from increasingly 
available data both on income distribution and environmental variables. Cushing et al 
(2015) review evidence on the link between income inequality and diverse forms of 
environmental degradation that can affect health. They found that evidence on a negative 
impact of inequality is stronger for air and water than for other more dispersed pollutants 
that might have a less immediate but more longer-term health impacts. Wolde-Rufael and 
Idowu (2017) claim that a reduction in income inequality could be beneficial for 
environmental protection and diminishing CO2 emissions, but its relevance depends on 
the specific characteristics of each country. Kashwan (2017) analyses the impact of 
income distribution on the establishment of protected areas. However, it does so departing 
from analyses centred on economic interests, and focusing on ‘political choice’. Kashwan 
finds that the ‘democratic dividend’ – the idea that stronger democracies do 
environmentally better –  diminishes as inequality increases, and that the effects of 
inequality vary depending on the strength of democracy. Finally, Grunewald et al (2017) 
use a wider and more extended panel dataset compared to other analyses that try to test 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis, and find that the link between inequality 
and carbon emissions operate differently according to levels of gross national income. In 
rich countries, however, higher income inequality increases per capita carbon emissions. 
 
Nonetheless, while the literature cited above has convincingly argued in favour of 
considering distribution as a relevant factor along aggregate income when looking at 
environmental degradation, after Magnani (2000), the specific issue of ET adoption has 
been less studied.  
 
A few exceptions have emerged, however, after the 2009 financial crisis. For instance, 
Andrich et al. (2013) analyse different scenarios for adoption of electric vehicles in the 
state of Western Australia, and argue that income inequality is an obstacle to their uptake 
and therefore to sustainable energy use. However, the most cited recent work linking 
income inequality and ET adoption is the contribution by Vona and Patriarca (2011). 
These authors find a negative effect of income inequality on a wide range of innovation 
and technology adoption variables among OECD countries, including public R&D 
devoted to the control and the care of the environment, per-capita turnover of eco-
industries, and the quota of priority patent applications in selected environmental 
domains. They find a significant negative link between income inequality and these 
outcome variables, but add, as a caveat, that the closer the technology is to the beginning 





Consequently, what I can extract from existent work on inequality and adoption of ‘new’ 
environmental technologies, comes from Magnani (2000), Vona and Patriarca (2011) and 
Andrich et al (2013). All these authors argue in favour of a negative impact of income 
inequality on environmental technology adoption. In the case of Magnani (2000), 
inequality is expected to produce a gap between willingness to pay and ability to pay for 
investments on environmental technology research. In the case of Vona and Patriarca 
(2011), having wider segments of the population with ability-to-pay for new technologies 
will generate more demand for green innovation. In the case of Andrich et al (2013), 
although low-median income groups are the ones that can gain the most from electric 
vehicles and energy savings, they will lack investment resources for adopting new 
technologies, and therefore differential paths of transport technology use and energy 
consumption will lead to new inequalities: inequality is both a cause and consequence of 
unsustainable energy use.  
 
I was not able to find specific studies linking income inequality and adoption of mature 
ETs. However, the already mentioned recent work by Burlinson et al (2018) highlights 
the importance of consumer preferences in adoption of district heating. After analysing 
results from a quasi-experimental survey applied in the United Kingdom, these authors 
conclude that problems related to decision-making will likely dissuade consumers from 
adopting district heating, and they point out that these problems will be more acute among 
low-income users. Following Burlinson et al and the previous mentioned studies on new 
environmental technology adaption, I should expect income distribution to be a factor 
influencing the demand for mature environmental technologies and their less sustainable 
alternatives. Following literature on new environmental technologies, I should expect 
inequality to negatively affect adoption. However, this is how far I can go based on the 
existing literature on environmental technology. In what follows, I review sector-specific 
literature on transport and recycling to further inform my hypotheses.   
 
2.2.2 The role of income inequality in each sector  
 
2.2.2.1 Transport  
 
The idea of aggregate adoption of rail transport by passengers – in technology adoption 
language – is named by the transport literature as ‘modal shift’. In general, rail is 
understood as a subset of public transport modes. Transport economics has long ago 
studied modal shift to public transport by focusing on factors influencing travel demand. 
These studies are based on the idea that a series of transport modes are available according 
to ability to pay and preferences. Behavioural psychology has set some of the foundations 
for micro-level assumptions that sustain theoretical and empirical approaches to the 
problem. For instance, Collins and Chambers (2005) have provided experimental support 
for the notion that private vehicles are usually competing with public transport, and that 
socio-economic factors matter because once supply-variables such as public transport 
accessibility and fares are defined, costs and available income are crucial for modal 
choice. In the same line, in his review of the literature on demand determinants for public 
transport, Polat (2012) points to higher income elasticity of travel demand among low-
income groups, which could make one to expect income distribution to affect primarily 
modal shift among those groups. 
 
Although issues of transport affordability and social exclusion have been increasingly 
discussed (see for instance the work convened by Mattioli et al, 2018), it is rare to find 
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studies that specifically include income inequality as a factor influencing modal shift to 
public transport. The exception is Albalate and Bel (2010), who use data on European 
cities to look at factors influencing public transport demand and supply. These authors 
test the hypothesis that higher income inequality might foster both demand and supply of 
public transport, but they only are able to accept the latter.  
 
What Albalate and Bel find in relation to the role of income inequality is aligned with 
what is accepted in most studies that include inequality as a factor affecting demand for 
private motorised vehicles. Demand for public transport is seen as a rival of demand for 
purchase and use of private vehicles, and therefore inequality should have the opposite 
effect on each one. Although such studies are scarce, they all point to the same direction: 
higher income inequality will negatively affect the demand for purchase and use of 
private vehicles (Haque 1992; Storchmann, 2005; Lescaroux, 2010). The only exception 
is suggested by Storchmann (2005) who claims that this sign of the relation might be true 
for rich countries but actually in poorer countries, where adoption of private vehicles is 
lower, income concentration might foster aggregate demand by increasing ability to pay 
for private vehicles among the elites. In rich countries, however –as it is the case of the 
OECD–, the link should be negative. 
 
2.2.2.2  Recycling 
 
As mentioned above, I have not been able to find studies linking income distribution and 
adoption of recycling. However, what is usually present in the literature is income 
generation as a determinant of household level adoption of recycling, and median income 
level within a local authority jurisdiction as a factor determining aggregate levels of 
separate collection rates. Furthermore, adoption in the recycling sector can be understood, 
first, from the perspective of a municipal government, in other words, whether a local 
authority has adopted recycling as part of its waste management services. In this sense, 
existence of municipal services is a long time reality in most of the OECD countries 
analysed in this study. 
 
Once recycling is adopted by municipalities, however, adoption can be analysed using 
aggregate levels of separate collection rates, or in other words, the proportion of the waste 
that is produced in a determined area that is collected for recycling. This can be measured 
using volume or weight, being the latter the most commonly available account. Separate 
collection reflects adoption of recycling among households because aggregate separate 
collection rates will depend on household’s engagement with municipal recycling 
programs via waste separation in origin (Miafodzyeva and Brandt, 2013). This means 
both the extent to which a household adopts different forms of recycling in their daily life 
– programs usually involve a set of dry and wet options for separate collection –, and the 
probability of households adopting recycling at all.  
 
Although income inequality has not been explored as a factor determining these two 
dimensions of household level adoption, scholars do provide theoretical associations to 
income generation that could similarly apply to distribution. For instance, on the one 
hand, higher income may be positively linked to the probability of adoption of recycling 
by a household because of educational levels that might allow higher environmental 
awareness (Chen, 2010), higher ability to pay for recycling services (Abbott et al., 2011), 
or availability of storage space for waste separation in origin – lower income households 
often live in smaller dwellings and share space among a higher number of occupants 
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(Miafodzyeva and Brandt, 2013). On the other hand, once adopted, higher income may 
influence the extent of that adoption within a household because more affluent groups 
consume goods with higher recyclable content (Callan and Thomas, 2006).  
 
Although income is usually expected to be positively associated to recycling, there are 
also some scholars that mention possible negative links. For instance, due to higher 
opportunity cost of time for high income households, they could devote fewer time to 
waste separation (Abbott et al., 2011), and their larger consumption volumes might rise 
overall waste production and diminish the final proportion that is collected for recycling 
(Sidique et al., 2010). 
 
Considering the theoretical support for a disaggregated household-level link between 
income and adoption of recycling, I am able to use the same rationale to expect a negative 
link between income inequality and separate collection rates. Just as discussed by the 
literature on inequality and adoption of ‘new’ environmental technologies (Magnani, 
2000; Vona and Patriarca, 2011; Andrich et al, 2013), the link to adoption would occur, 
in the case of recycling, because a more egalitarian income distribution enlarges the 
portion of the population with enough income to increase the extent of their adoption or 
their probability of adopting recycling at all. 
 
2.2.2.3  Broadband 
 
As already mentioned, the literature on the effects of income inequality on adoption of 
ICTs is much more abundant than in the other sectors. All works on the impacts of income 
inequality on internet adoption point to a negative effect. Tigre (2003) claimed that higher 
income inequality was correlated to lower penetration of internet among households in 
Brazil. On a study on Zimbabwe, Albania, Namibia and Venezuela, Udo et al (2006) 
claimed that income inequality was an obstacle to adoption of ICTs. Similar results were 
found by Fuchs (2009), Močnik and Širec (2010), and Gulati and Yates (2012), all using 
cross-sectional models to look at differences between world samples of countries and 
density of internet connections. Using a different indicator, Weiss et al (2015) and 
Choudrie et al (2015) both claim that higher inequality is positively linked to higher 
mobile broadband prices across countries, which means less affordability for users. 
Asongu et al (2019) establish inequality thresholds at which information and 
telecommunication technologies promotes inclusive education: beyond that threshold, 
fixed broadband subscriptions will no longer positively affect inclusive education.  
 
2.2.3 Measuring income inequality  
 
The literature that covers the link between income inequality and technological 
innovation typically uses the Gini coefficient. As explained in Figure 11, the Gini is 
calculated as the area conformed between the real distribution curve and a ‘perfect 
distribution’, divided by the area under the real curve. Given this calculation, a more 
egalitarian distribution will have a Gini close to 0, and a distribution in which a few 
concentrate most of the income will have a Gini closer to 1.  
 
However, a recent and growing body of literature on inequality has focused on new ways 
of measuring changes in the income distribution. Piketty (2014), for instance, has focused 
on the income and wealth of the top 1 per cent of the distribution, signalling that 
concentration by this group tells much about the current nature of capital accumulation. 
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Moreover, Palma (2011, 2014) has highlighted problems with the Gini coefficient, in 
particular, its inability to capture changes in the tails of the distribution, and especially in 
the top 10 per cent and bottom 40 per cent of the population. Given the way of calculating 
the Gini coefficient explained before, the coefficient will be much more sensitive to 
changes in the middle than in the tails, therefore neglecting the relevance of the tails 
detected by Palma. Consequently, the ‘Palma ratio’ – ratio obtained by dividing the share 
of the top 10 per cent for the 40 bottom per cent – has increasingly been adopted in 
mainstream economics to complement the Gini (Palma, 2011; Cobham et al, 2015). 
 
The issue of focusing on the general distribution or on income shares of specific groups 
is not only a recent debate among inequality scholars, but was also acknowledged almost 
two decades ago by the ecological economists who aimed to understand the link between 
income inequality and environmental technology adoption. Magnani (2000), for example, 
warned that measures like the Gini have the disadvantage, ‘in common with any aggregate 
measure of inequality, that it may change of the same amount and in the same direction 
following very different changes in income distribution’ (Magnani, 2000:438). We 
engage with this discussion when accounting for adoption of mature environmental 
technologies, using new inequality indicators as the Palma ratio, as well as looking to the 
income share of specific groups.  
 
 
Figure 11. Calculation of different income distribution measures explained from a Lorenz curve. 
 
2.2.4 Hypotheses  
 
The proposed theoretical approach is summarised in Figure 12. On the one hand, the 
literature reviewed from the transport sector clearly establishes a link between individual 
income generation and overall income distribution. The former is observed in the context 
of the latter, and they are mutually dependent as different scales of the same phenomenon. 
The same applies for adoption at the societal and individual level. In the case of recycling, 
I conform my hypothesis by theorising on the basis of extrapolating findings from the 
literature on the individual level into what can be expected at the societal level. 
Additionally, one could speculate about feedback loops from adoption to income 
distribution and access, which points to the need of considering reverse causality and 





Figure 12. Theoretical links between income and adoption at individual and societal level. 
Thus, on the basis of the literature reviewed so far, I test two hypotheses the case of each 
network technology: recycling, rail passenger transport and broadband. Firstly, on the 
basis of Section 2.2.2, the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: income inequality causes lower network technology adoption.  
 
Secondly, based on Section 2.2.3., I account for the criticism on the use of the Gini and 
the call to took at specific changes in income shares of different groups both in income 
distribution studies, and in specific literature that looks at adoption of technology 
adoption: 
 
H2: instead of the overall income distribution, network technology adoption is 




The Random Effects (RE) regression equation is: 
 
ln	(𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)-. = 		 𝛽1 ln(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)-. + 	𝛽: ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)-. + 𝛽@ ln(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔)-.
+ 𝛽B ln(𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒	𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒)- + 	𝛽F ln(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑟)-.
+ 𝛽J (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦). + 	𝜀-. 
Where 
 
- ln	(𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)-. is the natural log of the percentage of adoption of Railway 
Passenger Transport or Recycling for each country i in each year t.  
- 𝛽N(k=1…6) is the coefficient for the natural log of the independent and control 
variables; 
- 𝜀-.is the composite error term. 
 
The modelling strategy aims to take advantage of the availability of panel data for OECD 
countries, both in the case of income distribution and adoption of the studied mature 
environmental technologies.  A Random Effects (RE) model is used to account for the 
variance between and within countries. In order to do so, the dependent variables include 
the main factors that can be found in the literature when modelling the income-adoption 
relationship. The first is, of course, income distribution, but I also include GDP per capita 
and Ageing of the population (percentage of the population aged 65 or more), since both 
are usually incorporated in models within the transport, waste management and internet 
literature. I use log transformation on all the variables, since most of them are fractional 
data, or using this transformation is part of the usual convention (as in the case of GDP 
per capita). Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was also calculated for pooled data in order 














The included income inequality measures are the Palma ratio, share of the top 10 per cent 
(percentiles 91 to 100), middle 50 (percentiles 41 to 90), bottom 10 (percentiles 1 to 10), 
bottom 20 (percentiles 1 to 20) and second-bottom 20 (percentiles 21 to 40). All the 
inequality measures are calculated using available household income, as specified by the 
metadata from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2019). 
 
GDP per capita is expected to determine modal share as it should increase total travel 
demand and the extent to which travel is made by private motorised vehicles (Bris et al, 
2017; Ahmad & Puppim de Olivera, 2016; Skálová & Stávková, 2013; Diaz Olvera et al, 
2008; Nolan, 2003). In a similar way, GDP per capita is expected to positively affect 
waste generation (Slavik and Pavel, 2013) and the aggregate level of wealth should also 
impact the recyclable content of consumed goods (Sidique et al, 2010; Lakhan, 2014). 
The same can be said about GDP or aggregate income and broadband internet adoption 
(Močnik and Širec, 2010; Gulati and Yates, 2012). 
 
Age structure of the population is also included in models as Ageing. In transport, 
percentage of the population that is 65 years or older is expected to have impacts on 
overall modal share because older people have a higher need for motorized travel and, 
and greater demand for private and more flexible means such as cars (Aigner-Walder & 
Döring, 2012). In waste management, older people are expected to recycle more because 
their alternative cost of time should be lower than other groups (Sidique et al, 2010; Starr 
and Nicolson, 2015). Age is usually expected to negatively affect the digital divide 
(Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2011) 
 
A control variable is added to account for individual characteristics in terms of the supply 
of infrastructure and network services in each country. This takes the form of a ‘Supply 
Characteriser’ for each sector. In the case of railway passenger transport, I use total 
railroad kilometres per capita. In the case of recycling, I use total tons of waste recycled 
per capita by municipalities. Considering that we are already controlling for GDP per 
capita, which is a strong proxy of waste generation, this variable accounts for how much 
of the total waste is actually being collected by formal services, of which municipal 
recycling is part of. In the case of the telecommunications sector, I use mobile telephone 
subscriptions per 100 people. Given the widespread diffusion of mobile telephoning, and 
considering that broadband providers are often the same companies, this indicator can be 
used as a proxy of how active and spread the telecommunications sector is. 
 
Finally, since the analysed period covers almost two decades (1996 to 2013), I include a 
country-invariant dummy to account for the 2009 Financial Crisis. This implies that 
values are 0 between 1996 and 2008, and 1 between 2009 and 2013. In this way, I account 
for variations in income distribution, GDP per capita or supply-side austerity measures 
that could be specific for the second period, in order to be able to draw conclusions for 
the whole sample.  
 
After estimation, I run a Fixed Effects (FE) regression with a similar specification, in 
order to apply Hausman tests to define if RE is efficient, or, in other words, whether the 
included variables can sufficiently account for individual country characteristics.  
 
In order to test H2 and compare the effect of general income distribution measures such 
as the Gini coefficient with the income shares of specific groups, results for the same RE 
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model are compared using different income inequality measures in Table 10, accounting 
for correlation coefficients, standard errors, overall R2 and p-values for significance level.  
 
 
Table 6. Summary Statistics. 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Recycling overall 29.715 17.821 0.000 65.234 N =     258 
 between  17.180 1.095 60.195 n =      25 
 within  4.196 16.673 46.863 T-bar=10.32 
       
Rail overall 6.402 4.671 0.017 30.873 N =     250 
 between  6.604 0.122 30.873 n =      24 
 within  0.767 2.881 10.896 T-ba=10.4167 
       
Broadband overall 46.105 24.024 0.229 97.474 N =     151 
 between  18.146 15.539 95.154 n =      23 
 within  16.850 8.330 80.265 T-bar=6.56522 
       
Gini overall 32.679 6.036 23.700 51.400 N =     263 
 between  5.234 24.678 47.573 n =      25 
 within  1.205 29.707 37.759 T-bar=10.52 
       
Income Share of 10th decile overall 25.725 4.257 20.100 41.000 N =     263 
 between  3.595 20.567 37.641 n =      25 
 within  1.035 23.283 30.397 T-bar=10.52 
       
Income Share of 5th to 9th deciles overall 53.952 1.701 47.200 56.700 N =     263 
 between  1.376 48.869 55.918 n =      25 
 within  0.645 50.589 55.577 T-bar=10.52 
       
Income Share of 2nd quintile overall 12.655 1.590 7.900 14.900 N =     263 
 between  1.386 8.816 14.678 n =      25 
 within  0.286 11.655 13.438 T-bar=10.52 
       
Income Share of 1st quintile overall 7.668 1.566 3.900 10.200 N =     263 
 between  1.397 4.674 9.844 n =      25 
 within  0.303 6.468 8.461 T-bar=10.52 
       
Income Share of 1st decile overall 2.952 0.735 1.400 4.300 N =     263 
 between  0.662 1.740 3.989 n =      25 
 within  0.170 2.325 3.532 T-bar=10.52 
       
Palma ratio overall 1.339 0.509 0.801 3.475 N =     263 
 between  0.421 0.839 2.814 n =      25 
 within  0.113 0.888 2.000 T-bar=10.52 
       
GDP per capita overall 35266.040 11668.710 13468.500 65083.260 N =     263 
 between  11105.120 15555.970 62803.260 n =      25 
 within  1882.409 29145.670 39838.720 T-bar=10.52 
       
Population Over 65 overall 14.817 3.933 4.378 22.097 N =     263 
 between  3.766 5.388 22.097 n =      25 
 within  0.700 12.368 17.385 T-bar=10.52 
       
Km of railway lines per capita overall 11.006 4.711 0.361 19.692 N =     263 
 between  4.344 2.136 17.735 n =      25 
 within  1.215 0.508 14.743 T-bar=10.52 
       
Tons per capita colected overall 0.484 0.151 0.149 0.830 N =     263 
 between  0.138 0.155 0.760 n =      25 
 within  0.031 0.362 0.617 T-bar=10.52 
       
Mobile subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants overall 96.359 35.237 1.097 172.122 N =     194 
 between  24.334 42.628 142.529 n =      19 
 within  22.510 11.978 142.960 T-bar=10.2105 
       
Tax revenue as percentage of GDP overall 19.539 6.022 8.156 35.093 N =     187 
 between  6.099 8.932 32.802 n =      19 
 within  1.038 16.059 23.542 T-bar=9.84211 
       




In order to ensure that income inequality has an exogenous impact on adoption, I run a 
Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) regression with RE (Woolridge, 1997) in order to 
incorporate instrumental variables (IVs). These variables are the natural logarithms of a 
five year lagged Gini coefficient, and of total Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP. On the 
one hand, the overall income inequality from five years before each adoption measure 
can be expected to be free of influences of the current level of recycling, share of railway 
passenger transport and households with access to broadband internet. On the other hand, 
since Gini coefficients from the World Development Indicators are calculated on the 
bases of total available income, that is to say, after taxes and government spending, the 
Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP is expected to determine this income inequality 
measure separately from the market-based distribution of income that is usually regarded 
as a possible reverse causality from adoption.  
 
Thanks to the use of these two instruments, the 2SLS model can be over-identified and 
account for weak instruments. Results include post estimation tests, including Sargan-
Hansen´s test for overidentifying restrictions, Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity, 




The panel dataset covers the years 1996 to 2013 for 25 OECD countries, for which there 
is data availability. These countries are Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The three dependent variables Railway, 
Recycling and Broadband are measured, respectively, as passenger kilometres of railway 
passenger transport as percentage of total passenger kilometres (the totals also include 
buses and private vehicles) , tons collected for inorganic recycling and composting as 
percentage of total tons of waste collected by municipal recycling services (other options 
are landfilling or incineration), and percentage of total households with access to 
broadband connection. These variables, as well as the Supply Characterisers, come from 
the OECD (2019) statistic portal. Transport data for Iceland was not available. Available 
data for mobile telephone subscriptions is only available for 19 countries, which reduces 
the sample for the regression.  
 
Income distribution measures apart from the Palma ratio, GDP per capita, and percentage 
of the population aged 65 or more are available in the World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank, 2019). The Palma ratio – income share of the top 10 per cent 
divided by the share of the 40 bottom percent of the population –, as well as kilometres 
of railroads per capita, were calculated using the same database. Data for instrumental 
variables also comes fro the World Development Indicators. Table 6 shows summary 






Figure 13. Box and whisker Plot of available OECD data on Recycling in the 2003-2013 period. 
 



































































































The main results from the panel regressions are summarised in Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10. R2 
reaches 0.69 for municipal recycling, 0.50 for railway passenger transport and 0.26 for 
broadband internet. P-values from Hausman test for fixed versus random effects models 
are higher than 0.05 in the cases of recycling and railway passenger transport, which 
means that the country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables, 
or, in other words, the RE model is appropriate to account for country-specific 
characteristics. This does not happen for household internet broadband, which means that, 
at least using the Gini coefficient, the individual-specific effects are correlated with the 
independent variables, and therefore the FE model is the most appropriate. As shown in 
Table 5, efficiency of the RE model is robust to all the income inequality measures that 
were tried apart from the Gini. 
 
Moreover, income inequality measured by the Gini index is significantly and negatively 
linked to adoption in the RE model for recycling and railway passenger transport, and in 
the FE model for household broadband. Replacing the Gini by the Palma ratio and income 
share of different groups (Table 10) shows that the significance of the link, the goodness 
of fit of the model, and efficiency of the variables to account for country-individual 
characteristics varies according by sector according to the group being analysed. In the 
case of recycling, the only income inequality variable that is significant apart from the 
Gini is the share of the 2nd quintile. In the case of railway passenger tranpsort, income 
inequality is still significant regardless of the measure included, although the goodness-
of fit, significance and size of the effect are at their peaks when using the 2nd quintile. The 
correlation coefficient, for instance, is almost the double for the 2nd quintile than for the 
1st quintile. However, R2 is slightly higher in the latter than in the former. In the case of 
RE regressions on internet broadband, the only significant income inequality measure is 
the share of deciles 5th to 9th – the ‘middle’ in words of Palma (2011, 2014), for which R2 
also reaches its peak. However, negative p-values show that assumptions for the Hausman 
tests are not met. 
 
Table 7. Regression Results for Municipal Recycling. 
	 OLS FE RE 
ln Recycling Coef. Sig. Std. Err. Coef. Sig. Std. Err. Coef. Sig Std. Err. 
          
ln Gini 0.249  (0.298) -1.172 ** (0.595) -0.873 * (0.496) 
ln GDP pc 1.718 *** (0.145) 1.987 *** (0.384) 1.843 *** (0.290) 
ln Ageing 1.141 *** (0.167) 1.014 * (0.576) 0.823 ** (0.360) 
ln Totals Waste pc 0.095  (0.121) 0.248  (0.347) 0.192  (0.257) 
Financial Crisis dummy 0.183 ** (0.080) 0.117 * (0.067) 0.141 ** (0.055) 
Constant -18.729 *** (2.041) -16.120 *** (4.375) -15.186 *** (3.597) 
          
Observations 256   256   256   
Mean VIF (after OLS) 1.680         
Adjusted R2 0.699         
R2 within    0.290   0.288   
R2 between    0.683   0.687   
R2 overall    0.685   0.689   
          
Hausman test for fixed versus random 
effects model (p-value)    0.833      





Table 8. Regression Results for Railway Passenger Transport. 
	 OLS FE RE 
ln Rail Coef. Sig. Std. Err. Coef. Sig. Std. Err. Coef. Sig Std. Err. 
ln Gini -4.352 *** (0.515) -1.096 ** (0.470) -1.315 *** (0.451) 
ln GDP pc -1.264 *** (0.225) -1.477 *** (0.297) -1.438 *** (0.274) 
ln Ageing 2.513 *** (0.309) 2.717 *** (0.622) 2.924 *** (0.504) 
ln Km lines pc -0.030  (0.065) 0.003  (0.028) 0.004  (0.028) 
Financial Crisis dummy 0.264 * (0.136) -0.004  (0.051) -0.020  (0.046) 
Constant 22.726 *** (2.991) 13.244 *** (3.253) 13.150 *** (3.136) 
Observations 235   235   235   
Mean VIF (after OLS) 1.470         
Adjusted R2 0.557         
R2 within    0.189   0.187   
R2 between    0.404   0.428   
R2 overall    0.478   0.495   
Hausman test for fixed versus random 
effects model (p-value)    0.561      
*p-value ≤ 0.1; **p-value ≤ 0.05; ***p-value ≤ 0.01 
 
 
Table 9. Regression Results for Household Broadband Internet. 
 OLS FE RE 
ln Broadband Coef. Sig. Std. Err. Coef. Sig. Std. Err. Coef. Sig Std. Err. 
ln Gini 0.569  (0.515) -1.928 ** (0.837) -0.699  (0.807) 
ln GDP pc 1.179 *** (0.207) 5.551 *** (0.961) 2.264 *** (0.448) 
ln Ageing -1.313 *** (0.378) 1.112  (2.237) -0.789  (0.741) 
ln mobile subscriptions  0.518 ** (0.253) 1.348 *** (0.412) 1.962 *** (0.330) 
Financial Crisis dummy 0.692 *** (0.134) 0.466 *** (0.115) 0.447 *** (0.099) 
Constant -9.561 *** (3.381) -57.332 *** (8.910) -24.622 *** (5.751) 
Observations 111   111   111   
Mean VIF (after OLS) 1.200         
Adjusted R2 0.380         
R2 within    0.760   0.704   
R2 between    0.120   0.083   
R2 overall    0.198   0.258   
Hausman test for fixed versus random 
effects model (p-value)    0.000      
*p-value ≤ 0.1; **p-value ≤ 0.05; ***p-value ≤ 0.01 
 
Table 10. Key indicators after RE regressions for different income distribution measures. 
  Gini  
 




10th decile 5th to 9th decile 2nd quintile 1st quintile 1st decile 
        
         
Recycling 
Overall R2 0.689 0.698 0.701 0.685 0.697 0.690 0.694 
P>|z| 0.078 0.216 0.980 0.059 0.455 0.144 0.174 
Coefficient -0.873 -0.609 0.043 1.436 0.322 0.456 -0.391 
Srd. Err. 0.496 0.492 1.725 0.762 0.432 0.312 0.288 
 Hausman test (p-value) 0.833 0.923 0.918 0.848 0.947 0.878 0.920 
         
Rail 
Overall R2 0.495 0.470 0.427 0.535 0.548 0.523 0.513 
P>|z| 0.004 0.021 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Coefficient -1.315 -0.989 2.490 3.050 1.745 1.018 -0.888 
Srd. Err. 0.451 0.429 1.433 0.735 0.385 0.258 0.260 
 Hausman test (p-value) 0.561 0.133 0.381 0.694 0.682 0.458 0.438 
         
Broadband 
Overall R2 0.258 0.264 0.300 0.261 0.270 0.269 0.260 
P>|z| 0.386 0.185 0.061 0.617 0.917 0.826 0.334 
Coefficient -0.699 -1.053 5.440 0.759 0.089 0.135 -0.485 
Srd. Err. 0.807 0.795 2.904 1.517 0.847 0.613 0.501 
 Hausman test (p-value) 0.000 -8.200 -14.540 0.000 0.028 0.144 0.000 
         




The use of instrumental variables – whose correlations with the income inequality 
measure used as main explanatory variable are shown in Tables 11, 12 and 13 – allows 
to confirm that the income-adoption link is exogenous for recycling and railway 
passenger transport, but not for household internet. Results from post estimation tests are 
summarised in Table 14. F-statistics show that instruments are weak for broadband 
internet, but strong for recycling and railway passenger transport. P-values above 0.05 in 
the Sargan-Hansen’s test mean that 2SLS RE models are robust to over-identification. 
Results from the Wu-Hausman test allow to discard endogeneity in the link between 
income inequality and both adoption of recycling and railway passenger transport. 
 
Table 11. Income Inequality measure and Instrumental Variables used for Recycling. 
(obs=132) ln Share of second quintile 
ln Tax Revenue 
 vs GDP 
ln 5-year  
lagged Gini 
ln Share of second quintile 1.000   
ln Tax Revenue vs GDP -0.835 1.000  
ln 5-year lagged Gini 0.508 -0.452 1.000 
  
Table 12. Income Inequality measure and Instrumental Variables used for Railway Passenger Transport. 
(obs=132) ln Share of first quintile 
ln Tax Revenue  
vs GDP 
ln 5-year 
 lagged Gini 
ln Share of first quintile 1.000   
ln Tax Revenue vs GDP -0.794 1.000  
ln 5-year lagged Gini 0.422 -0.452 1.000 
 
 
Table 13. Income Inequality measure and Instrumental Variables used for Household Broadband Internet. 
(obs=132) ln Share of 5-9 deciles 
ln Tax Revenue 
 vs GDP 
ln 5-year  
lagged Gini 
ln Share of 5-9 deciles 1.000   
ln Tax Revenue vs GDP -0.605 1.000  
ln 5-year lagged Gini 0.474 -0.452 1.000 
 
 






The results bring relevant contributions to the literature on the link between income 
distribution and network technology adoption, particularly in the case of environmental 
technologies. Firstly, I find evidence that income inequality is significantly, negatively 
and exogenously linked to adoption of municipal recycling between and within OECD 
countries. This is a major contribution considering that I was not able to find previous 
  Recycling (RE) Rail (RE) Broadband (RE) 
    
Sargan-Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 0.053 0.104 0.124 
F-statistics (rule of thumb for weak instruments) 101.922 55.202 4.135 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity on pooled data (p-values)    
Durbin 0.189 0.760 0.082 
Wu-Hausman 0.204 0.770 0.099 
    
Wu-Hausman on Random Effects regression 0.068 0.313 0.896 
        
 
 73 
studies looking at this relationship. Furthermore, the link works as expected by the 
theorisation based on studies on adoption of ‘new’ environmental technologies, as well 
as on the influence of individual income generation and recycling rates. The causal 
relationship between income and recycling that I extrapolate from existing theories can 
find empirical support in these findings.  
 
Secondly, the results on railway passenger transport challenge the existent theorisation 
on the link between income distribution and modal choice in transport. As explained in 
section 2.2.2.1, the existant theories are based on the assumption that private motorised 
vehicles are the preferred modal choice when enough income is available. Higher share 
of income by the bottom 40 per cent, as shown by the results, should diminish and not 
increase the share of railway passenger transport, as more people would have the option 
to operate private vehicles to satisfy their travel demand. Consequently, I need to provide 
alternative theoretical explanations for income inequality acting in the opposite sign than 
expected. 
 
One alternative explanation could be that, when available, railway passenger transport is 
preferred to private motorised vehicles by poorer households. This might be expected in 
countries with lower motorisation rates, but is not so obvious in OECD countries, in 
which a relevant part of the poor has access to private vehicles. In fact, recent studies 
have pointed towards transport disadvantage as an increasingly prevalent phenomenon 
by which the poor are forced to own and use cars in order to access to mobility (Curl et 
al, 2018; Walks, 2018). A complementary explanation could be that higher share of 
income by the poor is activating their demand and therefore railway passenger transport, 
as part of public transport systems, is sustaining additional trips that are supressed if the 
poor have less income generation. It could be that there is not modal shift going on, but 
simply an increase in the intensity of use of rails by those that were already using them 
under more restricted circumstances. If any of these two explanations is accepted, the 
theoretical assumptions behind existing studies on the link between income inequality 
and transport should be revised. The main issue to be questioned would be the assumption 




Figure 16. Demand-based and supply-based causal explanations for the link between income inequality and adoption 
of mature environmental technologies. 
Nevertheless, another explanation could also be possible (Figure 16). My hypotheses, just 
as most of the reviewed literature, only focus on demand-based explanations for the 
significance of income inequality on mature technology adoption. However, it could be 
possible that income inequality is acting as a proxy of supply-side phenomena. In order 
to explore these possibilities, one would need to go beyond neoclassical economics and 
dive into the realm of institutional political economy (Chang, 2002) and a more 
interdisciplinary body of literature. For instance, welfare state regime approaches study 

















Andersen, 1990). More recently, political settlements theory (Khan, 2010) focuses on the 
interdependence between institutions, distribution of benefits and balance of power, 
which has been suggested as an appropriate framework for analysing the urban built 
environment (Goodfellow, 2017). Furthermore, social epidemiologists have extensively 
highlighted a negative causal link between inequality and health, arguing that larger 
income differences reinforce social distances, and therefore social class and status 
differences (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015). More recently, mainstream economics has also 
turned towards the analysis of the “price of inequality”, arguing that increased income 
inequality was a cause of the market failures linked to the 2009 financial crisis (Stiglitz, 
2012). In all these views, inequality not only shapes markets due to the distribution of the 
ability to pay, but also shapes institutions by influencing the rules of the game or by being 
a proxy of power relations beyond consumer behaviour (see Neckerman & Torche 2007 
for a thorough review of the literature on social effects of inequality).  
 
Thus, income distribution could be understood as a proxy of the political settlement 
(Khan, 2010) that determines the degree of commodification of public services. These 
services include railways. In a more commodified regime, income distribution could 
worsen at the same time than a higher portion of costs of services are transferred to users, 
which could make transport less efficient and attractive. In contrast, a particular set of 
institutions could be at the same time causing a more egalitarian income distribution, and 
sustaining stronger public goods that include public transport and railway infrastructure. 
If the latter were correct, we could be in presence of a new explanation for the empirical 
results. Income inequality would not be reflecting a demand-side phenomenon, but rather 
acting as a proxy of supply-side conditions that favour adoption of railway passenger 
transport over other transport modes. Adoption of mature environmental technologies 
would be fostered by progressive institutions and balance of power that also redistribute 
income, and not just by changes in consumer behaviour in the demand-side. A question 
for further research could be how to bridge the institutional implications of income 
inequality and socio-technical regime theory, which has integrated institutional theory 
and innovation studies (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014; Fuenfschilling and Binz, 2018).  
 
Furthermore, regardless of speculations about supply and demand side explanations, 
accepting H2 drives the attention toward the income share of specific groups and its 
influence on adoption. As detailed in Table 10, while R2 does not show notable variations 
by changing the income inequality measure when analysing recycling, accepted 
significance levels – p-values equal or bellow 0.1 –only hold for the Gini coefficient and 
the second quintile (percentiles 21 to 40). Income inequality is not significantly linked to 
recycling when using the Palma ratio or the shares of other income groups. 
 
Two theoretical explanations could arise. On the one hand, if the lower-middle income 
groups are already participating in recycling, an increase of their share might also be 
associated to the extent of their participation by means of adopting a wider range of 
recycling options – for instance, incorporating composting or other more specialised 
waste separation activities (see Chapter 4 for examples) – or by consuming goods with 
higher recycling content. On the other hand, it could also be possible that recycling is 
mostly a high and medium-income activity – part bourgeois and middle-class culture – 
and in places where the top part of the bottom 40 per cent increases their share, some new 
people are incorporated to the ‘green club’. Nonetheless, it is important to notice that, 
although results for recycling follow the expected demand-based theoretical explanation, 
a supply-side alternative causal mechanism (as explained in Figure 16) could still be 
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playing a role. However, the difference between rail passenger transport and recycling is 
that the link to income distribution and the former holds for the shares of all income 
groups, while in the case of the latter is restricted to the 5th quintile. A demand-based 
explanation seems more appropriate.  
 
Goodness-of-fit also provides some elements for discussion. The results for transport 
show a more notable increase of goodness-of-fit when shifting the income inequality 
measure, along with an increase of already high significance levels when using the Gini. 
The percentage of the variance that can explained by the model ranges from 43 to 55 
depending on the measure used. In contrast to what is observed for recycling, in railway 
passenger transport, the share of the rich seems to matter. Higher income concentration 
is linked to lower adoption. Furthermore, the less significant measure, with the lowest 
goodness-of-fit, is the share of the middle 50 per cent (percentiles 41 to 90). The 
phenomena of transfers between the tails of the distribution, observed by Palma (2011, 
2014) seems to be crucial in the case of transport, but not in recycling. This could also 
resonate with possible supply-side explanations, as the relevant phenomena could be not 
so much about modal shift by the rich, but actually taxation and the amount of resources 
that are channelled toward public services, which include railways. Regarding transport, 
I might have to further reflect on Palma’s way to put it: “it’s the share of the rich – and 
what they do with it –, stupid!” (Palma, 2011:120). 
 
Finally, although results are not as robust for household broadband internet as in the case 
of the other sectors, there are some signs of a relevant role of inequality (as expected by 
the literature reviewed in Section 2.2.2.3). It is worth noting that the significance of the 
income share of the ‘middle’ in the RE model could support demand-based explanations 
according to ability to pay. The lack of robustness of the result is linked to the sample 
size – notably less countries and years than in the case of recycling and railway passenger 
transport – and to the fact that the telecommunication sector is institutionally different 
from the other two, and therefore some other relevant factors might be missing from the 
models. This interpretation is backed by the lower goodness-of-fit compared to the other 





In this chapter I was able to analyse and compare the link between income inequality and 
adoption of municipal recycling, railway passenger transport and household broadband 
internet in OECD countries. Panel data regressions provide evidence to support the 
negative effect that income distribution has on adoption of environmental technologies 
such as recycling and railway passenger transport. In these cases, adoption is lower when 
income inequality is higher, both between and within countries. These findings are 
relevant in the context of the existing literature, first because I was not able to find 
previous studies on the influence of income distribution on recycling, and because the 
results contradict the usual assumption of the primacy of private motorised vehicles as 
modal choice by users when more income is available.  
 
Additionally, I show that more than general income distribution – as measured by 
traditional indicators like the Gini coefficient – what seems to matter for mature 
environmental technology adoption is the income share of specific groups. While 
recycling is more significantly linked to the share of the richest half of the bottom poorest 
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40 per cent, adoption of railway passenger transport depends on both income 
concentration by the rich and the share of other groups, particularly the poor. Both links 
are proven to be exogenous. By discussing these results, I theorise that neoclassical 
demand-based explanations are limited to explain possible supply-side institutional 
phenomena that could be determining both income redistribution and adoption of public 
services. Further research would be needed to explore the nature of these causal links. 
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3 Why do more unequal countries spend more on 
private vehicles? Evidence and implications for the 




Household transport expenditure (HTE) can account for issues of transport affordability 
and of how mobility interacts with other needs. Income inequality, on the other hand, is 
crucially linked to both transport demand and institutions that can shape transport 
regimes. However, existent literature has scarcely linked income inequality and HTE. 
This research provides evidence about this link. Income concentration by the richest 10 
per cent of the population is found to be significantly, positively and exogenously 
correlated with HTE on purchase and use of private transport equipment. The proposed 
econometric models can explain close to half of the variance of this type of HTE among 
countries. Two theoretical explanations are proposed and debated. One is demand-based, 
and the other supply-based. I show that the latter is more conceptually sound and claim 
that income concentration by the elites is a proxy of a balance of power that is associated 
to private-oriented transport regimes. Such regimes promote private goods over public 
goods; in other words, car dependency, transport disadvantage and/or informal transport 
over strong public transport networks. A fundamental challenge for the future of cities is 
that more unequal societies are in danger of producing wider inequalities after adopting 
private-oriented smart transport technologies.  
 
Keywords: Income inequality; Mobility; Transport consumption; Household 
expenditure; Institutional political economy; Smart city; Electric cars 
  
                                                
2 This paper has been published as Valenzuela-Levi, N. (2018). Why do more unequal countries spend 
more on private vehicles? Evidence and implications for the future of cities. Sustainable Cities and 









As recently acknowledged by the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals 
(United Nations 2017) and a growing body of literature (notably Palma 2011, 2014; 
Palma & Stiglitz 2016; Piketty 2014; Milanovic 2011), fighting income inequality is a 
central task for our societies. However, is inequality relevant to the discussion about the 
future of smart and sustainable cities? Some existent literature has stated that higher 
income inequality can be an obstacle for diffusion of innovations such as electric vehicles 
(Andrich et al 2013) and other environmental technologies (Vona & Patriarca 2011). This 
research provides evidence on the link between income inequality and household 
transport expenditure (HTE) on purchase, operation and maintenance of private vehicles, 
and discusses further possible impacts on the future of smart and sustainable cities.  
 
Two types of causal mechanisms – one demand-based and other supply-based – are 
proposed as part of a conceptual framework (Section 3.3) that is empirically tested via 
econometric analysis. Beta Regression Models (BRM) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
are used, as well as Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions and Instrumental 
Variables (IV) to account for endogeneity. The link is shown to be positive, significant 
and exogenous. Additionally, models can explain almost half of the variance of HTE on 
operation and maintenance of private vehicles between countries. 
 
After discussing the results (Section 3.7), the favoured theoretical interpretation comes 
from institutional political economy: more unequal countries are more likely to have 
private-oriented transport regimes, in which public goods such as public transport 
networks and regulation of the use of private vehicles are weak. Private-oriented transport 
regimes – as opposed to public-oriented ones – promote automobile dependency, as well 
as informal transport when public services are scarce. This is why HTE and inequality 
are linked: households from unequal societies tend to be more dependent on using private 
vehicles. 
 
Moreover, the example of electric cars is used to illustrate consequences of the findings 
for smart transport technology adoption. Under private-oriented transport regimes, 
societies that are unequal today are likely to produce wider and/or new inequalities in the 
future. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a literature review that helps to 
contextualise and justify the contribution of this research; Section 3.3 discusses a 
theoretical framework to understand the link between income inequality and HTE; 
Section 3.4 explains the econometric models; Section 3.5 describes the data; Section 3.6 
explains the results; Section 3.7 discusses interpretation of results, as well as implications 
that the findings could have for smart transport technology adoption and the future of 
cities; Section 3.8 concludes.  
 
3.2 Literature Review  
 
3.2.1 Approach to the variables 
 
The approach that the literature has for defining HTE tends to follow what is usually 
considered as ‘transport expenditure’ in Household Budget Surveys (HBS), and its 
disaggregated components. The same sort of definitions of HTE is used in this study, as 
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detailed in Table 15. There are three dimensions of this expenditure. A first one is the 
part of the household budget that is spent in purchasing vehicles. Second, these vehicles 
are operated and maintained. Third, households also pay for transport services when they 
do not own or are not using private vehicles.  
 
Furthermore, when it comes to the analysis of factors influencing HTE, income 
distribution is rarely seen among explanatory variables. This occurs despite long-standing 
warnings such as ‘per capita increase in demand for transport and communication item 
would be underestimated if the income distribution would not be considered’ (Haque 
1992:52). Moreover, relevance of the influence of personal or household level ability to 
pay is approached by means of the GDP, available income, or total consumption (Bris et 
al 2017; Ahmad & Puppim de Olivera 2016; Skálová & Stávková 2013; Diaz Olvera et 
al 2008; Nolan 2003; Nicholson & Lim 1987). However, although expenditure on food 
and non alcoholic beverages falls as GDP per capita grows (a phenomenon known as the 
Engel Law), Figure 17 shows that there is a wider dispersion when it comes to transport.  
 
 
Figure 17. Cross-country differences in household expenditures and GDP per capita (2010). 
 
Table 15. Categorisation of THE: disaggregated transport expenditure. 
Type of expenditure Details 
  
Purchase of vehicles Motor cars, motor cycles, bicycles, animal drawn vehicles. 
  
Operation of personal 
transport equipment 
Fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment, maintenance and repair of personal transport 
equipment, other services in respect of personal transport equipment. 
  
Transport services 
Passenger transport by railway, passenger transport by road, passenger transport by air, passenger 
transport by sea and inland waterway, combined passenger transport, other purchase transport 
services. 
  
Source: the author based on World Bank (2014) 
 
Surprisingly, the few studies that have been found during the present research point to a 
negative correlation between income inequality and HTE (as discussed in Sections 3.6 
and 3.7, the opposite sign of the correlation is found in regression results). On the one 
hand, Haque (1992) uses the Lorenz ratio or Gini index while using Engel elasticity 
models to predict household consumption on transport and communications. He claims 
that ‘the percentage change in demand increases with the decrease of the Lorenz ratio’ 
(Haque 1992:52). On the other hand, Lescaroux (2010) includes income dispersion as a 
variable for estimating car ownership from household budgets, also using an Engel’s 






































































accelerated curve for transport expenditures such as purchase of vehicles, since, once a 
certain threshold of available income is passed, more egalitarian countries will have wider 
groups of consumers with the required ability to pay in comparison to more unequal 
countries.  
 
Nonetheless, other variables are more often included. Some are only applicable so far at 
sub-national scales and usually on a small number of cities. That is the case of urban 
morphology (Ahmad & Puppim de Olivera 2016), access to specific transport 
infrastructures and services (Li et al 2015), and commuting distances (Li et al 2015; 
Mattingly & Morrissey 2014; Zolnik 2012; Day & Cervero 2010). Other variables are 
sometimes observable at a national level, although diverse data availability constraints 
might apply. Examples are: diesel prices, car ownership, access to ICTs (Bris et al 2017), 
household size and composition, age and occupation of head of household (Nicholson & 
Lim 1987), association to socio-cultural or ethnic groups (Ahmad & Puppim de Olivera 
2016), housing expenditure (Li et al 2015; Mattingly & Morrissey 2014; Zolnik 2012), 
and distinction between rural and urban areas (Dargay 2002).  
 
3.2.2 Scope of cross-national studies and sample size 
 
The body of literature that tries to provide an international perspective on HTE started 
first comparing a small number of countries or cities. This type of perspective had its first 
contributors in the 1980s, with studies such as Roth & Zahavi (1981) on Bogota, Santiago, 
Singapore and Salvador, or Nicholson & Lim (1987) on New Zealand and Australia. 
More recent studies follow a similar scope, as Falavigna & Hernandez (2016) on two 
cities in Argentina and Uruguay, Berri et al (2014) on France, Denmark and Cyprus, and 
Skálová & Stávková (2013) on Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic. A 
particular contribution on a region that concentrates key development challenges is the 
work by Diaz Olvera et al (2013) on six cities from West and Central Africa, and Diaz 
Olvera et al (2008), which reviews practically all the available data from African cities, 
and focuses on three specific cases to compare discrepancies produced by different survey 
types. 
 
Recent literature about HTE has acknowledged the scarcity of studies covering 
‘developing economies’ (Ahmad & Puppim de Olivera 2016:106). Furthermore, research 
attempting to provide a global perspective on HTE tends to use small samples. Lescaroux 
(2010), for instance, looks at 64 countries, while Kauppila (2011) covers 25 OECD 
economies, and Bris et al (2017) 33 countries with a diverse degree of economic 
development. In contrast, this research contributes by using a worldwide sample with 123 
countries, including 90 considered ‘developing’. It was not possible to find such a broad 
sample within the existent literature.  
 
3.2.3 Empirical and conceptual problems 
 
Finally, some empirical and conceptual issues are mentioned by the literature. Two of 
them seem to be the most relevant ones. Firstly, transport costs are a phenomenon that 
not only involves a pecuniary dimension, but also time. Transport economics has worked 
long ago with time and money all together (Roth & Zahavi 1981). However, data 
including time is usually collected at a city level, is expensive to obtain, scarcely 




Secondly, as discussed by Diaz Olvera et al (2008, 2013), walking is particularly 
important for poor and vulnerable citizens, and their activities often tend to take place 
near home due to travel difficulties. Under these contexts, HTE tends to underestimate 
the costs of transport for part of the population that does not even reach the minimum 
ability to pay for transport. However, acknowledging these issues, and although HTE is 
limited to pecuniary costs, it is still a valuable approach for a global perspective, since 
there are no other available alternatives to observe a more precise variable at such a large 
cross-country scale.  
 
3.3 Conceptual Framework  
 
The conceptual framework proposed attempts to account for two types of causal 
mechanisms that can theoretically influence the link between income inequality and HTE: 
one is demand-based and the other is supply-based. 
 
The ‘political settlement’ approach by Khan (2010) is the basis for developing the 
conceptual framework behind this research. A political settlement is ‘an interdependent 
combination of a structure of power and institutions at the level of a society that is 
mutually ‘compatible’ and also ‘sustainable’ in terms of economic and political viability’ 
(Khan 2010: 20). In other words, a particular institutional arrangement will be sustainable 
only if the distribution of benefits that it produces is compatible with the existent balance 
of power. Therefore, income inequality is used here to account for the distribution 
allowed by a particular political settlement, which means that it can be a proxy of the 
balance of power between the rich, the middle-income groups and the poor (as notably 
discussed by Palma 2011, 2014; Palma & Stiglitz 2016).  
 
Furthermore, recent research on political settlements, such as Goodfellow (2018), has 
illustrated how political settlements are useful to describe mutually dependent national 
and city-level dynamics. In the same line, the proposed conceptual framework assumes 
that part of the institutions that are defined by the political settlement include those that 
shape mobility regimes. Thus, national-level HTE can account for these multi-scalar 
dynamics that occur within countries, regions and cities. 
 
 
Figure 18. Proposed theoretical approach. 

















Source: the author  
 
Figure 18 describes the proposed theoretical causal mechanisms by which income 
inequality can be linked to HTE. The left side of the diagram explains the demand-based 
link, whereas the right side explains the supply-based nexus.  
 
On the one hand, one of the main benefits distributed according to the political settlement 
is income. Different income distributions lead to diverse patterns of purchase and use of 
private goods such as vehicles (Lescaroux 2010). This demand-based link is the 
conceptual basis for the existent studies that pay attention to the HTE-inequality nexus 
(Lescaroux 2010; Haque 1992). On the other hand, consumer behaviour will be 
influenced by both regulations of the use of different transport modes and availability of 
public transport as a rival to private vehicles. For instance, segregated lanes implemented 
in Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors produce radical improvements of public transport 
(Lindau et al 2010); at the same time, they restrict the public space available to private 
vehicles. Another example is public transport fare reduction thanks to government 
subsidies (Bocarejo & Oviedo 2012).  
 
These examples are closely linked to the balance of power in a society. Institutions 
involved in the political settlement entail definitions of social rights (Marshall 1950), 
which today include the right to public transport (Lipsitz 2004). This is how income 
distribution is embedded in multi-directional causal links to provision of public goods by 
governments (see Neckerman & Torche 2007 for a thorough review of research in this 
link). Investment, social spending and regulatory decisions by the latter are the basis of 
the supply-side nexus between balance of power and HTE. In summary, institutions that 
are part of a specific political settlement will include the transport regime within a country 
and/or a city. Depending on who is favoured by the political settlement, this regime will 
end up leaning towards a private or public orientation. 
 
Finally, the bottom of the diagram shows the interaction between the demand and supply 
sides. This is how HTE is determined, since it is defined as the aggregate of expenditure 
on transport services plus purchase and use of personal transport equipment (Table 15). 
Transport decisions are influenced by rival alternatives derived from access to different 
mobility options, their respective time and money costs, and associated regulations of 
public space.  
 
This is where the hypothesis for this research comes from. On the one hand, we know 
that within-country inequality at the beginning of the 21st century is strongly shaped by 
income concentration by the elites (as demonstrated for the top 10 per cent by Palma 
2011, 2014 and the top 1 per cent by Piketty 2014). On the other hand, income shares 
reflect the balance of power between different groups within a society, since power, 
institutions and benefits must be mutually compatible in a political settlement 
(Goodfellow 2018; Khan 2010). Therefore, the hypothesis was formulated as follows:  
 
H: higher power concentration by the elites, evidenced by income inequality, is 
linked to looser regulation of private vehicles and weaker public transport 
provision, leading to higher expenditure on purchase and use of cars.  
 




3.4 Econometric Model  
 
3.4.1 Model selection 
 
The empirical approach to verify the abovementioned hypothesis implies using HTE as 
the outcome variable, and income inequality as the explanatory variable plus controls. 
Two modelling strategies are suitable given the fact that dependent and independent 
variables are fractional data (i.e. ratios, percentages, coefficients). The first one is running 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions after logarithmic transformation (see, for 
instance, Hyytinen & Toivanen 2011). The second one avoids data transformation and 
allows non-linear relations by using beta fractional outcome regressions (BRM). 
 
Let yi denote HTEdi on a disaggregated expenditure d (on private vehicle purchases or 
operation/maintenance of private transport equipment) for country i and and xi a k x 1 
vector that includes all the explanatory and control variables described in sections 3.4.1 
and 3.4.2. HTEdi can only assume values between 0 and 1 (0 and 100 if read as a 
percentage). The model should explain as much as possible of the expected value of yi 
given xi, µi∈(1,0) for every xi. The OLS estimator of β in the linear model is problematic, 
as it may predict values outside the 0 to 1 range. The alternative is to use the Beta 
Regression Model (BRM) with similar specifications to the OLS (for more on the BRM, 
see Castellani et al 2012).  
Results are also reported two OLS models, yi= xi β + µi, and lnyi= lnxi β + µi. Post-
estimation tests are ran for diagnostic purposes: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
calculation for multicollinearity, and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests for 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
3.4.2 Main variables 
 
On the dependent variable side, the hypothesis defined in Section 3.3 requires to pay 
attention to two disaggregated elements of HTE, which are (1) purchase of private 
vehicles and (2) operation and maintenance of personal transport equipment. Table 1 
provides a definition of these variables. HTE on transport services is not analysed, since 
it would require control variables that are not available for all the countries included in 
the sample (i.e transport fare prices, transport subsidies). 
 
 On the independent variable side, the research process included four different measures 
of inequality: Gini coefficient, Palma ratio, income share of the 10 per cent (IT10), and 
income share of the bottom 10 per cent. Due to space constraints, only results using IT10 
are reported in detail. This measure has the best fit with the theoretical model and 
hypothesis defined in Section 3.3, and results show that it contributes to higher 
explanatory power compared to other indicators (see table 23).  
 
3.4.3 Selection of control variables 
 
Control variables needed to be found in order to account for relevant possible drivers of 
HTE at a national level. Those included in the model cover factors mentioned by the 
literature (see Section 3.2) that were available for a large sample of countries. These 
controls are associated to economic development, urbanisation patterns, geography, 




Firstly, GDP per capita (GDPpc) is expected to be the basis of the raise in transport 
expenditure as food and non-alcoholic beverages decreases its relative importance (see 
Figure 17). Controlling for GDPpc also allows comparisons between countries with a 
diverse range of economic development.  
 
Secondly, urbanisation patterns are expected to affect HTE (Kauppila 2011), therefore 
percentages of total population living in both urban areas and in the country’s main city 
are included. While the former explains rural versus urban demographic balances, the 
latter accounts for economies of scale and agglomeration. 
  
Thirdly, the mean absolute latitude of every country is also incorporated to capture 
different climatic conditions associated to the distance to the equator. Temperature and 
weather should be a relevant factor influencing transport-related decisions among 
households. In fourth place, government spending is also included since it is expected to 
affect transport costs (Metz 2011). Although this link should be looked at a much more 
detailed level, such as transport subsidies in specific cities (Bocarejo & Oviedo 2012), 
government spending at a national level accounts for the general environment in which 
transport consumption occurs. 
 
In fifth place, percentage of population over 65 years old was considered since ageing is 
expected to have a relevant impact on HTE (Aigner-Walder & Döring 2012). Older 
people have a natural need for higher motorised transportation, which should be 
expressed by the data. Finally, two variables related to private vehicle markets are 
included. On the one hand, motorisation rate is added since acquisition and use of cars is 
usually regarded as relevant for the link between economic development, consumption 
and transport (Lescaroux 2010). On the other hand, the mean trade value per imported 
vehicle accounts for the market environment in which consumers take decisions regarding 
private vehicles.  
 
Additionally, from a theoretical perspective, it would have been appropriate to include 
oil consumption per capita to account for fossil fuel dependency, since energy prices can 
impact household budgets and access to transport (Li et al 2015; Kauppila 2011). 
However, although data was available, the inclusion of this variable caused problems of 
multicollinearity (tested using Variance Inflation Factor), since it is strongly correlated to 
GDPpc (see figure 19). Data on other factors that might be relevant is not available or 
only exists at a sub-national level, which means that such variables were omitted. 
Examples are housing prices, availability of infrastructure for different modes, urban 
morphology, public space regulation, and multiple dimensions of local culture.  
 
 






3.4.4 Endogeneity and instruments 
 
It is reasonable to consider that HTE might have an impact on income distribution, since 
transport could affect income generation via impacts such as accessibility of jobs. For 
instance, Verikios & Zhang (2015) find evidence of small impacts of transport reforms in 
Australia on the country’s income distribution. This would mean that the causal link 
discussed in Section 3 operates in the opposite direction. To explore this possibility, 
Instrumental Variables (IVs) in a Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) model are 
incorporated and reported.  
 
The first instrument is the lagged value of INEQ (INEQt-10) (see Cingano 2014 for a 
similar IV). Values for this IV correspond to one decade before the measurements of HTE 
and IT10. There are a number of studies that have focused on recent changes in the 
elasticity of transport during the 2000s, which means that it has recently become a basic 
need – for elasticity studies see Cortés & Pérez (2010). On the other hand, an increasing 
number of case studies are analysing the 2009 financial crisis and austerity policies as an 
episode of strong commodification of public services, including transport, with a 
simultaneous increase in income inequality (see Cascajo et al 2017). Considering the 
latter, HTE is assumed to have effects on income inequality after the mid 2000s, so that 
distributions a decade before can be used as an instrument to observe more recent effects.  
 
The second instrument is LWHEATSUGAR, which is a measure of agricultural 
endowments based on the proportion of land suitable for wheat versus sugar cane. This 
instrument was found by development economists when looking for a variable that could 
explain income inequality before recent effects of market inequality and redistribution 
via taxes and transfers. It was proposed by Easterly (2007), who followed a proposition 
by the economic historians Engerman and Sokoloff (1994). The latter authors 
hypothesised that structural inequality in Latin America is higher than in the United States 
due to a mixture of geographic characteristics and a specific agrucultural business model 
that was sustained by a set of social and economic institutions. According to this 
hypothesis, in Latin America, the land endowments lent to commodities featuring 
economies of scale and the use of slave labor, especially in the case of sugar cane. In 
North America, in contrast, land endowments lent themselves to ‘commodities grown on 
family farms (…) and thus promoted the growth of a large middle class’ (Easterly, 
2007:756), being wheat the best example of such kind of crop. The hypothesis was 
empirically verified by Easterly (2007) in a cross-sectional sample of countries. 
Accordingly, LWHEATSUGAR has been used as an instrument to account for 
endogeneity by researchers who aim to understand the effect of inequality on more 
contemporary phenomena, such as adoption of mobile telephoning (Hyytinen, and 
Toivanen, 2011). 
 
The instrument is measured as:  LWHEATSUGARi = log[(1+arable land suitable for 
wheat)/(1+arable land suitable for sugar cane)] in country i. As it is developed 
theoretically and empirically by Easterly (2007), countries with more suitability for wheat 
than for sugarcane were those in which family farms had a bigger share of total land, and 
therefore implied a more egalitarian distribution for the century between 1858 and 1958. 
LWHEATSUGAR is significantly correlated with the values of current income inequality, 
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part of which can be explained by this structural historical long-term association. In 
contrast, changes in HTE are much more recent, and correspond to processes of 
urbanisation and technification of passenger transport that occurred mostly later during 
the 20th century. Therefore, there are no causal links to be expected between suitability 
for different crops and HTE, and any correlation might be due to the independent relation 
of each variable with income distribution. Thanks to the use of these two instruments, the 
2SLS model can be over-identified and account for weak instruments, as discussed in 
Section 3.6. 
 
Table 16. Distribution of countries by region. 
Continent/region Countries 
Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Dem. Rep., 
Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Yemen Rep., Lao, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Timor Leste, Turkey, Vietnam, Israel, Japan, Korea. 
Eastern Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, 
Serbia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom. 
Former USSR Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Estonia. 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica. 
North America Canada, United States. 




The study uses the World Bank’s (2014) Global Consumption Database (GCD), which 
informs household expenditure from 90 developing countries. The GCD data is based on 
Household Budget Surveys (HBS). Following Kauppila (2011), HBS data is 
complemented with National Accounts (NA) data for additional countries. In this case, 
OECD (2017) data is used to add 33 countries whose data is reported in the OECD NA 
and were not included by the GCD. The final number of countries included in the dataset 
is, therefore, 123 (Table 16).  
 
Some minor considerations need to be mentioned about reference values for ratios and 
time periods. National level ratios of a specific expenditure versus total household 
expenditure are used. The GCD reports original values in the table ‘Consumption Shares 
2010 by Country, Product/Service, Area and Consumption Segment (Percent)’ (World 
Bank 2014). Although it reports rural/urban areas and different income groups separately, 
aggregated national data is used in order to make them comparable with the NA data from 
the OECD. In the case of the latter, the measure ‘Current Prices’ is used as the basis for 
calculating percentages, since it is the one that presents more observations. The 
percentages for each item in the OECD data were calculated using the item ‘P31DC: Final 
consumption expenditure of households on the territory’ as the total. The data from the 
OECD is extracted for 2010 since the GCD presents homologated values for that year. 
Three countries presented values equal to zero for HTE on operation/maintenance (Benin, 




Most of the remaining variables come directly from the World Bank’s (2017) World 
Development Indicators, or were calculated using figures from the same source. That is 
the case of GDPpc, income distribution measures (post-tax), urbanisation patterns, and 
demography. Absolute latitude was calculated from the original values by country found 
in Google Developers’ canonical concepts (Google Developers 2012). Trade value per 
vehicle comes from the United Nations (2017) Comtrade Database. Oil consumption per 
capita was calculated using data from the International Energy Agency’s Atlas of Energy 
(IEA 2015). However, as already mentioned, this variable was dropped from the model 
due to multicollinearity issues.  
 
Motorisation rate by country was extracted from the International Organization of Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers’ (OICA 2014) dataset. The use of this variable presents some 
conflicts, as it lowers the number of observations since data is available for only 98 of the 
123 countries. On the other hand, the database provides reports for 2013/2014 and not 
2010. The variations between 2010 and 2014 might be minimum in most countries, but it 
is considerable in others such as China (ITF, 2017). The values are still used here, as they 
account for relevant differences between countries. However, results must be analysed 
with the caveat that motorisation rates are not useful to interpret results in exceptional 
cases like China.  
 
All the remaining figures correspond to year 2010, with the exception of the measures of 
income distribution. In the case of the Gini index and Palma ratio, the values correspond 
to the mean between the years 2005 and 2015, in order to be able to reflect the long term 
situation during the decade in which consumption data was collected, and to have more 
observations. Regarding the instruments, the lagged measure of income inequality, INEQ-
1, corresponds to the mean between 1995 and 2005. The data for LWHEATSUGAR comes 
from Easterly (2007). Descriptive statistics for all the variables are summarised in Table 
17. 
 
Table 17. Descriptive Statistics.. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Ratio vehicle purchase vs total household 
consumption 118 0.048 0.026 0.003 0.151 
Ratio vehicle operation and maintenance vs 
total household consumption 115 0.041 0.026 0.001 0.113 
IT10 118 0.298 0.064 0.207 0.523 
GDP pc 123  12,807.470   19,613.210   231.194   104,965.300  
Ratio people in Cities 1 million vs total 
population 110 0.301 0.140 0.030 0.758 
Ratio people in urban areas vs total 
population  123 0.547 0.222 0.106 0.976 
Absolut Latitude 123 28.322 18.262 0.024 64.963 
Ratio Gov. Spending vs GDP 117 0.169 0.094 0.051 0.969 
Ratio people aged over 65 vs total 
population 123 0.084 0.058 0.023 0.229 
Mean trade value per imported vehicle 
(USD) 109  217.847   478.726   0.150   3,607.583  
Motorisation rate 98 268.335 251.639 1.597 848.733 
lwheatsugar 97 0.122 0.205 -0.393 0.544 
INEQ-1 107 0.314 0.071 0.206 0.548 






3.6 Results  
 
Results provide evidence of the significant, positive and exogenous link between IT10 
and household expenditure on operation and maintenance of personal transport 
equipment. They also show a significant positive correlation between IT10 and household 
expenditure on purchase of vehicles. 
 
In regard to the latter, as shown in table 18, a significant positive correlation between 
income inequality and HTE on vehicle purchase is seen in the OLS regression without 
data transformation and in the BRM. However, in the OLS, the adj. R2 is barely above 
0.22, and a p-value of less than 0.05 in the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test implies 
heteroscedasticity. The OLS after logarithmic transformation has almost no explanatory 
power, as also shown in Table 4. In the BRM, IT10 is significant (at the 0.005 level) and 
positively correlated. The control variables that are significantly correlated (at the 0.05 
level) are urban population and absolute latitude. After controlling for key variables 
(GDPpc, urbanisation, concentration in big cities, government spending, people over 65 
years old, value per imported vehicle and motorisation rate), IT10, percentage of urban 
population and distance from the equator are significantly linked to expenditure on private 
vehicle purchases. BRMs allow calculating marginal effects at certain values of the factor 
variable, therefore projecting conditional means that provide an easy interpretation of the 
link, as shown in Figure 20. Table 19 shows details of the significance of the correlation 
at each point. Figure 20 shows that the link is not entirely linear. 
 
Table 18. Regression results for HTE on purchases . 
  
OLS regression without 
transformed variables   
OLS regression after 
logarithmic transformation   
Fractional outcome Beta regression 
(marginal effects) 
            
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  dy/dx  
Delta-Method 
Std. Err. 
            
Inc. share of top 10%  0.204   ***   (0.058)    0.606    (0.422)    0.152   ***   (0.046)  
GDP pc  0.000    (0.000)    0.081    (0.115)    0.000    (0.000)  
% Cities 1 million  0.008    (0.021)    0.046    (0.113)    0.012    (0.018)  
% urban  0.049   **   (0.019)    0.263    (0.250)    0.035   *   (0.017)  
Absolut Latitude  0.001    (0.000)   -0.012    (0.070)    0.001   *   (0.000)  
% Gov. Spending -0.030    (0.060)   -0.080    (0.209)   -0.042    (0.055)  
% aged over 65 -0.062    (0.104)   -0.203    (0.229)   -0.078    (0.095)  
Value per imported car 
(USD)  0.000    (0.000)   -0.005    (0.043)    0.000    (0.000)  
Motorisation rate -0.000    (0.000)    0.032    (0.115)   -0.000    (0.000)  
Constant -0.044    (0.023)   -2.041    (1.755)      
            
Observations 83    83    83   
R2  0.308      0.128        
Adj. R2  0.223      0.021        
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg p-value 0.000    0.020       
                        










Figure 20. Income inequality and household transport expenditure (margins after Beta regression with 95% 
interval). 
Table 19. Marginal effects of THE on purchases at specific values of income inequality after BRM. 
 at IT10 value Margin 
Delta-Method  
Std.Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
1  0.016   0.005  0.002  0.006   0.025  
2  0.022   0.005  0.000  0.013   0.032  
3  0.031   0.004  0.000  0.024   0.038  
4  0.044   0.002  0.000  0.040   0.049  
5  0.062   0.007  0.000  0.048   0.076  
6  0.087   0.018  0.000  0.052   0.122  
7  0.120   0.035  0.001  0.052   0.188  
 
As already mentioned, the most robust results come from regressions for HTE on 
operation and maintenance of personal transport equipment. The three models show 
significant positive correlations for the same three variables: income inequality, 
government spending and proportion of population over 65 years old (see Table 20). The 
OLS after logarithmic transformation, however, presents problems of heteroscedasticity 
(table 20 shows the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test’s p-value under 0.05). However, 
Table 21 shows that the linear regression after log transformation is not heteroscedastic 
anymore after excluding the OECD countries. 
 
Table 20. Regression results for HTE on operation and maintenance 
  
OLS regression without 
transformed variables   
OLS regression after 
logarithmic transformation   
Fractional outcome Beta 
regression (marginal effects) 
            
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  dy/dx  
Delta-Method 
Std. Err. 
            
Inc. share top 10%  0.157   **   (0.050)    1.321   **   (0.449)    0.175   ***   (0.047)  
GDP pc  0.000    (0.000)    0.099    (0.122)    0.000    (0.000)  
% Cities 1 million  0.003    (0.018)    0.093    (0.122)    0.005    (0.017)  
% urban -0.010    (0.016)   -0.279    (0.267)   -0.006    (0.017)  
Absolut Latitude  0.000    (0.000)    0.062    (0.074)    0.000    (0.000)  
% Gov. Spending  0.120   *   (0.052)    0.489   **   (0.224)    0.106   *   (0.050)  
% aged over 65  0.225   *   (0.089)    0.493   *   (0.244)    0.218   *   (0.086)  
Value per imported car 
(USD)  0.000    (0.000)    0.029    (0.046)    0.000    (0.000)  
Motorisation rate  0.000    (0.000)    0.041    (0.122)    0.000    (0.000)  
Constant -0.047   *   (0.020)   -6.063   **   (1.865)      
            
Observations 82    82    82   
R2  0.520      0.506        
Adj. R2  0.460      0.441        
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg p-value  0.766     0.000       
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Figure 4. Income inequality and household transport expenditure 
(margins after Beta regression with 95% interval) 
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Table 21. Regression results for OLS with logarithmic transformation, excluding OECD countries 
        
 Including Motorisation rate  Excluding Motorisation rate 
        
                
        
Ratio income share of top 10% vs total income  1.621   *  (0.610)    1.439   *   (0.564)  
GDP pc -0.104   (0.236)   -0.037   (0.197)  
Ratio people in Cities 1 million vs total population  0.126   (0.187)    0.166    (0.173)  
Ratio people in urban areas vs total population  -0.206    (0.349)   -0.083    (0.308)  
Absolut Latitude  0.072    (0.092)    0.061    (0.085)  
Ratio Gov. Spending vs GDP  0.338    (0.292)    0.344    (0.269)  
Ratio people aged over 65 vs total population  0.606    (0.326)    0.621   *   (0.290)  
Mean trade value per imported vehicle (USD)  0.040    (0.074)    0.019    (0.072)  
Motorisation rate  0.097    (0.162)      
Constant -6.022   *   (2.493)   -6.065   **   (2.162)  
        
Observations 57    63   
R2  0.300      0.264    
Adj. R2  0.166      0.154    
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg p-value  0.095      0.060    
                
*** = p-value < 0.005; ** = p-value <0.01; * = p-value < 0.05 
 
As seen in table 20, correlation coefficients and marginal effects present a quite similar 
size in the linear OLS and the BRM. Table 22 shows how p-values for the margins at 
each value of the factor variable never go below 0.001, as they do in the case of purchases 
(Table 19).  
 
Table 22. Marginal effects of HTE on operation/maintenance at specific values of income inequality after BRM 
at IT10 value Margin Delta-Method Std.Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
1 0.014 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.022 
2 0.021 0.004 0.000 0.013 0.029 
3 0.031 0.003 0.000 0.025 0.037 
4 0.047 0.002 0.000 0.042 0.052 
5 0.069 0.009 0.000 0.052 0.087 
6 0.101 0.022 0.000 0.058 0.143 
7 0.144 0.042 0.001 0.062 0.226 
 
Although BRMs do not provide such an intuitive indicator of goodness-of-fit as R2 in the 
case of OLS, it is possible to expect the non-linear model to provide a more precise fit, 
and that the Adj. R2 of 0.460 from the OLS without data transformation is a reliable 
indicator that these variables can explain almost half the variance of household 
expenditure on operation and maintenance of private vehicles. Discarding 
heteroscedasticity, a remaining possible problem with the OLS regression without data 
transformation is that the model could theoretically predict negative values if the factor 
variables get close to 0, and numbers beyond the limit of 1 (or 100 if figures are used as 
a percentage) among the highest values. Nonetheless, figure 21 shows real and predicted 
values: there are no predicted values below 0 or above 1. Also Honduras, the country with 
the highest reported HTE in the GCD (World Bank 2014), is shown clearly as an outlier. 




The model shows that ten additional percentage points of IT10 are linked to 1.75 
additional percentage points of household expenditure on operation/maintenance of 
private vehicles. Given the non-linearity observed (Figure 20), this increase is higher as 
income inequality gets to the maximum observed values.  
 
In regard to endogeneity, the 2SLS regression was run using the IVs mentioned in section 
3.4.4. The instruments pass tests for weak instruments and over-identifying restrictions, 
as shown in Table 23. Running the 2SLS regression pre and post logarithmic 
transformation checks robustness of these results. Given the heteroscedasticity problem 
after transformation discussed above, post estimation results are reported also for a 
sample excluding the countries added from OECD NA (which does not have the problem 
of heteroscedasticity). In the three reported settings, the link between income inequality 
and HTE on operation and maintenance of vehicles is exogenous. 
 
Figure 21. Goodness of fit OLS model without logarithmic transformation: real and predicted values for HTE  on 
operation and maintenance of personal transport equipment. 
 
Table 23. Test results after 2SLS with instrumental variables for endogeneity of the link between income inequality 





OLS model with logarithmic 
transformation 
Sample Full sample Full sample No OECD 
Hansen’s test of restrictions (p-value) 0.881 0.928 0.600 
F-statistics (rule of thumb for weak instruments) 28.493 87.824 89.283 
Durbin test for endogeneity (p-value) 0.862 0.947 0.852 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.874 0.952 0.871 
Observations 66 66 43 
    
 
Summarising, evidence is found to support the proposed theoretical approach and 
hypothesis (Section 3.3). This evidence is stronger in the case of operation and 
maintenance than of purchase of vehicles. Endogeneity was ruled out for the former but 
not for the latter. The theoretical fit of IT10 as a measure of income inequality and as a 
proxy of the power of the elites is reinforced by empirical results from the models. For 
instance, Table 23 summarises R2 of the OLS models and p-value of different income 
inequality measures. Using income share of the richest decile provides the highest 





Table 24. Predictive power of models for operation and maintenance of vehicles using different measures of income 
inequality (OLS regression without logarithmic transformation) 
   Gini   Palma   bottom 10 share   IT10  
     
 R2   0.514   0.515   0.492   0.520  
 Adj R2   0.450   0.452   0.428   0.460  
 p-value   0.002   0.002   0.023   0.002  
          
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that additional models were run including the square of 
income inequality measures and GDPpc. In the case of the former, a quadratic relation 
was discarded – neither the original variable nor the squared one resulted significant when 
added together in the regression for any one of the two dependent variables. On the other 
hand, the case of squared GDPpc was included to check any possibility of a Kuznets-style 
curve (Palma 2011, 2014; Picketty 2014), especially considering the relevance of this 
idea in inequality studies and ecological economics – as the ‘environmental Kuznets 
curve’ (Magnani 2000; Chen & Chen 2008). Results allow discarding this sort of 
quadratic correlation between GDPpc and HTE, at least in a cross-national setting at the 




3.7.1 Is it the rich driving more or rather private-oriented transport regimes? 
 
This section focuses on the implications of results for HTE on operation and maintenance 
of personal transport equipment, given the significance and exogenous nature of the link 
to IT10. 
 
The fact that IT10 is the inequality measure that provides the best goodness-of-fit for 
HTE on operation (Table 23) means that the most relevant part of income distribution is 
the share of the rich. Therefore, it is not what happens in the middle, as it would have 
been the case if the Gini coefficient resulted more efficient. Neither is what happens in 
the bottom, as it would have been the case if the R2 increased by using the income share 
of the poorest 10 per cent. IT10 is also better to predict HTE than the Palma ratio (share 
of the bottom 40 per cent in relation to IT10), meaning that it is more about concentration 
by the rich than deprivation of the poor. 
 
Furthermore, this result can be more specifically interpreted, particularly since the 
proposed conceptual framework from Section 3.3 suggests two possible causal links (see 
Figure 18). One is a demand-based explanation: higher HTE on operation is produced 
due to higher available income among the rich. The other is supply-based: higher IT10 is 
a proxy of a political settlement that prioritises private goods over public goods, which 
includes to incentivise the use of private vehicles. Exogeneity, verified for the link 
between IT10 and operation of personal transport equipment, can be applied to both 
explanations. But, is it possible to validate one explanation over the other? 
 
On the one hand, to validate the demand-based explanation, one must accept that higher 
ability-to-pay by the rich leads to more vehicles being operated, or more intensive use-
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patterns by this group, all of which rises aggregated national-level HTE on operation. In 
this case, raises of HTE on operation within this minority should not only equal but also 
surpass the aggregate impact of drops of aggregated HTE due to lower income shares by 
the rest of the population. 
 
On the other hand, the supply-based explanation is plausible under two scenarios. In both, 
IT10 works as a proxy of institutional variables that are difficult to measure. These 
scenarios are, firstly, weak public transport with no proliferation of informal transport – 
which would be the case of car-dependent rich countries –, and secondly, weak public 
transport with high levels of informal transport – which would be the case of most poor 
countries.  
 
Given that existent institutions are only admitted in a political settlement when they are 
compatible with specific distribution of benefits and balance of power (Goodfellow 2018; 
Khan 2010), IT10 can account for benefits derived from those institutions – expressed in 
form of income. These institutions are the ones that define social rights and public goods 
such as provision of public transport and regulation of public space. The same 
institutional arrangement that benefits the rich could be also promoting car-dependency 
and private-oriented transport regimes. If this explanation were plausible, the correlation 
between IT10 and HTE on purchases and operation would be due to this supply-side 
causal link.  
 
The relevance of informal transport in poor countries deserves additional discussion. It 
could be possible that some of the expenditure on purchase and operation of vehicles by 
households is, in fact, masquerading expenditure on vehicles for producing transport 
services. If they were not informal, costs would be entirely or partly absorbed by 
households in form of HTE on transport services (the third sub-item of HTE in Table 15). 
Existent research such as Diaz Olvera et al (2008, 2013) discusses both measurement 
issues and how important informality is for access to mobility within poor or ‘developing’ 
countries. Under these circumstances, a private-oriented transport regime and its 
subsequent weak public goods would also pose incentives for the growth of informal 
transport services that could be hidden behind a rise in HTE on purchases and operation 
of vehicles. 
 
Opportunely, available data on household size can help one to validate the supply-based 
explanation and to disregard the demand-based one. As seen in Figure 22, only 6 out of 
62 countries with available household size data (United Nations 2018) have less tan 0.1 
vehicles per household: Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Mali, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Vietnam. 
Being these national averages, tenancy of vehicles probably grows much higher among 
the richest ten per cent of the population. Moreover, if there are ten vehicles available per 
every hundred households – as it is the case with 0.1 vehicles per household –, the rich 
will probably own most of these vehicles. Even with such low motorisation rates, rich 
households would already have access to vehicle ownership.  
 
Nonetheless, the figure is greater in most of the countries: mean vehicle per household at 
country level within the 62 countries is 0.95, and the median is 0.90. It is likely that higher 
income concentration by the rich will lead them to spend more on purchases of vehicles 
(Cascajo et al 2017; Dargay 2001) for renewing their existent personal transport 
equipment, or for luxury consumption. However, these sorts of expenses on purchases 
are unlikely to substantially increase total distance travelled and HTE on operation and 
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maintenance by the rich. By way of explanation, it is improbable for increases of IT10 to 
have such an impact on HTE on operation that could lift national aggregated figures. It is 
implausible for additional purchases to incorporate more cars to operation by rich 
households: there is a practical limit for significantly increasing operation options that 
are already available for them. Most of those vehicles will be parked most of the time. 
On the contrary, HTE on operation of vehicles by the rich will probably decrease if 
replacement equipment is more energy-efficient (as seen in Nayum et al 2016).  
 
Consequently, since the demand-side explanation can be discarded, the strongest 
interpretation is that a private-oriented transport regime favours private goods over public 
goods, which includes neglecting private transport and incentivising use of private 
vehicles and/or informality. In other words, more unequal countries, and particularly 
those in which the rich concentrate income, tend to be more car-dependant.  
 
 
Figure 22. Vehicles per household in countries with available data on household size (n=62). 
 
3.7.2 Impacts on adoption of smart transport technologies 
 
Such a finding has fundamental consequences for the future of cities, and particularly for 
the adoption of smart transport technologies. The reason is that this nexus between 
income concentration and what can be called private-oriented mobility regimes implies 
that more unequal societies are precisely those most in risk of increasing inequalities and 
of producing new ones while adopting smart transportation technologies.  
 
Existent research can illustrate this risk. Dargay (2001), for instance, proved that income 
elasticity of car ownership is not symmetric. Car ownership is more sensitive to rising 
than to falling income. This is in line with more recent studies, such as Curl et al (2018), 
which suggests that deprived urban communities experience a phenomenon of ‘forced car 
ownership’. This notion was, born out of transport research on British rural areas, implies 
that poor households avoid spending on other necessities and/or reduce their travel 
activity to a bare minimum, in order to be able to have basic access to car-based mobility 
(Mattioli et al 2017).  
 
Automobile dependence is, of course, linked to transport disadvantage, which means a 
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important destinations’ (Walks 2018:137). In poor countries with less access to cars, 
transport disadvantage means to depend on informal transport or to simply limit mobility 
to what can be reached by walking (Diaz Olvera et al 2008, 2013). The opposition 
between public-oriented and private-oriented transport regimes is evident: vulnerability, 
social exclusion and even higher debt are associated with automobile dependence (Walks 
2018), while prioritising public transport benefits those with less income. Cascajo et al 
(2017), for instance, found that stronger public transport networks facilitated adaptation 
to the 2009 financial crisis in Spain. Moreover, a private-oriented transport regime, or 
austerity policies that can lead to one, do not only come with smaller and weaker public 
transport networks, but also can imply less subsidies and higher fares, with greater impact 
among the poor (Cascajo et al 2017; Li et al 2015). 
 
What does all the above have to do with adoption of smart transport technologies?  A 
good example to answer this question is electric vehicles. Andrich et al (2013) studied 
impacts of income inequality on adoption of this sort of vehicles, which are a significant 
feature of what is considered smart technology. These authors found that income 
inequality can be an obstacle to the uptake of electric vehicles, and also that subsequent 
disparity on energy use by different income groups leads to increased inequality. In their 
words, ‘low-median income households have the most to gain from overall electric 
vehicle uptake, but these same households cannot afford to adopt these vehicles” 
(Andrich et al 2013:315).  
 
Furthermore, qualitative studies in advanced economies – where adoption of electric 
vehicles is occurring at a higher pace – have shown that socio-economic characteristics 
linked to income are fundamental to understand willingness to adopt electric vehicles. 
According to a study from Norway, adopters of electric vehicles tend to evaluate 
convenience and performance attributes in a lesser extent than conventional vehicle 
buyers (Nayum et al 2016). Conversely, education level – which is linked to income – 
has been found to have a positive impact on attitudes for adoption of electric vehicles 
among Swedish buyers (Westin et al 2018). In the same line, willingness to pay is key to 
understand purchase intention of electric vehicles among users from Hong Kong (Ng et 
al 2018). The above-mentioned characteristics point to the same direction of Andrich et 
al (2013): an electric vehicle adoption process that will take place primarily among the 
rich and will amplify existing inequalities.  
 
The key question is, therefore, about the future transport regime that adoption of smart 
technologies will help to build. Is smartness going to be private-oriented or public-
oriented? If smart technologies follow a merely demand-based diffusion process 
(Hatipoglu 2012; Vona & Patriarca 2011), smart transport technologies that will flourish 
will be those individually purchasable, as opposed to natural monopolies such as public 
transport systems. Technology adoption within those monopolies requires effective 
policy and active government involvement (Mazzucato 2011). Under a private-oriented 
regime, as suggested by Andrich et al (2013), current inequalities will delay adoption of 
new technologies and produce new divides. The warning that emerges from this research 
is that, without active policies to break inertia, societies that are unequal now – which are 
likely to have private-oriented transport regimes –, will probably produce more socially 
unjust cities in the future. A better horizon for all requires public-oriented smart cities, 




3.8 Conclusion  
 
After controlling for other external factors that could explain HTE at a country level, 
more income unequal countries, particularly those characterised by income concentration 
by the elites, have higher levels of expenditure on purchase and use of private vehicles. 
The proposed theoretical explanation is that higher income concentration reflects a 
particular political settlement in which the power balance produces private-oriented 
transport regimes.  
 
Further research on longitudinal data would be desirable to more thoroughly analyse this 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the bridge between transport and structural adjustment or 
austerity policies deserves a more detailed attention, following emergent studies such as 
Cascajo et al (2017). Nonetheless, the evidence from this study should be enough to 
include income distribution and transport regimes as factors when attempting to analyse 
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4 Do the rich recycle more? Understanding the link 
between income inequality and separate waste 






There is a widespread concern about increasing inequalities within cities. However, it is 
not clear whether these inequalities translate or not into differences in pro-environmental 
activities such as recycling. In this chapter, Barcelona and London are compared to 
characterise the income-recycling nexus within cities. On the one hand, in Barcelona, 
although the income gap is smaller, separate collection rates reproduce income disparities 
between local authorities. On the other hand, in London, a bigger income gap is not 
translated into separate collection rates. Evidence is provided to hypothesise that this 
difference is linked to their service financing regime. The idea that the rich recycle more 
because of being more educated or having different consumption patterns should be re-
examined under institutional lenses. If the rich recycle more, it might be just because of 
regressive distribution of municipal resources. It is urgent to consider distributional issues 
when designing metropolitan recycling policies. Otherwise, transitions to sustainable 
urban environments might be restricted to affluent areas within cities. 
  
                                                
3 This paper has been published as Valenzuela-Levi, N. (2019). Do the rich recycle more? Understanding 
the link between income inequality and separate waste collection within metropolitan areas. Journal of 








Promoting recycling and reducing income inequality are both part of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (United Nations, 2016), as well as central pieces of any transition 
towards equitable, sustainable, and liveable cities. In order to implement such a transition 
in the world’s largest urban areas, attention needs to be paid to how social inequalities 
and environmental policies interact. Furthermore, resources and waste management 
decisions do not take place in a vacuum, but ‘within the framework of historically 
contingent socio-political institutions (e.g. liberal democracy, consumer society, 
atheistic/humanistic/hedonistic values prevailing)’, and ‘under conditions of the 
contemporary political economy (e.g. highly financialised, globalised, and 
deindustrialising capitalistic market systems)’ (Iacovidou et al, 2017:1283).  
 
In an attempt to contribute to our understanding of part of that framework in which waste 
management is defined, this research explores the link between income inequality and 
municipal separate collection rates (SCRs) among local authorities (LAs) within 
metropolitan areas (MAs). In order to perform this exploration, an institutional political 
economy perspective (Chang, 2002) is employed to overcome the limits of usual studies, 
most of which tend to neglect institutional variables which might shape the income-
recycling nexus. In particular, this chapter highlights the importance of the distributional 
aspect of the service-funding regime (SFR) that sustains municipal waste management 
(MWM); that is to say, the question is whether funding mechanisms and local fiscal 
autonomy (LFA) reproduce, ignore or correct income inequalities between LAs, 
particularly when it comes to SCRs.  
 
As part of the neglect of institutional factors, most of the existent literature places income 
on the demand side of variables, seeing it as a predictor of consumer or voter behaviour. 
Scarce consideration is given to the fact that income distribution might be a proxy of 
institutional arrangements, political settlements and balance of power between different 
groups (Goodfellow, 2017). A possible explanation for a lack of discussion about the SFR 
might be that studies analysing determinants of SCRs at LA level tend to select samples 
of cases that belong to the same institutional framework. For instance, a vast majority of 
existent studies focus on LAs within one specific country (Hahladakis et al, 2018; 
Agovino et al, 2016; Carvalho & Cunha Marques, 2014; Slavik & Pavel, 2013; Gallardo 
et al, 2012; Abbott et al, 2011; Matsumoto, 2011; Lavee & Khatib, 2010; Chen, 2010; 
Chen & Chen, 2008; Peretz et al 2005), and some additional studies look at what happens 
within a specific region or state (for states under federal regimes see Starr & Nicolson, 
2015; Lakhan, 2014; Sidique et al, 2010; Callan & Thomas, 2006; for a region see 
Passarini et al, 2011). In both national or regional/state scale studies, the analysis is 
usually limited to one specific institutional framework, therefore reducing the 
possibilities of observing differences associated to relevant contrasts in rules. The aim of 
this chapter is to fill the gap by using a mixed methods approach is used here to explore 
this gap by means of comparing two MAs from different European countries: Barcelona 
(Spain) and London (United Kingdom). 
 
This work therefore provides an institutional supply-side approach to income as a factor 
determining recycling within cities. Evidence is provided of the relevance that 
institutional factors such as the SFR might have on this link. This research should 
contribute, first, to expand our understanding of the income-recycling nexus in cities, and 
second, to move beyond a focus on the demand side, also considering institutional supply-
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side factors. The way in which existent income inequality can shape new divides – as 
could be the environmental ones – depends on policy and urban political economy.  
 
4.2 Material and methods 
 
4.2.1 Case study selection 
 
This study compares two cases of MAs that operate mature recycling systems (Peretz et 
al, 2005), within the European Union: Barcelona and London. These cases are particularly 
interesting in the context of a discussion on accelerating the transition to equitable, 
sustainable, and liveable cities towards post-fossil carbon societies, since the two have 
been referenced as model cities in regard to different urban development paradigms. For 
instance, both have been regarded as global cities (Sassen, 2007), creative cities (Florida, 
2005), and more recently, smart cities (Morandi et al, 2016).  
  
 
Figure 23. Separate Collection Rates at LA level in Barcelona and London 
  
 
As MAs with mature recycling systems, the mean SCR at a LA level is stable above 30 
per cent in both Barcelona and London (Figure 23), although the mean is slightly higher 
in the former than in the latter (Tables 24 and 25). Both cities have long ago implemented 
both compulsory municipal recycling and landfill tax, which are key policies for 
promoting recycling (for the European context see Antonioli & Massarutto, 2012; for 
Spain and Barcelona, see Chamizo-Gonzalez et al, 2016, Puig-Ventosa, 2008, and Rifé 
& Domènech, 2007; for the UK see Abbott et al, 2011, Martin & Scott, 2003, and 
Burnley, 2001). For instance, landfill tax was implemented for the first time in the UK in 
1996 (Seely, 2009), while Catalonya implemented it in 2004 (Almasi & Milios, 2013). 
 
However, whereas general recycling policies and waste-collection responsibilities of LAs 
are similar in both cases, municipal financing models differ, leading to contrasting levels 
of LFA. Autonomous revenue, that is to say, income generated by municipalities 
regardless of grants from other government levels, is a relevant measure to understand 
financial capacities at the local level. As it can be seen in Figure 24, autonomous revenue 
is far more relevant as part of municipal budgets in Barcelona than in London. During 
year 2014, for instance, while autonomous revenue represented a mean of 71.1 per cent 
in Barcelona’s metropolitan municipalities, the equivalent figure was 27.4 per cent in the 
case of London boroughs. Weights of central versus local resources are the opposite in 
both cities. Additionally, although the relevance of locally generated income is lower, 
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divergence among LAs is higher in London than in Barcelona, as it can be seen when 
looking at the standard deviation for the 2010-2014 period: 12.2 in the latter and 8.4 in 
the former (Tables 24 and 25). While in Barcelona municipal budgets are more stably 
dependent on autonomous revenue, ranging between 42.3 and 89.6 per cent of total 
municipal budget during the period, in London divergence is wider, ranging from 1.8 to 
66.6 per cent.  
 
 
Figure 24. Autonomous revenue as percentage of total municipal budget. 
 
Moreover, in regard to income distribution, Gini coefficient among households during 
year 2016 was 0.39 for Greater London and 0.33 for Barcelona (Barcelona Activa & 
Barcelona City Council, 2017). Although income inequality is higher in London, both 
cases rank close to the average within the OECD, which was 0.32. Both cities are quite 
egalitarian compared to other OECD MAs, such as New York – 0.42 – or Santiago de 
Chile – 0.48 (Barcelona Activa & Barcelona City Council, 2017). However, household 
income is geographically distributed differently in both cities. Barcelona, for instance, is 
not only slightly less unequal at a household level, but also differences in mean income 
between LAs are smaller than in London, and rich municipalities are not so spatially 
concentrated as in the UK’s capital (Figure 25).  
 
 




The research questions that guide the chosen methods are: 
Do separate collection rates necessarily mirror the residents’ income differences 






Are service financing regimes linked to separate collection rates? 
 
In order to answer these questions, the study adopts a mixed-methods exploratory 
approach. This implies that more than entirely defining causality issues, the objectives 
are: 
- to describe and characterise different forms of the nexus between income and 
recycling between LAs within a MA, based on the two selected cases, and 
- to find evidence that institutional supply-side factors such as the SFR might have 
a role in shaping this link. 
 
In order to advance towards these objectives, a comparative analysis between the two 
cases is made on the basis of the three methods described below. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Descriptive analysis: comparing curves 
 
In order to obtain a more general and intuitive approach to both income and recycling 
gaps at LA level within each city, a simple exercise is performed to draw curves 
representing these gaps. A ratio is calculated both for the SCR and mean residents’ 
income per LA, using the formula Ratio = xi / xmin, where xi is the value per LA, and xmin 
is the minimum value per LA within the metropolitan area. LAs are ordered from the 
lowest to the highest mean income. The Results are shown in Section 4.4.1.  
 
4.2.2.2 Econometric models: panel data regressions 
 
Fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) regressions on panel data are used for both cases.  
Mean income and autonomous revenue are the explanatory variables. Autonomous 
revenue is the percentage of the municipal budget that comes from local sources instead 
of grants or transfers from the central or regional government. Residential density is used 
as control variable, as present in most of the models from the literature. Due to data 
availability constraints, other relevant explanatory variables that can be found in the 
literature are missing (i.e. age, education, collection frequency and technique, density of 
drop-off points and pricing scheme). However, the models do not attempt to predict 
SCRs, but to look specifically into the link between recycling and income differences at 
LA level. Logarithmic transformation of variables is included as a standard approach that 
allows working with fractional data.  
 
The FE regression equation is: 
ln	(𝑅𝐸𝐶)-. = 	𝛼- + 	𝛽1 ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶)-. +	𝛽: ln(𝐴𝑈𝑇)-. + 𝛽@ ln(𝐷𝐸𝑁)-. + 𝜇-. 
Where 
- ln	(𝑅𝐸𝐶)-. is the dependent variable (natural log of the SCR), where i = LA and 
t = time; 
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- ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶)-. , ln(𝐴𝑈𝑇)-., and ln(𝐷𝐸𝑁)-. represent the independent variables, which 
are the natural logs of mean income, autonomous revenue, and density, 
respectively; 
- 𝛽N(k=1…3) is the coefficient for the independent variables; 
- 𝛼-(k=1…n) is the intercept for each entity (LA-specific intercepts); 
- 𝜇-. is the error term. 
The RE regression equation is: 
ln	(𝑅𝐸𝐶)-. = 𝛽1 ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶)-. +	𝛽: ln(𝐴𝑈𝑇)-. + 𝛽@ ln(𝐷𝐸𝑁)-. +	𝜀-. 
 
Where 
- ln	(𝑅𝐸𝐶)-. ,	ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶)-. , ln(𝐴𝑈𝑇)-., ln(𝐷𝐸𝑁)-. r, as well as 𝛽N(k=1…4) represent 
the same as in the FE model; 
- 𝜀-.is the composite error term. 
In addition, squared mean income (𝐼𝑁𝐶^2) to account for the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC) structural relation (see Section 4.3.3.). In the case of the FE regression, the 
new equation is ln	(𝑅𝐸𝐶)-. = 	𝛽1 ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶)-. + 	𝛽:𝐼𝑁𝐶^2-. + 	𝛽@ ln(𝐴𝑈𝑇)-. + 𝛽B ln(𝐷𝐸𝑁)-. + 𝛼- +
	𝑢-.. In the case of the RE regression, the new equation is ln	(𝑅𝐸𝐶)-. = 	𝛽1 ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶)-. +
	𝛽:𝐼𝑁𝐶^2-. + 	𝛽@ ln(𝐴𝑈𝑇)-. + 𝛽B ln(𝐷𝐸𝑁)-. + 	𝜀-..  
 
Hausman tests for fixed versus random effects models are run and reported for all the 
regressions. Results can be found in Section 4.4.2. Along with FE and RE regression 
results, reports also include Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions on pooled data, 
and Between Groups Regressions (BR) for the panel data. Reported R2 is ‘adjusted’ for 
OLS, ‘overall’ for RE, ‘within’ for FE, and ‘between’ for BR. 
 
4.2.2.3 On-site visits to selected LAs  
 
On-site visits (Shen et al, 2018; Ingrao et al, 2014) are a commonly used approach to 
collect data that can help to get a more detailed account of how systems work at a local 
level. In order to have qualitative evidence that could be helpful to interpret the 
quantitative analysis, these on-site visits to LAs were performed at three selected LAs 
within each MA. The six selected LAs are in the extremes of the distribution in terms of 
SCRs. In Barcelona, selected LAs were Santa Coloma de Gramanet and Sant Adria de 
Besos among those with lower SCR, and Tiana among those with higher SCR. In London, 
Newham and Barking & Dagenham are among the underperformers, and Richmond upon 
Thames among the overperformers regarding SCRs. These cases can be seen in context 
in Figure 26, which shows SCRs for 2014. On-site visits were focused on waste collection 
infrastructure as it can be observed from the public space. The main findings are discussed 











Whereas qualitative data was collected during on-site visits, quantitative sections of the 
paper use secondary data from a range of sources. In the case of Barcelona, SCR, mean 
income per capita and density comes from the Sistema d'Indicadors Metropolitans de 
Barcelona (SIMBA), published by the Institut d'estudis Regionals i metropolitans de 
Barcelona (2018). Autonomous revenue percentages for metropolitan municipalities 
within Barcelona were calculated using figures from the Municipal Budget platform by 
Gobierto (2018).  
 
In the case of London, SCR, mean income per capita and density comes from the Greater 
London Authority’s London Datastore (2018). Autonomous revenue percentages for 
London boroughs were calculated using figures from ‘Local authority revenue 
expenditure and financing’, as published by the Ministry of Housing, Communities & 
Local Government (2018a). The latter was done following the methodology proposed by 
the same source (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2018b) to 
calculate the reported local authority income from central government grants as a 
percentage of revenue expenditure. The ‘City of London’ administrative territory was 
excluded from the analysis. 
 
In both cities, the figure used for mean income is tax payers declared income. Mean 
income per capita figures from London were converted to Euros in order to make 
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coefficients more easily comparable. Summary statistics can be found in Tables 1 and 2. 
All figures and tables included in the text were produced by the author. 
 
Table 25. Summary Statistics: Barcelona 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Separate Collection Rate (%) 180 39.86 12.12 16.72 86.36 
Mean Income p/c (M EUR) 180 22.30 4.68 15.80 38.61 
Autonomous revenue (%) 180 71.80 8.44 42.33 89.59 
Density (people p/Km2) 180 4,858.16 5,408.59 125.60 20,730.40 
 
Table 26. . Summary Statistics: London 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Separate Collection Rate (%) 160 33.39 8.78 14.92 55.21 
Mean Income p/c (M EUR) 160 47.64 26.75 24.76 183.70 
Autonomous revenue (%) 160 35.80 12.19 1.17 66.63 





4.3.1 Income as a demand-side factor influencing recycling 
 
Existent research typically includes income as one of the most relevant socio-economic 
variables determining SCRs (Agovino et al, 2016). However, as already mentioned, the 
usual approach tends to look at income as a demand-side variable (see Figure 5). Tadesse 
(2009:190) provides a good overall framing to understand the difference between 
demand-driven and supply-driven factors influencing municipal recycling: 
The demand-driven (such as age, education and income) and supply-driven (such 
as regulation, access and distance to waste containers) factors can also be 
considered for policy applications as they directly or indirectly influence the 
environmental attitude (concern) and waste management practices (such as 
appropriate disposal) (Tadesse, 2009:190). 
 
Placing income on the demand side may follow diverse theoretical justifications (Figure 
5). Conversely, different signs of the correlation between income and recycling can be 
expected according to those justifications. On the one hand, some argue that higher 
income is linked to lower probability of recycling. An explanation has to do with 
consumption patterns and waste production. Sidique et al (2010), for instance, expect 
higher income to be related to more consumption, and therefore greater waste generation 
and lower recycling rate. Another explanation has to do with the opportunity cost of time: 
high-earners have a higher opportunity cost, therefore might be more reluctant to recycle 
(Abbott et al, 2011).  
 
On the other hand, some expect income to be positively linked to recycling. Justifications 
are related to purchasing patterns: richer people are able to purchase goods with a higher 
recyclable content (Callan & Thomas, 2006). Other theories argue that, although 
everyone desires to protect the environment, higher income people are the ones with 
capacity to pay to do it (Abbott et al, 2011). Moreover, income is seen as intrinsically 
linked to other demand-side factors. As described by Chen (2010:451), ‘rising disposable 
income may increase the propensity to consume and generate solid wastes, but it also can 
bring about the increase in recycling rate through rising education levels’. In the same 
line, Challcharoenwattana & Pharino (2016) find links between income and pro-
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environment attitudes, involving a mixture of socio-economic conditions, education and 
household characteristics that are all inter-correlated.  
 
Although the literature finds mixed evidence on the significance and sign of the link 
between income and municipal recycling, all the studies put income along demand-side 
factors. In contrast, they do not seem to see a link between income and supply side 
determinants. For instance, Starr & Nicolson (2015) mention policy factors along with 
demographic ones. However, the former are associated to existence of mandatory laws 
and political affiliations of LAs, whereas income is defined as demand-side. Likewise, 
Lakhan (2014) focuses on policy measures related to investment on educational programs 
that should affect people´s behaviour. For Lakhan, these supply-side measures are 
relevant because education will end up impacting consumer behaviour, or, in other words, 
demand. Income is expected to reflect relevant characteristics of consumers or voters, but 
the link with recycling is not expected to say anything about supply-side phenomena. 
Other views on income, as it could be to see it as a proxy of balances of power within a 
society, and to particular institutions linked to those balances (Goodfellow, 2017), are not 
considered. 
 
Some authors, such as Challcharoenwattana & Pharino (2016) and Slavik & Pavel (2013) 
touch the issue of income and municipal finances when discussing possible pricing 
schemes. However, the latter are considered as mechanisms to produce behavioural 
change. What is definitely missing is an account of the influence of the SFR on SCRs. 
SFRs are defined by LFA and MWM financing models, which are strictly supply-side 
factors that can reasonably be expected to shape the link between recycling and income. 




4.3.2 Local fiscal autonomy and funding mechanisms as supply-side factors shaping 
the link between income and recycling  
 
The main theoretical proposition in this article is that institutional determinants such as 
regulations on municipal revenue models and central government grants, might affect the 
nature of the income-recycling nexus, beyond what happens with the demand for 
recycling services among people.  The notion of SFR allows to characterise ways in which 
these institutional determinants can be observed in each specific case. 
 
Only after the Great Recession and implementation of austerity policies this issue has 
somehow emerged in the literature, but it is not yet in the centre of the analyses. For 
instance, Abbott et al (2011), after discussing recycling in the UK, briefly comment that 
‘given limited resources, local authorities have to get ‘more bang for their buck’. Never 
is this more true than now in the post financial crisis period with local authorities facing 
dramatic cuts to their budgets’ (Abbott et al 2011:2222).  
 
Therefore, the SFR will be understood as result of the interaction between LFA and 
funding mechanisms for services. The resulting regime will determine whether SCRs are 
linked or not to residents’ income. If a SFR is not linked to any socio-economic factor, it 
can be considered distribution-neutral, and there should not be a link between SCRs and 
income. If a SFR does depend on socio-economic factors, it can be progressive – when a 
redistribution system gives more to the poor – or regressive – if distribution of municipal 
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resources rewards the rich or depends directly or indirectly on having high-income 
residents. Whereas in a progressive regime income and SCRs should be negatively linked, 
the opposite sign should be observed in a regressive regime. This theoretical proposition 
is summarised in Figure 27. In what follows, Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 explain why the 
SFR from Barcelona can be considered a regressive regime, while the SFR from London 
is closer to be distribution-neutral. 
 
4.3.2.1 Local fiscal autonomy 
 
In regard to revenue sources, Spanish municipalities are able to ‘take advantage of three 
mandatory and two optional taxes’ (Loughlin & Lux, 2008:220). On the one hand, 
mandatory are taxes on property, businesses and motor vehicles. Municipalities have a 
degree of discretion to set these taxes, within limits defined by the central Government. 
On the other hand, optional are taxes on construction, building installations and works, 
and on capital gains in urban areas. While law sets the former, each LA sets the latter 
within state-imposed limits. The nature of these sources of income makes them strongly 
linked to the inter-correlated presence of wealth, income and economic activity (i.e. 
number, type ad size of businesses; purchase and use of private vehicles; investment on 
new buildings; capital gains). Furthermore, the central government grants system fails to 
equalise differences in tax capacity between the different Spanish municipalities, actually 
favouring those LAs with greater tax capacity (Loughlin & Lux, 2008).  
 
In the UK, on the other hand, the main source of autonomous revenue is the council tax 
(Bosch Roca & Espasa Queralt, 2008). LAs can have certain degrees of discretion on 
setting this tax, within ranges defined by the central Government (Gottlieb, 2016). 
However, as seen in Figure 2, in contrast with Barcelona, boroughs in London depend 
mostly on grants, being autonomous revenue a much smaller portion of their budget. This 
lower level of local autonomy in the UK compared to Spain is also linked to a higher 
degree of possibilities of equalisation by central government grants. All the other types 
of taxes are centrally collected and redistributed via these grants. This situation has 
sparked a long lasting debate on devolution and local autonomy, which involves both 
territorial equity and the flexibility and pertinence of the ‘menu of services’ delivered by 
each LA, almost entirely set by the central Government (Six, 2008).  
 
In the British context, the relevance of central grants also implies that most LAs have 
very little possibilities of finding alternative revenue sources apart from council tax if 
there are changes in central fiscal policy, as it was the case after the 2008 financial crisis 
(Ferry & Eckersley, 2011). ‘UK municipalities are compelled by law to deliver austerity 
and they have no control over welfare reform. They may spend reserves, but deficit 
budgeting is prohibited. Municipalities have even less room for manoeuvre than in Spain’ 
(Davies & Blanco, 2017:1521).  
 
This is not to say that a higher degree of local autonomy implies to escape the effects of 
financial crisis and austerity in Spain. All levels of government and sources of revenue 
have been affected after the crisis, pushing Spanish LAs to perform diverse strategies, 
which included both reducing services and transferring costs to users (Cascajo et al, 
2017). Furthermore, the crisis widened existent inequalities, since ‘municipal finance in 





4.3.2.2 Funding mechanism for recycling services 
 
Funding of recycling services is embedded in each LFA context. As reviewed by 
Chamizo-Gonzalez et al (2016), existent mechanisms to fund MWM services can be 
classified in four main systems: undesignated funds, flat fee, variable fee depending on 
waste generated, and variable fee system not depending on waste generation. Whereas 
recycling services in most of Barcelona’s municipalities are financed by variable fee 
system not depending on waste generation, in London it is financed by undesignated 
funds in all boroughs. In Barcelona, fees are charged according to water consumed by 
each household. However, a minority of municipalities have decided not to charge to their 
residents but pay it from undesignated funds instead (Rifé & Domènech, 2007) and there 
are also cases of LAs implementing Pay As You Throw (PAYT) schemes (Puig-Ventosa, 
2008). In contrast, ‘local governments in the UK are not allowed to charge for waste 
collection. Funding for recycling and residual waste collections comes from the council 
tax, a tax on property, and a central government grant, which fund all local government 
services’ (Abbott et al, 2011:2215). 
 
Therefore, both similarities and differences can be stated between the two funding 
systems. On the one hand, in neither case the way of charging for recycling services is 
directly linked to waste produced. In Barcelona, it can be charged according to water 
consumption or considered included in taxes. In London, it is considered paid via taxes. 
An additional similarity is that LAs in both cities have a certain degree of discretion on 
local tax rates, although the impact of local decisions on the municipal budget is far 
superior in Barcelona. However, the biggest difference is that LAs in Barcelona can 
decide on charging the usual fee, or even to implement additional charges. In contrast, 
London councils are not allowed to charge apart from the council tax.  
 
High LFA, revenue sources associated to mean residents’ income, and discretional 
charging for MWM makes the SFR in Barcelona to be regressive. Low LFA, with most 
funding coming from central government grants that do not necessarily follow residents’ 
mean income, and inability to charge for MWM, makes London to be a distribution-
neutral SFR. 
 
4.3.3 Structural relation: Environmental Kuznets Curve  
 
In addition to the discussion above regarding demand or supply-based approaches, 
research on the income-recycling nexus should also consider relevant theories that aim to 
link income and environmental issues within ecological economics. In this sense, a strong 
idea that has found mixed empirical support is a structural relation named as the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Nassani et al, 2017; Roca & Alcántara, 2001). 
This idea follows the original seminal work by Kuznets (1955), who claimed the existence 
of an inverted U-shaped relation between economic development and income inequality: 
countries might experience an increase in inequality as their income grows, but, allegedly, 
they will later reach a plateau and finally see a decrease in inequality as they become 
‘developed’. Although this structural relationship has proved to be inexistent in recent 
years (Piketty, 2014; Palma, 2011), ecological economists have used the same notion to 
illustrate a similar link between economic growth and environmental harmfulness 
(Nassani et al, 2017; Roca & Alcántara, 2001). This idea has been discussed in the case 
of MWM by works such as Chen & Chen (2008), and Chen (2010). Furthermore, in this 






Following the aforementioned theoretical discussion, three hypotheses are formulated 
and tested: 
 
H1: The wider the income inequality between LAs, the bigger the SCR divide will 
be within a metropolitan area. 
 
H2: LFA and redistribution of resources within a MA can influence the link 
between residents’ income and SCRs.  
 
H3: If SCRs follow income differences, the link between mean income and SC rates 








4.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
 
Curves representing the LA-level income and recycling gaps within each MA can be 
found in Figure 28. As expected, the income gap is wider in London than in Barcelona. 
While in Barcelona the mean income is 2.3 times higher in the richest LA than in the 
poorest one, in London the equivalent ratio rises to 6.3. However, surprisingly, when it 
comes to recycling, the gap is wider in Barcelona than in London. In the Catalonian 
capital, the ratio between the LA that recycles the most and the one that recycles the less 
is 4.3, while in London it is 3.1.  
 
However, more interesting for the research questions and hypotheses is to consider the 
trend followed by the two curves in each case. In this sense, the recycling curve only 
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tends to follow the income one in the case of Barcelona, but there are no signs of any sort 
of ‘mirror effect’ in London. 
 
 




Just as in the descriptive analysis, regression results show that the link between SCRs and 
income works differently in the two cases. On the one hand, income is significantly linked 
to SCRs among Barcelona’s LAs. On the other hand, whereas income is not a significant 
variable in London, percentage of autonomous revenue is indeed significant and 
positively linked to SCR within boroughs. 
 
Table 26 shows regression results for Barcelona. The Hausman test for FE versus RE 
produces a p-value above 0.05, which implies that the RE model is appropriate. 
Therefore, the selected variables can explain changes between and within LAs. In the 
case of Barcelona, the RE model can explain almost 40 per cent of the variance of SCRs, 
both between and within LAs. While income is significantly and positively correlated to 
SCRs, percentage of autonomous revenue is not significant. 
 
In contrast, mean income is not significant in London (Table 27). In this case, the 
Hausman test t-statistic is below 0.05, which means that the FE model is appropriate. It 
is notable that, in London, percentage of autonomous revenue is positively and 
significantly correlated to SCRs within boroughs. 15 per cent of the variance of SCRs 









































Table 27. Regression Results: Barcelona 
 OLS F-E R-E BR 
             
 Coef. sig. S.E. Coef. sig. S.E. Coef. sig. S.E. Coef. sig. S.E. 
             
log Mean Income p/c (thousand EUR)  0.536   ***   (0.102)   0.156    (0.522)   0.571   **   (0.193)   0.528  *  (0.217)  
log Autonomous revenue (%)  0.327   *   (0.157)  -0.190    (0.239)  -0.025    (0.196)   0.387    (0.349)  
log Density (people p/Km2) -0.058   ***   (0.016)  -1.168    (0.813)  -0.077   *   (0.031)  -0.055    (0.034)  
constant  1.048    (0.722)   13.076    (7.261)   2.588   *   (1.026)   0.796    (1.592)  
             
Observations 180   180   180   180   
N. groups.    36   36   36   
R2  0.396     0.026     0.389     0.460    
             
Hausman test for fixed versus random effects 
model (p-value) 
 0.271             
*p-value ≤ 0.05; **p-value ≤ 0.01; ***p-value ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 28. Regression Results: London. 
 OLS F-E R-E BR 
             
 Coef. sig. S.E. Coef. sig. S.E. Coef. sig. S.E. Coef. sig. S.E. 
             
log Mean Income p/c (thousand EUR)  0.090   *   0.043  -0.345    0.189   0.121    0.081   0.026    0.088  
log Autonomous revenue (%)  0.143   ***   0.034   0.060   *   0.026   0.020    0.022   0.320   **   0.098  
log Density (people p/Km2) -0.306   ***   0.034   2.224   ***   0.482  -0.319   ***   0.066  -0.238   **   0.071  
constant  5.308   ***   0.324  -14.862   ***   3.957   5.730   ***   0.568   4.334   ***   0.748  
             
Observations 160   160   160   160   
N. groups.    32   32   32   
R2  0.493     0.148     0.462     0.635    
             
Hausman test for fixed versus random effects 
model (p-value) 
0.000            
*p-value ≤ 0.05; **p-value ≤ 0.01; ***p-value ≤ 0.001 
 
 
Additionally, as explained in sections 4.2.2.2 and 4.3.3, the presence of an EKC type 
relation between income and recycling rates was also tested. Results from regressions 
including the squared term are not shown in detail due to space constraints, but can be 
requested to the author. Signs of an EKC relation are absent from both cases. Actually, 
the result from the FE regression in Barcelona – the only case in which the Hausman test 
assigns efficiency to a model in which squared income is significant – implies that the 
relation between income and recycling within LAs over time shows the opposite sign than 
expected by the EKC proposition. 
 
4.4.3 On-site observation 
 
On-site observation provides possible explanations for the links between income, 
municipal revenue and recycling. What becomes evident after visiting the selected six 
LAs is that higher SCRs seem to be associated to higher levels of specialisation in the 
MWM systems. High performers such as Tiana in Barcelona and Richmond Upon 
Thames in London have in common to provide a more diverse collection service 
compared to other LAs within the same MA. These services cover a wider range of types 
of waste, and are also associated to a higher collection frequency of all sorts of 
recyclables. In contrast, lower performance LAs, such as Sant Adria de Besos and Santa 
Coloma de Gramanet in Barcelona, and Newham in London, seem to have less specialised 
collection systems. 
 
This specialisation could be the explanation for the link between autonomous revenue 
and recycling, which is expressed in the panel data for the case of London, and implicit 
in the significance of mean income in the case of Barcelona. Specialising requires two 
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alternatives, both of which would be reflected by higher autonomous revenue. On the one 
hand, proactive investment on specialised MWM services requires available resources 
beyond those needed to cover the most basic needs. On the other hand, policies such as 
PAYT or other price-related policies – which have been implemented in some 
municipalities in Barcelona (Puig-Ventosa, 2008) – that increase SCRs (Starr & Nicolson, 
2015) could consequently produce growth in autonomous revenue. More detailed 
research regarding timing of decisions on prices and local taxes, as well as of investment 
on and returns from municipal services, would be needed to solve this causality problem.  
 
Furthermore, a good example of this specialisation can be found in Barcelona. In this city, 
both Sant Adria and Santa Coloma have a similar dense grid of drop-off points, which 
provide a standard supply of containers for glass, plastic, paper and mixed waste. 
Something common in both cases was to find excess of mixed waste surrounding drop-
off points, or even additional bins for residual waste (see the case of Santa Coloma shown 
in Figure 29, letter B). In contrast, drop off points do not include mixed waste in Tiana – 
that reaches an impressive 85 per cent SCR. As shown in Figure 29 (letters D, E and F), 
mixed waste containers are considered ‘emergency containers’, located separated from 
the recyclable drop-off points. Tiana collects organics 4 times a week using a kerbside 
service, while mixed waste is officially collected home by home only once a week. 
Moreover, some drop off points for recyclables include bins that are highly specialised. 
An example are bins for nappies: given the characteristics of this sort of waste, neighbours 
are asked to request a key at the town hall to be able to use the service. 
 
A similar pattern can be found in London. Newham, which was the lowest performer 
within the MA in 2014, only has two types of bins for kerbside collection: non-organic 
and mixed (Figure 29, letter G). Barking & Dagenham, which performed slightly better, 
includes a third bin for organic waste (Figure 29, letter H). Bins looked particularly full 
in Newham, which was paired with excess of mixed waste piled on the streets around 
drop-off points and litterbins. This might be a sign of a supply of collection frequencies 
that is not able to meet the existent demand, especially in mixed-use zones.  
 
As in Barcelona, higher SCRs in London seem to be associated with higher specialisation. 
For instance, Richmond upon Thames has five different classifications of waste. A first 
bin is paper, card and cardboard; a second one is for plastic bottles, pots, tubs, trays, 
unbroken glass bottles, food tins, drink cans and empty aerosol cans; a third bin is for 
food waste; a fourth is for residual waste; finally, the council also provides a service for 
garden waste collection (Figure 29, letter I). This higher specialisation is also reflected in 






Figure 29. Photo-registry of on-site observation. 
Sites: Sant Adria (A); Santa Coloma (B); Tiana (C, D, E, F); Newham (G, J); Barkin & Dagenham (H, K); Richmond upon Thames 
(I, L) 
 
4.4.4 Summary of results 
 
In regard to hypotheses defined in Section 4.3.4, results can be summarised as follow. 
Firstly, H1 can be rejected within this two case-comparison (the wider the income 
inequality between LAs, the bigger the SCR divide will be within a metropolitan area). 
On the one hand, although London is more income-unequal than Barcelona, the recycling 
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gap is wider in the latter than in the former. On the other hand, the link between income 
and SCRs is only significant in Barcelona, but not in London.  
 
Secondly, results from regressions and qualitative evidence from the qualitative part 
allows accepting H2 (the institutional regime determining LFA and redistribution of 
resources within a MA can influence the link between residents’ income and SCRs). 
Income is significantly linked only under the context of a regressive SFR in Barcelona. 
In London, in contrast, the link is not significant, but SCRs are significantly and positively 
linked to changes in autonomous revenue over time within boroughs. Observational 
evidence about specialisation point to possible specific mechanisms that could explain 
this nexus, such as availability of investment resources beyond those used to cover basic 
needs in both MAs, or the consequence of implementing charging schemes in Barcelona. 
Finally, H3 is rejected (if SCRs follow income differences, the link between mean income 
and SC rates at LA level will follow the EKC logic).  
 
4.5 Discussion and public policy implications 
 
Existent research on the income-recycling nexus tends to assume that the smaller income 
differences between LAs are, the less significant socioeconomic level should be to predict 
SCRs (Passarini et al, 2011). In contrast, results from this study point to the opposite 
direction. Although income differences between LAs are smaller in Barcelona than in 
London, the income-recycling link is significant only in the former but not in the latter. 
As explained above, this contrast between some assumptions from the demand-oriented 
literature and results from this particular study are linked to institutional factors. Results 
from comparing Barcelona and London suggest paying higher attention to supply-side 
factors such as MWM funding mechanisms and LFA. The neglect of institutional 
elements might be distorting theories and interpretation of empirical results. 
 
Consequently, a relevant question to ask is whether income is always a given demand-
side factor, or is it instead institutional design that turns income into a predictor of SCRs. 
If income is linked to consumer behaviour regardless of supply-side factors exemplified 
in the SFR, the association between income and SCR in distribution-neutral London 
should have been significant. In this two-case study, the nexus is only significant in 
Barcelona, where the SFR is regressive.  
 
Furthermore, although there might be deep historical and path-dependency related 
explanations for the way municipal services are financed in each context, SFRs can 
definitely be subject of policy design. For instance, although austerity policies might be 
damaging the capacity of LAs to recycle (Abbott et al, 2011), they also show that factors 
such as LFA can be modified by policy decisions, as it can be observed with the 
generalised reduction in autonomous revenue among London boroughs (Figure 24).  
 
In summary, the demand-side income-recycling nexus should not be taken for granted, 
since it could be reflecting phenomena beyond consumer or voter behaviour, such as 
metropolitan tax and municipal funding structures that are regressive.  
 
Furthermore, distribution of municipal recycling budgets should be taken in account 
when discussing how to accelerate the transition to equitable, sustainable, and liveable 
cities towards post-fossil carbon societies. In this sense, some suggestions could be made 
for both research and policy. First, among researchers, to pay attention to how regressive 
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or progressive SFRs are, in order to understand the way institutions shape the link 
between recycling and socio-economic factors. Second, among LAs, to provide more 
detailed account of both expenditure and revenue regarding MWM services. It is very 
difficult to analyse efficiency of transition strategies, as well as distinguishing between 
supply versus demand factors, without being able to observe these key financial variables 
as they interact with other service characteristics. Third, among national, regional or 
metropolitan governments in charge of defining recycling policies and goals, it is 
fundamental to give priority to the problem of distribution of resources, so that having 
effective recycling services – which could even create revenue or at least cost reduction 
for LAs after proper investment – is something achievable for those LAs where the poor 
live.  
 
Income inequality within cities can lead to new divides, such as widened recycling gap. 
However, as shown by comparing the cases of Barcelona and London, recycling does not 
need to necessarily mirror existing inequalities. Letting income differences determine 
recycling capacities might lower the peace of transition towards sustainability, making 




The recycling gap within metropolitan areas does not necessarily mirror the existent 
income inequality. Barcelona and London represent two contrasting examples that can 
illustrate two forms of this link. In Barcelona, although income inequality between LAs 
is smaller, SCRs are influenced by income differences between LAs. In London, larger 
income differences are not translated into SCRs. This research presents consistent 
evidence to explore the hypothesis that this difference is linked to the SFR, which depends 
on institutional design. Further research should be cautious about attributing an 
explanatory power over SCRs to residents’ income. Beyond demand-driven phenomena 
(i.e. expected influence on consumer and voter behaviour), the income-recycling nexus 
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5 The written and unwritten rules of internet 
exclusion: inequality, institutions and network 






Studies about the link between income and Internet access tend to focus exclusively on 
the demand side, or, when considering the supply side, to neglect any possible role of 
local and informal institutions. This research pays attention to the relationship between 
income distribution and internet access within metropolitan areas of the Global South, 
with a special emphasis on local and informal institutions that could shape the ways by 
which this relationship works. Using a mixed-methods approach, two Latin American 
metropolitan areas are analysed: Santiago (Chile) and Medellín (Colombia). Although 
income is clearly linked to household Internet access in both cases, there are supply-side 
differences that can influence the income-connectivity nexus. The author proposes to 
introduce the concept of ‘institutionally generated network disadvantage’. Examples of 
formal and informal institutional factors are redlining, informal housing, socio-spatial 
segregation, tax exemptions and local public provision of services. The urban poor seem 
to be the most affected by institutionally generated digital exclusion. 
 
Keywords: Internet, inequality, Global South, digital divide, institutions 
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Income inequality has joined a central stage in the global development debate. However, 
in which ways does the income divide influence new divides, such as those related to 
access to digital connectivity? This research explores this question, focusing on the link 
between income and access to Internet within cities of the Global South. 
  
To approach the discussion, it is worth mentioning some caveats among dominant 
perspectives on provision of telecom services. On the one hand, normative narratives are 
polarised between celebration of market-based provision (Joskow, 2009) and critiques of 
inevitable forms of exclusion emerging as a product of profit-driven logics (Graham and 
Marvin, 2002). On the other hand, empirical studies of Internet access tend to provide 
insightful analyses about the demand-side, but to forget the supply-side. Yet, what is 
common in all these different approaches is the neglect of the roles played by written and 
unwritten rules in shaping Internet provision. In particular, the role of local and informal 
institutions tends to be absent from the discussion. The consequence of this absence an 
implicit assumption that telecommunications markets are identical everywhere, shaped 
by the same processes of privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation (The World Bank, 
2016).  
 
Here I provide a more nuanced approach, built on the basis of local characteristics rather 
than universal determinism, as well as on views from supply-side actors rather than just 
the experience on the demand-side. In order to do so, it presents evidence from mixed 
methods that include descriptive statistical techniques, regression analysis, and 
qualitative interviews conducted in Santiago (Chile) and Medellín (Colombia). Although 
income is significantly linked to material access to Internet, the extent of its influence and 
specific mechanisms by which this link operates are associated to formal and informal 
institutions, policy decisions and local history of service provision. These institutional 
factors can influence access beyond the willingness and ability-to-pay of potential users. 
Thus, as discussed in Section 5.6, in this paper I introduce the concept of institutionally 
produced network disadvantage: a phenomenon that is shaped by power relations 
between the poor and the elites. 
 
5.2 Internet access and institutions 
 
Internet studies have moved from the ‘first-level’ and ‘second-level’ digital divides, to 
focus on a ‘third-level’ (van Deursen and van Dijk, 2015a). The first-level refers to access 
to infrastructure, continuity and quality of services. The second-level is determined by 
skills and usage patterns. The third-level has to do with the benefits that users get from 
their internet use. Although this approach has enormously contributed to a multifaceted 
model of Internet appropriation and access (van Deursen and van Dijk, 2015b; Helsper 
and Reisdorf, 2017), it has not provided a perspective on how institutional factors can 
influence the different levels of the digital divide.  
 
For instance, when Van Deursen and Helsper (2015a) mention institutions, they do so to 
refer to ‘institutional uses’ and ‘institutional outcomes’ linked to public services and 
government. In a study that looks outside ‘developed’ countries, Pearce and Rice (2017) 
consider trust in as a factor that can influence the third-level digital divide. However, this 
relationship between individuals and institutions does not consider how those institutions 
are configured or can change over time. More recently, when Fernandez et al (2019) look 
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at the digital divide within cities, they only briefly mention that poor communities could 
suffer from redlining by big telcos, but do not discuss the latter as a structural supply-side 
factor shaping access.  
 
Nevertheless, recent shortcomings from the usual policy recipes that supposed to deliver 
universal access to internet should spark renovated attention to institutions. While 
previous generation of telecom services – such as mobile telephony – appeared to be 
following a path towards universal access, new technologies are being a source of 
increasing gaps and inequalities. Particularly after worldwide adoption of high-speed 
Internet, the material access gaps between the rich and the poor have widened (The World 
Bank, 2016). Additionally, commonly accepted policy formulas, such as privatisation and 
liberalisation, are now under scrutiny – as it has been recognised, for instance, by the 
World Bank in its 2016 World Development Report (The World Bank, 2016). As shown 
by the results bellow, I would add that those policy formulas, deemed universal and 
homogeneous, can include more local variations than what is usually expected.  
 
Fundamental questions about the supply side are, for instance: does policy matter? Do 
formal and informal institutions play a role in technology adoption? can local decisions 
shape the provision of highly globalised services such as Internet?  
 
More specifically, the significance of the link between income distribution and internet 
access has been studied at country-level by authors such as Fuchs (2009), Gulati and 
Yates (2012), and more recently by Bauer (2018). The latter provides a theoretical model 
to explain the relationship between Internet access and income inequality. This model 
assumes that causal links can be stablished in both directions. On the one hand, higher 
aggregate inequality is likely to lead to broader internet access gaps, and individual 
income generation determines ability to pay for internet services. On the other hand, as 
proposed by the third-level digital divide literature, differences in internet access and use 
will have consequences in terms of economic outcomes. Conversely, individual and 
aggregate levels – of both income generation and Internet – are expected to influence 
each other, configuring a complex net of causal links which are part of the imbrication 
between digital connectivity and broader social dynamics. Yet, although Bauer (2018) 
mentions social and institutional factors that may influence these links, he does not 
explore such factors further.  
 
A useful source from which to obtain some elements to fill this gap is institutional 
economics. Scholars from this field have introduced the idea of institutions as a way of 
understanding the ‘rules of the game’ in which transactions occur (North, 1990). 
Although this view includes both formal and informal institutions – written and unwritten 
rules, respectively –, it is difficult to find attention paid to the latter within Internet studies. 
Institutional perspectives from Internet scholars have taken two paths: one focusing on 
regulations and policies, and the other focusing on political regimes and democratic 
values. On the policy side, Beltrán (2014) focuses on governance and finance strategies, 
Neokosmidis et al (2015) on efficient regulation, public investment, and copper/fibre 
access prices policy, Haucap et al (2016) on tariff diversity, and Ghosh (2017) on the 
enunciation of a National Broadband Policy. On the regime and values side, democracy 
and authoritarianism have been debated as enhancers and inhibitors of Internet 
penetration first by Milner (2006) and later by Stier (2017). In a middle ground, Gulati 





While all the studies above come from country-level international analyses or specific 
case studies from wealthy countries, the reality in the Global South might require 
devoting more attention to informal institutions. For instance, in his recent ethnographic 
account of Mexico, García Canclini (2019) mentions that ‘it would not be possible to 
build in Mexico City without the under-the-counter-arrangements with those who give 
permission or who are responsible for the provision of water, light or the Internet to a new 
building’ (García Canclini, 2019:491).  
 
This example can be understood within a wider theoretical picture thanks to Khan (2010), 
who provides a description of at least three types of informal institutions that can play a 
role in shaping transactions. Firstly, there are patterns of behaviour that are based on 
internalisation of norms and values. Secondly, there are rules that require enforcement 
but are not written down, and therefore, are informally enforced by extra-state or intra-
state actors. Thirdly, there are tacit institutions that emerge simply because of the need 
for coordination, such as driving on one side of the road without need of enforcement. 
According to Khan (2010), while mainstream institutional economics discusses the first 
type of informal institutions as derived from norms and values, he proposes to focus on 
the second type of institutions. That is to say, those that require enforcement and hence 
are intrinsically rooted in balances of power.  
 
In order to look at the role of these institutions in economic development, Khan (2010) 
proposed the ‘political settlements approach’, which has more recently been adapted to 
analyse cities in Africa by Goodfellow (2017). A political settlement ‘is a combination of 
power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of 
economic and political viability’ (Khan, 2010:4). In this context, ‘the “rent-seeking” 
activities of powerful groups result in the creation of both formal and informal 
institutions’, which ‘sustain distributions of economic benefits for the participants in 
these institutional arrangements’ (Khan, 2010:25). The ‘under-the-counter-arrangements’ 
from the Mexico example, can be understood as informal institutions that are sustained 
by a specific political settlement. 
 
Departing from Bauer (2018), I propose a theoretical framework summarised in Figure 
30. There is an obvious link between income and access to Internet. However, this link is 
mediated and shaped by institutional factors. Thus, I add formal institutional factors that 
are mentioned in the literature, plus informal institutions that emerge as part of the 
political settlement. Following contributions like Goodfellow (2017), which explores 
national-level and city-level expressions of the political settlement, I also divide 
institutional factors between national and local. I will come back to this framework when 





Figure 30. Theoretical links between income and internet access. Institutional factors found in Santiago and Medellín 
are included and underlined. 
 
5.3 Santiago and Medellín 
 
This research uses the cities of Santiago in Chile and Medellín in Colombia as case 
studies. Chile and Colombia are among the most unequal countries in Latin America – 
the most unequal region in the world (Palma, 2011). Both are also part of the same cultural 
inheritance of Catholic and Hispanic post-colonial norms and values (Khan, 2010). 
Furthermore, although Internet access might influence income distribution and therefore 
endogeneity should be taken in account in wider cross-sectional analysis, inequality in 
these cases is originated in long term processes and factors that came long before Internet 
adoption, and income distribution has remained stable during the last decades (Rodríguez 
Weber, 2018; Palma 2011). A key question arising from comparing these similarly 
unequal Latin American cases, is whether the link between income distribution and 
network technology adoption changes according to the differences between political 
settlements. 
 
Metropolitan governance regimes (Kantor et al, 1997) differ in Santiago and Medellín, as 
do political settlements that sustain their national and local institutional arrangements 
(Goodfellow, 2017). Although both countries are part of the Pacific Alliance and 
therefore are usually regarded as ‘market-oriented’ or ‘neoliberal’ within Latin America 
(Aranda and Salinas, 2015), their degree of dependency on private investment is 
significantly different. Santiago relies heavily on private investment and privatised public 
utilities, whereas Medellín’s local authorities have an unusual advantaged financial 
position thanks to revenue from their municipal multi-utility company: Empresas 
Públicas de Medellín (EPM) (Maclean, 2015).  
 
Moreover, both cities are landmark examples of contrasting models of housing provision 
(Chiodelli, 2016). On the one hand, Santiago is an emblem of slum-eradication through 
policies that aimed to enable the development of the formal housing sector by means of 
subsidising demand, as well as giving land ownership to the poor (Gilbert, 2002). On the 
other hand, Medellín is a well-known case of slum-upgrading, exemplifying the 
Colombian prioritisation of providing services to informal settlements even before 
ensuring land tenure or building formal housing units (Gilbert, 2012). As is discussed in 
Section 5.6, formality and informality of housing appears to be a relevant factor 
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The qualitative part of this study is based on 50 semi-structured interviews conducted in 
the two case-studies. Interviewees are part of the supply-side: I was able to reach high-
level officials (cabinet ministers, heads of departments), public servants (specialised 
professionals from government teams), local community-leaders (community boards, 
local NGOs), board members and managers from transnational telecommunication 
companies, workers and union leaders from the same big telcos, and owners of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). 
 
Internet provision SMEs were not part of the original methodological design. However, 
soon after starting doing interviews among community leaders in Santiago, the presence 
of SMEs providing Internet services within the poorest areas of the Chilean capital 
became relevant. This led to their inclusion in the methodological design for Medellín, 
where similar phenomena were found. 
 
Fieldwork was conducted in both cities between March and May 2018. A total of 50 
interviews were carried out: 22 in Santiago and 28 in Medellín. Distribution of 
interviewees is summarised in Table 28. In the case of community leaders, SMEs, as well 
as borough level public officials, a territorial selection criterion was applied. Since both 
cities are divided in boroughs, interviews targeted areas that included emblematic 
marginalised neighbourhoods in each city, plus adjacent zones with diversity of income 
groups. In the case of Santiago, the emblematic marginalised neighbourhoods were La 
Pincoya in Huechuraba and El Castillo in La Pintana; boroughs included were 
Huechuraba and Recoleta – in the North of the city –, plus La Pintana and Puente Alto – 
in the South. In the case of Medellín, marginalised neighbourhoods were Zona Nor-
Oriental and Comuna 13; boroughs included were Comunas 1-Popular, 2-Santa Cruz and 
3-Manrique – in the East of the city –, as well as 13-San Javier, 12-La América and 14-
Laureles-Estadio – in the West. 
 
An interview schedule was utilised to organise semi-structured interviews. Depending on 
each interviewee, some topics were developed in more depth and extension. Interviews 
were conducted in Spanish, recorded in audio and transcribed for analysis. Quotations are 
translated to English by the author. A set of codes was developed based on pilot 
interviews. These codes were confirmed after transcription and used for content analysis. 
Specific quotes are presented to exemplify elements that can help to interpret the 





Table 29. Summary of interviews   
Type of actor Medellín Santiago Total 
Provision  
Board member /managers 3 3 6 
Small/medium-sized enterprises 2 2 4 
Workers/union leaders 2 5 7 
Constituency  
Community leaders 17 8 25 
Policy  
High level authorities 2 3 5 
Public servants 2 1 3 
Total 28 22 50 
Gender    
Female 11 3 14 




The quantitative data comes from household surveys collected by governments in each 
city. In both cases, the version used is for the year 2015. In the case of Santiago, the 
survey is the Encuesta de Caracterización Socio-Económica Nacional (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Social, 2015), using a sample limited to 37 municipalities that are considered 
part of the Santiago Metropolitan Area. In the case of Medellín, the survey utilised is the 
Encuesta de Calidad de Vida Urbana de Medellín (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2015). The data 
includes the 16 boroughs that are part of the urban jurisdiction of the Alcaldía de 
Medellín, plus five semi-rural areas called corregimientos. Summary statistics for each 
city can be found in Tables 29 and 30. 
 
A descriptive quantitative exercise was produced in order to intuitively comprehend the 
link between income distribution and material access to Internet within each city, and 
then be able to compare both cities. In order to do so, income-access curves are produced. 
Income quantiles are ordered from lowest to highest from left to right on the X-axis, and 
mean household income per quantile is expressed on the Y-axis. Then, a similar curve is 
generated, showing percentage of access to Internet by households within each income 
quantile. 
 
Secondly, a logit binary outcome model was developed to be applied using household 
survey data. Questionnaires from household surveys in both cities were compared in order 
to find similar questions to account for what interviewees mentioned as factors that might 
influence access to Internet among households. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable, INT, defined by each household’s declared access to Internet (by any means 
such as fixed broadband, mobile internet, connected smartphone, etc.), which means a 






INC = Household total income including subsidies (standardised in order to compare between 
relative position in income distribution within each city) 
EDU = Tertiary education degree by the head of household (has=1, does not have=0) 
SEX = Sex of the head of household (female=1, male=0) 
AGE = Age of the head of household 
ETN = Belonging of the head of household to ethnic or racial minority groups: black plus 
indigenous in the case of Medellín, indigenous in the case of Santiago (does belong=1, does not 
belong=0) 
PAR = Participation in community organisations by the head of household (participates=1, does 
not participate=0) 
NW = Head of household that does not work (non working=1, working=0) 
HOU = Housing typology: apartment building instead of single houses (apartment=1, other=0). 
HEL = Self reported bad health by the head of household: Likert scale values 1+2 out of 4 in 
Medellín, and 1+2+3 out of 7 in Santiago (bad=1, other=0) 
BOR = Borough dummies (borough with the highest internet access rate is used as reference, that 
is Providencia in Santiago and Laureles-Estadio in Medellín) 
 
Average marginal effects were calculated, as well as percentage of correctly predicted 
values. 
 
Table 30. Summary Statistics for Santiago. 
Continuous Variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household Income (CLP) 16,034 1,434,216.0 1,746,909.0 0.0 49,800,000.0 
Standarised H. Income 16,034 0.0 1.0 -0.9 28.0 
Age of head of household 16,034 53.0 16.2 17.0 104.0 
Dichotomous variables 
Variable for household or head of household (yes=1, no=0) N % value = 1 % value = 0   
Access to Internet  16,034 74.0 26.0   
Degree 16,034 27.6 72.4   
Female 16,034 41.5 58.5   
Ethnic/Race minority 16,032 5.4 94.6   
Participation in Organisations  16,022 25.1 74.9   
Non working 16,034 30.4 69.6   
Housing Typology: flat  16,034 25.4 74.6   
Health problems 16,034 8.5  91.5     
  
Table 31. Summary Statistics for Medellín. 
Continuous Variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household Income (COP) 8,810 1,593,742.0 1,709,075.0 6,666.7 20,200,000.0 
Standarised H. Income 8,810 0.0 1.0 -0.9 10.9 
Age of head of household 8,810 52.8 16.4 17.0 104.0 
Dichotomous variables 
Variable for household or head of household (yes=1, no=0) N  % value = 1 % value = 0   
Access to Internet  8,810 55.4 44.6   
Degree 8,810 22.7 67.3   
Female 8,810 46.3 53.7   
Ethnic/Race minority 8,810 3.6 96.4   
Participation in Organisations  7,381 8.1 91.9   
Non working 8,810 44.2 55.8   
Housing Typology: flat  8,810 52.4 47.6   












There are relevant shared views among all the interviewees, in both cities. In general, 
they see Internet as an increasingly fundamental service, and access to it as essentially 
depending on ability-to-pay. Additionally, the entirety of them considers that income 
inequality is a central issue in both Santiago and Medellín. Socio-spatial segregation and 
differences in access to opportunities are perceived as the way income inequality can be 
noticed in each city’s daily life. However, with regard to income inequality and material 
access to Internet, important differences can be found when it comes to the mechanisms 






A first element that appeared as a key issue regarding the income-access link is the idea 
of zones that are excluded from service provision. These are specific neighbourhoods or 
areas within a neighbourhood where services are not available. This notion was present 
among almost all actors interviewed in Santiago, named as ‘red zones’ – zonas rojas. In 
Medellín, although exclusion zones were also present, the reasons given for their 
existence were different. While in Santiago the red zones are stablished unilaterally by 
big private corporations, in Medellín they are associated to areas designated as hazardous 
for human settlements by the municipal planning instruments. 
 
In Santiago, providers, community leaders and local government officials mentioned red 
zones as the ultimate problem to produce universal access to Internet. However, they 
differ in the causes that explain their existence. For instance, for a transnational 
company’s high ranked manager, their origins are a structural link between poverty and 
crime: 
 
In the case of the older technology, which is copper, and particularly in poor zones, cables are 
stolen. Since having copper in the streets is the same as hanging one dollar bills (laughs), if you 
have one dollar bills hanging on the streets, evidently people that has economic needs will collect 
those dollars. 
 
For community leaders, cable robbery is in the past. However, it produced a stigma over 
those who live in affected neighbourhoods:  
 
no internet provider that uses cables reaches us. Why? Because this is a red zone, because here 
copper cables used to be robbed… so they decided to call us red zone, and now no one arrives 
with Internet… no one! 
 
Furthermore, SMEs that provide Internet services in red zones point to masqueraded 




If you call to hire the service, they will tell you that your area doesn’t have technical viability. That 
is because it is a red zone, and a red zone are all these sectors that big companies stay away from. 
Their characteristics are that at some point copper cables were stolen, or that people there has 
liquidity problems that makes them be outside the big telcos’ business model. They call these 
neighbourhoods red zone and use a technical excuse to discriminate. 
 
Finally, workers from big companies share the idea of business-model-related origins. 
They also point to illegal activities, but closer to illegal connections than to cable stealing: 
 
If there are too many illegal connections, the network fails. You will have too many technical 
service requirements. It is not convenient for the company to send 20 times a technician to the 
same place within one week or one month. (…) So, what the company does is that drops the 
services where it will have too many problems. (…) That is what happens, and that is why these 
areas are called red zones. 
 
There is a consensus around red zones being a relevant factor that affects access to 
Internet in Santiago. However, it is not clear who decided to implement them, the 
legitimacy of the exclusion, and how do telecommunication policies interact with other 
policies, such as those related to crime. In contrast, a different situation was found in 
Medellín. There, exclusion zones are areas of natural risk defined that were openly 
debated in the City Council. As a community leader told me, in Medellín,  
 
to say that all the poor can’t have access would be a lie. (…) There are certain places that are 
precarious in terms of access to any sort of service: transport, water, Internet. (…) Here usually 
poverty is concentrated in places with natural risk. The slope is too high, access is difficult, so 
installing an antenna is difficult, but it also happens that those are the poorest areas.  
 
5.5.1.3 Local public provision of services 
 
Something that only emerges in Medellín is a view shared by all interviewees, according 
to which the historical presence of the local public company EPM, and its 
telecommunications branch ‘Une’ – unite in Spanish –, has a fundamental role. As a 
community leader told me, ‘it used to be the company of the Antioqueños’ – the people 
of Antioquia, the region of which Medellín is the capital. 
 
The presence of EPM, which only was half-privatised as recently as 2014, is seen as a 
difference-maker in terms of how does the Internet market work in Medellín. A strong 
sense of localism can be perceived in many of the interviews, as exemplified by the idea 
of ‘the company of the Antioqueños’. As a public official from the Municipality puts it:  
 
EPM has coverage in absolutely all corners of the city. (…) When new foreign actors entered (…), 
EPM took the decision of taking Une as a different business unit. But that work essence and that 
ability to manoeuvre to reach all corners stayed. (…) New companies had to compete under exactly 
the same conditions. Therefore, I think that, in contrast with what happens in Chile, no operator 
can dare to deny coverage to any neighbourhood. 
 
These ideas of localism and pre-privatisation patterns were completely absent from 
interviews in Santiago. This difference probably comes from the late privatisation in 
Antioquia, compared to the widespread shrinking of the state a few decades before in 
other parts of the world, including Chile. For instance, Telefónica-Chile and Entel, two 
of the main companies in the Chilean Internet oligopoly, were state-owned only until the 
mid-1990s. Consequently, the Chilean companies were never involved in Internet 




5.5.1.4 Neighbourhood-based SMEs 
 
A third key topic is the emergence of SMEs that only serve specific neighbourhoods. 
Their presence emerged for the first time in the interviews with community leaders. They 
are a strictly local phenomenon, as one of the community leaders from La Pintana puts it:  
The internet that I have now is provided by a guy from the neighbourhood. I met him in the street 
market. (…) this guy was offering his Internet… I didn’t hire him at once… I didn’t want to hire 
a company that I never heard of, doesn’t have a TV commercial… you know? But my friend next 
door bought it, and it worked… so I called the guy and he installed the Internet that I have now. 
 
Both the awareness of being a red zone and presence of these local SMEs were common 
in La Pincoya and El Castillo in Santiago. In contrast, only one similar SME was found 
in Medellín, in Comuna 3-Manrique. However, this lone case has some differences 
compared to those from Santiago. Although similar wireless technologies are used for 
providing the service, owners of the local company from Manrique declared having a 
bigger number of clients compared to the SMEs from Santiago. While the latter claim to 
have around 1,000 clients, the former declares more than 2,000. Another difference is 
how the companies were founded. While entrepreneurs in Santiago come from the same 
borough where they provide services, the SME found in Medellín is a local branch of an 
existent Argentinian company, which decided to operate in Manrique for strategic 
reasons.  
 
However, in both cities, these SMEs mention the rigidity of the big companies’ business-
model as an opportunity that they saw to emerge as competitors. Nonetheless, in Santiago, 
SMEs and big companies do not really overlap. SMEs rather take advantage of potential 
clients that are excluded by the red zones. In Medellín, the opportunity comes from a lack 
of adaptation to users’ preferences and ability to pay, and bad quality of cable-based 
services. As one of the owners of the SME from Manrique told me, their 
target will be where others aren’t present or they have bad quality of service. Because if you use 
copper, the more distant the worse the speed (…) Secondly, there is a group of young people that 
does not want fixed telephone line, or cable TV (…) here they force you to buy a triple-pack. There 




Furthermore, in words of its owners, the emergence of an Internet-provision SME in one 
of Medellín’s neighbourhoods was a product of a public policy: 
 
There is a regulatory body, the Ministry of Telecommunications, which started a plan called 
Internet for Everyone. (…) In fact, we are part of the plan, and what the government does is to 
give tax exemptions. So, strata 0, 1, 2, and 3 – the poor – don’t pay taxes for these types of services. 
They don’t pay VAT. 
 
In contrast, the emergence of SMEs in Santiago does not respond to any public policy. In 
fact, their owners complain that existent regulations impose entry-barriers that are 
designed for bigger companies, and that the data regarding where the red zones are 
located is not publicly available. Furthermore, the policy that big companies are 
advocating for in Santiago is to treat the problem as a demand-side issue. They propose 
to subsidise poor individuals to pay for internet, without substantially altering the pre-
existent business-models within the sector. A high ranked manager from a transnational 




Our position as company is that the solution is subsidizing demand (…) in Chile, that was the way 
we solved access to electricity and sanitation. This is similar. You have parts of the population that 
wouldn’t have access to drinkable water without subsidies for utility bills. Well, that would be 
unacceptable, so the Government puts the money. We believe it’s the same with Internet. If the 
Government subsidises those in need within neighbourhoods that today aren’t economically 
viable… one will say here we will get the same effect that we get in a middle-class neighbourhood. 
This means that half of the users will hire us if we put a cable there. Therefore, we will invest and 
install the cable. Problem solved. 
 
 
Figure 31. Income curves in Santiago and Medellín. 
 
Figure 32. Internet-access curves in Santiago and Medellín. 
5.5.2 Income-access curves 
 
Income and Internet access curves for each city provide a clear picture of similarities and 
dissimilarities between the two cases. For instance, on the one hand, the income curves 
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Internet access curves evidence some differences, as seen in Figure 32. The chart shows 
a higher slope of the access curve in Santiago between percentiles 1 to 60, followed by a 
flatter section between percentiles 60 to 90, and virtually universal access by the 10 
richest per cent. In contrast, the access curve is flatter between percentiles 1 to 60 in 
Medellín, followed by an increased slope between percentiles 60 and 100.  
 
Part of these differences can be attributed to overall gaps between the two cities, since 
they have different aggregate access rates – 74 per cent in Santiago and 55.4 in Medellín. 
However, two facts can be highlighted. On the one hand, income and Internet access seem 
to be more strongly correlated within different groups in each city. While in Santiago this 
group is the poorest 40 per cent of the population, in Medellín it is the richest 40 per cent. 
On the other hand, it is notable to see that, although Internet access in Santiago is higher 
than Medellín among most income quantiles, the two curves intersect bellow percentile 
15. The overall higher Internet access in Santiago does not translate into what happens 
among the poorest of the poor. If a household is part of that poorest group, it does not 
seem to matter whether to live in Santiago or Medellín in terms of access to Internet. 
Santiago’s advantage in aggregate access vanishes in this segment. This could be 
interpreted in two ways: as an achievement of Medellín, lifting its poorest population to 
the level of more advantaged cities; or as a proof that, in Santiago, trickle-down 
economics does not work for Internet. Furthermore, one could hypothesise that wider 
access to smartphones might be mitigating this stark drop in Internet access among the 
poor in Santiago. However, Figure 33 shows that such hypothesis has to be rejected. 
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Table 32. Logit model regression results: Santiago 
Variable  Coef.  S.E. Dy/dx S.E 95% conf. int.  Coef.  S.E. Dy/dx S.E 95% conf. int. 
INC = Standarised H. Income 3.81*** (0.09) 0.33*** (0.01) 0.32 0.34  3.68*** (0.11)   0.26*** (0.01)  0.25   0.28  
EDU = Degree        0.89*** (0.08)  0.06*** (0.01)  0.05   0.07  
SEX = Female       -0.02  (0.04) -0.00 (0.00) -0.01   0.00  
AGE       -0.04*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00  -0.00  
ETN = Ethnic/Race minority       -0.15* (0.09) -0.01* (0.01) -0.02   0.00  
PAR = Participation in Orgs.        0.05  (0.05)  0.00  (0.00) -0.00   0.01  
NW = Non Working       -0.01  (0.05) -0.00  (0.00) -0.01   0.01  
HOU = Housing Typology: flat        0.12*  (0.06)  0.01*  (0.00) -0.01   0.01  
HEL = Health problems       -0.07  (0.07) -0.00  (0.00) -0.01   0.00  
Borough dummies No      Yes      
Constant 2.31*** (0.05)      4.81*** (0.18)     
Observations 16,034      16,020      
Pseudo R2 0.2023      0.2871      
Correctly classified 77.30%      81.06%      
p-value * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: reported coefficients are marginal effects. 
 
 
Table 33. Logit model regression results: Medellín 
Variable Coef. S.E. Dy/dx S.E 95% conf. int. Coef. S.E. Dy/dx S.E 95% conf. int. 
INC = Standarised H. Income 1.04*** (0.04) 0.25*** (0.01) 0.23 0.27  0.76*** (0.05)  0.18*** (0.01)  0.16  0.20 
EDU = Degree        0.658** (0.07)  0.14*** (0.02)  0.10  0.17 
SEX = Female       -0.00 (0.05) -0.00 (0.01) -0.03  0.03 
AGE        0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) -0.00  0.00 
ETN = Ethnic/Race minority        0.05 (0.14)  0.01 (0.03) -0.15  0.08 
PAR = Participation in Orgs.        0.08 (0.10)  0.02 (0.03) -0.03  0.07 
NW = Non Working       -0.09 (0.07) -0.02 (0.02) -0.05  0.01 
HOU = Housing Typology: flat       -0.10* (0.05) -0.02* (0.01) -0.05  0.00 
HEL = Health problems       -0.20*** (0.06) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.08 -0.02 
Borough dummies No      Yes      
Constant 0.34*** (0.02)     1.36*** (0.21)     
Observations 8,810      7,381      
Pseudo R2 0.0770      0.1261      
Correctly classified 62.58%      66.45%      




Regression results (Tables 31 and 32) confirm findings from access curves. In both cities, 
income is significantly and positively correlated to material access to Internet. However, 
income is a much better predictor in Santiago than in Medellín. Pseudo R2 is 0.287 in the 
former and 0.126 in the latter. Furthermore, after dropping all the rest of the variables 
from the model, income alone still has a pseudo R2 of 0.202 in Santiago, while in Medellín 
the equivalent indicator drops to 0.077. Marginal effects of standardised income, after 
controls, are also higher in Santiago than in Medellín.  
 
Results regarding other variables are worth commenting. The only three factors that are 
non-significant in both cases are sex, participation in organisations, and work status of 
the head of household. Having a degree is significant and positive in sign in both cities 
but has a much higher marginal effect in Medellín. Interestingly, the housing typology is 
significant in both cases, but with a different sign. To live in a flat instead of a house 
seems to affect Internet access in opposite ways: slightly rises the probability of having 
Internet connection in Santiago and decreases it in Medellín. Furthermore, as results for 
age and ethnic group show, while in Santiago households with a head that is older and 
belongs to an ethnic minority have less probabilities of accessing Internet, these factors 
are not significant in Medellín. Finally, notable are results for health. Self-perceived ‘bad 
health’ is only significant and negative in the case of Medellín. One possible explanation 
came from the interview with one of the board members of EPM, who mentioned that 
Medellín implemented a policy that made compulsory for all primary health appointments 
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to be made online. This link would require further analysis, but it is remarkable that health 




As results show, informal institutions and policies represent institutional factors that can 
play a role in the income-internet nexus. They mediate the relationship between income 
and access to Internet, as summarised in Figure 30. However, consequences of these 
institutional factors do not affect all the population equally. Their potential impacts 
concentrate on one specific segment: the urban poor. In this sense, adapting a notion that 
is increasingly being used in mobility studies (Walks, 2018), I propose to use the concept 
of network disadvantage. By this concept I mean a supply-side problem of lack of 
connectivity options available to people, regardless of their individual ability and 
willingness to pay. 
 
In this sense, bringing back the discussion about the digital divide, institutionally 
produced network disadvantage should be a factor to consider when analysing all levels. 
For instance, the first-level digital divide in Santiago and Medellín does not have to do 
with any structural supply-side technical incapacity to reach all corners of the city. The 
internet oligopoly is fully developed, and within it, exclusion of clients is part of 
deliberate decisions to maintain profitability levels. However, this exclusion is not just 
based on income generation, since we find evidence that individual households are 
excluded by institutional mechanisms such as the red zones even if they have ability and 
willingness to pay for connectivity. The exclusion of these households is not a 
technological problem, nor one of individual income poverty. It is institutionally 
produced network disadvantage.  
 
Results also provide elements to illustrate second and third level digital divides playing a 
strong role in both Santiago and Medellín. For example, the educational level of the head 
of household is significant in both cities after controlling for all other factors. Considering 
that inter-generational educational levels are deeply correlated in unequal societies 
(Neckerman and Torche, 2007), this result is probably signalling to second level divides, 
related to education, that are being reproduced among new generations. Another example 
is the significance of the link between the head of household having health problems and 
less probability of having internet in Medellín. This illustrates possible third-level digital 
divides involving outcomes in health. Such result, along with the fact that Medellín has 
enforced online medical appointments, deserves further research. 
 
Nevertheless, institutions are embedded in these multi-level digital divides. The usually 
studied explanatory variables such as income, age and education are just not enough to 
understand how these divides are produced.  Formal and informal institutions are key 
factors shaping the degree of network disadvantage. Moreover, a feedback loop can be 
expected since network disadvantage will probably produce third-level digital divides, 
which in turn can influence the political settlement that defines institutional mechanisms 
in the first place. Since institutions emerge as a result of rent-seeking behaviour by those 
who concentrate power (Khan, 2010), Internet-related network disadvantage in these 
cities depends in part on the balance of power involving big telcos, local and national 




Moreover, a set of new elements can be proposed for future inquiries about institutions 
affecting the digital divide (all included in Figure 30). On the formal side, at a national 
level, notable are VAT exemptions for the poor, and at a local level, public ownership of 
companies and inclusion of SMEs in Internet provision. However, as already examined, 
informal institutions are also present and deserve attention. Informality plays three types 
of roles, which can be classified as direct, indirect and contextual.  
 
Firstly, redlining has a direct role, central to the telecommunications markets. In Santiago, 
redlining is informally enforced by big telcos at a local level, and is viable thanks to a 
lack of control by the national government. Although the excuse of crime is used as the 
justification for having red zones, it is revealing that what big telcos propose as a solution 
is not focused on crime, but on demand-subsidies to make the poor more attractive under 
their current business model. Advocacy for this approach by transnational telcos confirms 
what is claimed by their own workers, community leaders, local governments and SMEs: 
that the problem is one of profitability under a specific business model, and not 
necessarily one of crime. 
 
Secondly, informality in housing provision plays an indirect but still remarkable role in 
Internet access. As already mentioned, Santiago and Medellín have opposing approaches 
to housing provision for the urban poor – slum-eradication in the former and slum-
upgrading in the latter. It is notable that the housing typology variable is significant in 
logit regressions for both cities, but showing opposite signs. It is likely that higher density 
has different consequences for economies of scale that might play a role in facilitating 
Internet access, depending on being part of formally or informally generated built 
environments. This is outstandingly important under new ideas regarding ‘connected 
homes’, as is the case of the Internet of Things (Atzori et al, 2010). Unless such vision is 
expected to be limited to rich countries where informal housing is virtually inexistent, 
attention must be paid to the link between informal housing and provision of network 
services. The historical path of slum-upgrading in Colombia is a useful source of practical 
experiences (Gilbert, 2012). Paradoxically, while in Colombia the exclusion from 
network services serves as a formal instrument to regulate informal settlements, in Chile 
red zones are an informal instrument to shape the market in formal state-funded housing 
developments.  
 
Thirdly, informality also plays a contextual role, one that is much more difficult to 
measure and to confront via policy approaches. This role has to do with wider social and 
cultural norms and values. What I mean is the tendency to spatial segregation in Latin 
American cities, which is central to any attempt to extract conclusions regarding the link 
between income distribution and Internet access. As extensively discussed by Ruiz-Tagle 
and López (2014), a ‘mirror effect’ is usually assumed between income inequality and 
socio-spatial segregation.  
 
However, although inequality is a condition required for segregation, inequality does not 
necessarily translate into segregation. In other words, countries with the same levels of 
income inequality do not necessarily have cities with the same levels of segregation. 
While both redlining and informal housing have to do with what Khan (2010) identifies 
as informal institutions that require enforcement – or deliberate lack of it – and can be 
analysed under the political settlements approach, the tendency to segregation in Latin 
American cities is a much more complex and long-term phenomenon. Being probably 
rooted in colonialism (Ruiz-Tagle and López, 2014), it is much closer to discussions such 
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as those on the cast system in India than on telecommunication policies in emergent 
economies. It does, however, have a relevant effect on Internet access, since spatial 




Although there is an evident link between income distribution and Internet access, 
institutional factors play a role in shaping the ways by which this link operates. 
Institutions matter both at a national and local level. Particularly in the Global South, 
informal institutional factors such as redlining, informal housing and socio-spatial 
segregation need to be considered when analysing digital divides. Additionally, some 
nuances should be added to the usual narrative that sees digital connectivity services as 
an eminently globalised and technological phenomenon that is beyond possibilities of 
self-determination by local communities. Local institutions and balances of power matter 
for defining the digital divide. 
 
Moreover, two topics deserve particular attention in future research. One is the processes 
that lead to the implementation of unwritten rules. The other is the role of SMEs in 
providing internet access to the poor. Both Santiago and Medellín offered evidence of a 
recent but growing presence of these smaller and locally engaged internet providers. They 
represent an interesting innovation that entails technological, social, economic, spatial 
and political phenomena, all of which deserve attention in order to expand the chances to 
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6 Unravelling waste political settlements in Medellin and 
Santiago: income inequality, recycling, and the role of 






Institutional factors are crucial mediators of the relationship between income and adoption of 
recycling. However, a North versus South divide in recycling studies produces a scarcity of 
analytical frameworks for integrating institutions and recycling performance in the study of 
municipal waste management systems, especially in the Global South.  On the one hand, the 
Northern literature, strong in empirical analyses on performance of municipal recycling 
services, rarely considers institutional factors. When it does, theoretical approaches are limited, 
especially in regards to the role of informal institutions. On the other hand, the Southern 
literature strongly discusses informality, but it does so by focusing of the struggles of waste 
pickers more than on performance of services. In this paper, the author attempts to approach 
the role of income inequality in recycling by unravelling waste regimes in Medellín (Colombia) 
and Santiago (Chile). The focus is put on the political settlements that can explain the formation 
of these regimes. As a result, firstly, political waste regimes are explained as product of the 
interplay of balances of power, institutions and distribution of benefits. Secondly, a focus is 
put on the need to understand informal institutions as a relational phenomenon associated to 




                                                
5 At the time of submitting the thesis, this paper had been accepted for publication in Development & Change, as 
Valenzuela-Levi, N. (2020 – in press). Unravelling waste political settlements in Medellin (Colombia) and 








Promoting the circular economy and reducing income inequality are crucial challenges of our 
time. The two are included in the Sustainable Development Goals by the United Nations 
(2016). On the one hand, target 12.5 is ‘By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through 
prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse’. On the other hand, target 10.1 defines by 2030 to 
‘progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population 
at a rate higher than the national average’.  The increasing urgency of transitions towards lower 
resource-intensive development paths, occurs in the context of high levels of income 
concentration by the rich. But little is known about how existent inequalities might affect 
environmental challenges such as reducing waste generation. 
 
Furthermore, the global nature of the Sustainable Development Goals requires the involvement 
of countries in the often called periphery, and not just from the North. However, those countries 
in the South are at the same time the ones falling behind in circular economy efforts, the less 
covered by recycling scholars, and those dealing with the most rampant inequalities. 
 
For instance, the indicators to measure target 12.5 are the ‘national recycling rate’ and ‘tons of 
material recycled’ (United Nations, 2019). Yet, the United Nations have only been able to 
collect data from a handful of countries from the Global South (United Nations, 2019). Most 
of the empirical knowledge about effectiveness of household recycling is based on studies 
carried on in rich countries with decades of experience in formal recycling (Gregson and Crang, 
2015; Millington and Lawhon, 2018). In these contexts, policies that promote and regulate 
recycling have long ago been enforced. In contrast, recycling in most African, Asian and Latin 
American countries emerged as an informal activity that was driven by a rising global demand 
of recycling materials (Brooks et al, 2018), in most cases without any formal policy.  
 
Different disciplines that study recycling are also distanced from each other. On the one hand, 
studies that analyse performance of mature municipal recycling services (Peretz et al, 2007) 
tend to be quantitative, come from engineering and economics, and have a particular lack of 
attention to any form of institutional factors. On the other hand, while in the north the focus is 
put on effectiveness of actually existing recycling services, in the Southern studies that examine 
adoption tend to explore possibilities of hypothetical willingness to recycle 
(Challcharoenwattana and Pharino, 2016; Vasquez et al, 2014; Tadesse, 2009). Moreover, in a 
recent review of social studies of waste, Millington and Lawhon (2018) identify a similar North 
versus South divide within research on waste made by social scientists. In regard to Latin 
America, in particular, social studies have focused on waste pickers, who have been analysed 
from the perspectives of social inclusion (Magni & Günther, 2014), precarity (O’Hare, 2018), 
mobilisation (Sorroche, 2017), and hybridations between formal and informal sectors 
(Guibrunet, 2019).  
 
It is difficult, however, to find an integration of these stories of struggles of waste pickers into 
an analytical framework aiming to explain performance of recycling systems. In the North, 
where literature is more abundant, studies that look at performance and include factors such as 
electoral politics (remarkably Sidique et al, 2010 and Laidley, 2013), tend to focus on local 
level election results as a proxy of political leanings of individuals. Politics, in this sense, is 
more a variable to characterise demand than one to analyse institutions. More recent works, 
such as the study of Italian municipalities by Agiovino et al. (2019), have attempted to 
introduce corruption and culture as institutional variables to explain separate collection rates. 
These authors point to the need to understand failure and success as linked to specific local 
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contexts. A theoretical framework that has integrated these issues in a more systematic way is 
the proposal of ‘waste regimes’ by Gille (2010), applied to the case of Hungary. Although 
waste regimes are useful for this analysis, they do not, however, involve any discussion about 
performance or efficiency. 
 
What does the literature say about the role of income inequality? Within the performance-
oriented literature, income generation is seen as a fundamental factor to explain adoption of 
recycling by households and service performance by local authorities. However, income 
distribution is seen in those studies as a mere demand-side issue, without questioning its 
intrinsic association to balances of power and institutional settings (see Chapter 4 for a 
thorough discussion). In the context of Latin America, the most unequal region of the world 
(Palma, 2014), adoption of recycling by households is obviously conditioned by the politics of 
waste and the usually studied tensions between formal and informal actors (Millington and 
Lawhon, 2018). Issues such as marginalisation and dispossession are recurrent topics when 
discussing the role of waste pickers as service providers. Nonetheless, the lack of integration 
between views on actual adoption, performance in provision, and waste regimes, limits our 
possibilities of understanding how overall income inequality, so rooted in the region, is linked 
to the political economy of the circular economy.  
 
Departing from these gaps, the present research has two main goals. On the one hand, to explore 
how adoption of recycling is influenced by the interdependence of balance of power, 
institutions and distribution of benefits in two South American cities. On the other hand, to use 
these cases to shed some light on the role played by income inequality, income generation, and 
institutional factors in adoption of recycling. 
 
This article draws from mixed methods research in Medellín (Colombia) and Santiago (Chile). 
Chile and Colombia are among the most unequal countries in Latin America (Palma, 2014). 
Furthermore, Medellin and Santiago have almost the exact same household level distribution 
of available income (See Chapter 5). In regards to waste management and recycling, whereas 
in Medellín residential recycling operates based on formalisation of local waste pickers and a 
single municipality-owned waste management company, in Santiago services are based on an 
oligopoly of private companies competing for contracts with municipal governments, including 
a strong presence of transnational capital. 
 
Using both qualitative semi-structured interviews and collection of quantitative data on 
recycling, I characterise how waste management systems are incorporating recycling in both 
cities, their achievements in terms of separate collection, and the set of balances of power, 
institutions and distribution of benefits that shapes each system. Fieldwork consisted of surveys 
among recycling service providers, and a total of 50 interviews that focused on understanding 
the views of supply-side actors: managers and unions from waste management companies, 
recycling cooperatives, small and medium enterprises, national and local government officials, 
and community leaders.  
 
Two are the main theoretical contributions of this research. First, I integrate the frameworks 
from political settlements and waste regimes. Second, I illustrate the need to look at informal 
institutions as parts of these political settlements, and also as a phenomenon that has to be 
observed in relational terms, both among the rich and the poor, and not just as a survival 




6.2 Political Settlements and Waste Regimes 
 
Although some scholars have recently acknowledged that waste management decisions take 
place under specific institutions and political economy factors (see notably Moreau et al, 2017), 
these factors have been missing from most recycling studies, especially those that analyse 
performance of waste management services. A possible explanation for the neglect of 
institutional factors is that studies tackling economics of municipal recycling tend to select 
samples of cases that belong to the same institutional framework (See Chapter 4). Hence, they 
do not include the possibility of comparing two or more institutional settings.  
 
Outside this performance-oriented literature, Gille (2010) developed the notion of ‘waste 
regimes’. This author understands these regimes as, ‘a specific set of social institutions’ that 
determine what wastes ‘are considered valuable by society, that lay down the principles of 
valuation, and that resolve the resulting value conflicts’ (Gille, 2010:1056). More precisely,  
At their core is a structure of rights and rules, which implies a certain distribution of 
advantages and disadvantages. Social institutions determine what wastes (…) are 
considered valuable by society, and these institutions regulate the production and 
distribution of waste in empirically tangible ways. Waste regimes differ from each other 
according to the production, the representation, and the politics of waste. In studying 
the production of waste we are asking questions such as what social relations determine 
waste production, and what the material composition of wastes is. When we inquire 
into the representation of waste, we are asking which side of key dichotomies waste has 
been identified with, how and why waste's materiality has been misunderstood, and 
with what consequences. Also to be investigated here are the key bodies of knowledge 
and expertise that are mobilized in dealing with wastes. In researching the politics of 
waste, we are first of all asking whether, or to what extent, waste issues are a subject of 
public discourse, what is a taboo, what are the tools of policy, who is mobilized to deal 
with waste issues, and what nonwaste goals do such political instruments serve. Finally, 
no waste regime is static, thus we must study them dynamically, as they unfold, as they 
develop unintended consequences and crises (Gille, 2010:1056). 
 
Furthermore, in their account of literature on wastes and global recycling economies, Gregson 
and Crang (2015) mention the ‘connection to political waste regimes’ of waste as a fallout of 
social practices. They therefore emphasise the political dimension of the work by Gille (2010). 
However, as discussed by Gragson and Crang (2015) this analytical framework could fall short 
to analyse the reality in the Global South. An interesting exercise would be to explore the 
broader field of political economy and institutional economics, which has indeed largely 
discussed sets of ‘social institutions’ when attempting to account for performance of diverse 
productive sectors in the Global South. In what follows, I will explain some basic notions from 
these fields, and argue in favour of the use of the political settlements approach to enrich our 
understanding of waste regimes.  
 
Building on the idea of transaction costs and market failures (Coase, 1960), the second half of 
the 20th century saw institutional economists attempt to study the rules of the game in which 
transactions occur (North, 1990), leading to different degrees of overall efficiency in markets. 
However, the beginning of the 21st century brought strong criticism on hegemonic neoclassical 
analyses of the roles of markets, the state and institutions. Chang (2002), for instance, provides 
a thorough analysis of post-war institutional approaches among mainstream economists, and 
highlights how incomplete they are in regard to four main problems: ‘the definition of the free 
market; the definition and the implications of market failure; the market primacy assumption 
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(namely the view that the market is logically and temporally prior to other institutions, 
including the state); and the analysis of politics’ (Chang, 2002:557). Chang claims that 
conceptual downsides in economics are not able to be solved by just countering state-
interventionist policies to anti-interventionism. Crucially, the problem requires developing an 
institutionalist political economy to bring institutions and politics to its analytical core.  
 
Criticisms by Chang exemplify what has been called ‘heterodox economics’ (Pike, 2004). 
Particularly after the 2009 financial crisis, this heterodox field has been enriched with new 
theoretical and empirical works. For example, new approaches have included building on Karl 
Polany’s ‘network and embeddedness’ approach (Peck, 2013), applying it to real-life case 
studies that also introduce the problem of space into the analytical effort (Cahill, 2019). 
Another recent work that attempts to integrate heterodox economics and the role of urban 
agglomerations in current capitalist development is the work by Goodfellow (2017), who 
applied Khan’s (2010) ‘political settlements approach’ to comparative analyses of sub-Saharan 
cities.  
 
Khan (2010) originally proposed this framework to look at government failure, transition costs, 
and growth-enhancing institutions in the Global South. In his words, a political settlement ‘is 
a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in 
terms of economic and political viability’ (Khan, 2010:4). In this context, ‘the ‘rent-seeking’ 
activities of powerful groups result in the creation of both formal and informal institutions’, 
which ‘sustain distributions of economic benefits for the participants in these institutional 
arrangements’ (Khan, 2010:25).  
 
Goodfellow’s (2017) use of the political settlements approach makes it attractive to this 
particular analysis of institutions within waste regimes in the Global South. As shown by his 
account of Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Ruanda) and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), political 
settlements are useful to inform comparative analyses of the national and metropolitan political 
economy in the so called developing countries, especially in regard to the historical processes 
that explain current institutional configurations. Moreover, the political settlements approach 
puts effort on trying to identify and explain a diverse range of informal institutions, which 
appeals to the problems of formality and informality that are crucial in economics of recycling. 
Moreover, because of Khan’s original interest in transition costs, understood as those costs that 
emerge from conflict between policy, formal and informal institutions, powerful actors and 
different incumbent groups in society, political settlements can help to extract lessons for 
adoption of environmental technologies, such as recycling, that require fundamental change of 
the current business as usual.   
 
I propose to use the political settlements approach to look at Santiago and Medellin, this time 
not to account for economic growth, but to adopt it as a tool for explaining waste regimes, at 
least in their political dimension. Such exploration requires to pay attention to the configuration 
of broader rules of the game in order to reach the specific case of waste management and 
recycling. The characterisation of the balance of power obliges us to understand how different 
groups are able to hold power and impose their will via formal and informal institutions. 
Institutions are therefore looked as an expression of that balance of power – both from the 
perspective of policy and formality, as well as informality – and as enablers of the distribution 
of benefits that is allowed by each political settlement. 
 
Something that is relevant in this approach is that Khan (2010) sees informal institutions 
emerging when formal institutions do not distribute benefits in line with balances of power. In 
 
 155 
this sense, informality can be expected to be observed in all groups, and not just among the 
poor. As largely discussed by Millington and Lawhon (2018) there is a dominant view in 
recycling studies that associate the Global South with informality as a survival strategy among 
the poor. As discussed by Rosa and Cirelli (2018), this divide of the informal and the formal is 
not just between the Global North and South, but even in places like Europe informality, 
although permanently present, tends to be ignored. In all these views, however, as criticised by 
McFarlane (2012:91), ‘informality is represented by unorganised, unregulated labour, although 
in practice such labour is often highly organised and disciplined’. 
 
As the account of the following cases show, the political settlements approach opens the 
possibility of integrating informality as a relational issue: a phenomenon that involves both the 
rich and the poor. Even in accounts that attempt to provide innovative frameworks based on 
research from the South, informality keeps being seen as an issue of the poor. For instance, 
when Millington and Lawhon (2018) discuss efforts to understand the ‘informal waste sector’, 
they focus on ‘informal waste as marginal livelihood strategy’, ‘informal work as 
environmental and economic contribution’, and ‘coordination and formalization of informal 
work’. They then separately discuss ‘privatization and multiscalar governance’. However, 
words such as ‘corruption’ or ‘illegal’ are never discussed in this governance level. In contrast, 
Khan (2010) would discuss corruption, for instance, as part of the informal arrangements that 
emerge to conform privatization and multiscalar governance.  
 
Is it acceptable to talk about waste in the Global South without mentioning the role of 
corruption and illegal activities among the rich, and not just among the poor? Valuable efforts 
such as Millington and Lawhon (2018) do not provide any tool to do so, and perpetuate the 
focus on the ‘informality of the poor’. The introduction of the political settlements approach 
into the analysis of waste regimes can help to overcome this limitation. In the following section, 
I attempt to explain the particularities of waste political settlements in each city.  
 




It is a morning of April 2018, and I am sitting in a McDonalds in Medellin´s financial district, 
in Colombia. My interviewee asked me to convene there to use some spare time during his 
busy day. He works for a transnational waste management company that is looking for new 
business opportunities in Colombia. I got his contact after interviewing managers from the 
same company during previous fieldwork in Santiago, Chile. This same company owns the 
landfill where 54.7 per cent of tons of household waste produced Santiago goes to. He tells me 
that 
 
one time, an Austrian recycling expert came to Medellín to get to know our system. 
After seeing how it works, he described it as a Gipsy bazaar.  
 
He uses the visit of the Austrian expert and the image of the ‘Gipsy bazaar’ to explain me how 
unusual the Colombian waste management sector is. After a Constitutional Court ruling, 
separate collection service in residential areas must formally include waste pickers, who are 
grouped in recycling cooperatives. My interviewee is emphatic to say that the ruling is 
inhibiting capital investment in the waste sector. Because of that, – he explains – recycling will 




According to municipal data, by 2017, separate collection rates reached 17.4 per cent of total 
waste collected in Medellin (Medellín Cómo Vamos, 2019). The system is strongly based on 
the work by the recycling cooperatives, which include 3,662 registered recicladores de oficio. 
This separate collection rate has been continuously increasing from 13.5 in 2013, and reached 
a peak of 23 in 2018. According to municipal authorities, recent increases have to do with the 
strengthening of capacities of recyclers, thanks to support programs by the municipality. The 
mean recycling capacity per recycler increased from 78.1 kilograms per day in 2017 to 113 
kilograms per day by the fourth trimester of 2018 (Medellín Cómo Vamos, 2019). These 
municipal support plans are a consequence of the local waste management plan, which 
explicitly commits to trace separate collection rates according to the target 12.5 of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, aiming for a 70 per cent rate by 2030 (Medellín Cómo Vamos, 
2019). 
 
In the case of Medellín, separate collection data does not differentiate between household and 
commercial waste. This is a common problem with this sort of data, which has been 
acknowledged by teams from the United Nations (2019) and the European Commission (2015). 
For instance, similar problems make data from European capitals difficult to compare. As a 
reference, it could be useful to consider data provided directly to me by the recycling 
cooperative ASEMAR, which is part of the Recycling Board of the Department of Antioquia 
– the region of which Medellín is part of. Collected tons of material collected by recycling 
cooperatives, as claimed by them, reaches 8.2 per cent of total tons collected in 2017. The rest 
of tons collected for material recovery would therefore correspond to commercial waste, not 
collected by waste cooperatives. All the aggregate files are traced by yearly updates of the 
Integrated Waste Management Plan 2016-2027, in charge of the Alcaldía de Medellin (2019), 
and in the reports by the citizen watchdog entity Medellín Cómo Vamos (2019). 
 
But, what happens with the link between income distribution in the city and adoption of 
recycling? At the base of this relationship is the fact that the formalised work of waste pickers 
spreads all over the city. The municipality and recycling cooperatives coordinate a distribution 
of routes covering the entire territory. On the basis of this full territorial coverage, waste pickers 
recognise differences that have to do with income among residents of specific areas. As a 
member of a recycling cooperative in Medellin explained to me:  
 
In poor boroughs there is less material and its selection is inferior. In the rich areas 
people go to the supermarket, which means the material is better and comes in bigger 
quantities. (…) It is not that they separate better, because we do that job. Take for 
instance cans. Only here in richer boroughs we find good quality aluminium. 
 
As the interviewee from the transnational company told me in Medellín, it is big business, and 
not the waste pickers, who seem to feel excluded:  
 
recyclables from residential areas can only be collected by recycling cooperatives. No one 
else can enter there. For instance, if a company wants to implement a recycling route, it 
can’t do it because recycling cooperatives that are associated to that area can accuse them 
and the court will rule in favour of them. 
 
Such is the recycling landscape in Medellin after implementation of the Constitutional Court 
rulings at a local level. On the one hand, the territory is covered by recycling cooperatives, in 
agreement with the municipal government. Different areas of the city are responsibility of 
specific cooperatives. On the other hand, at a smaller scale, each cooperative organises the 
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coverage of their assigned territory. This organisation is illustrated by a map showed to me in 
the cooperative ASEMAR, in which smaller areas were assigned to each one of a total of 800 
recyclers. As seen in Figure 34, density of recyclers becomes lower as routes get closer to the 
city boundaries, which means higher slope of the mountains and lower density, at the left of 
the map.  
 
 
Figure 34. Photograph of a map showing distribution of micro-routes for separate collection that distributes zones for 800 
recyclers in the recycling cooperative ASEMAR. 
Source: the author. 
 
This high level of organisation has been crucial to implement what was a notable local 
consequence of the Constitutional Court ruling from 2011: the participation of recycling 
cooperatives in part of the municipal waste management revenue. This was implemented the 
year before this fieldwork was conducted. The process and its implementation is described as 
follows by one of my interviewees from the recycling cooperatives. He refers to Empresas 
Varias, which is a waste management branch of EPM [Empresas Públicas de Medellín], the 
multi-utility company owned by the municipality (Dávila, 2012). 
 
The executive order No. 596 from year 2017 introduced the possibility for the recycler 
to receive part of the municipal waste management fee, (…) what we recycle does not 
go to that service provided by Empresas Varias. This is not collected by them. 
Therefore, Empresas Varias was charging something without retribution for the 
recyclers. Thus, now we are generating a daily report that is sent to the Superintendence 
of Public Services. (…) Each report includes a detail of receipts from materials that we 
sell, and the name and identification of each recycler, plus how many kilos he brought 
each day to the storage point.  
 
This additional income allows recyclers to earn slightly above a minimum wage, something 
that was not possible only by payment from sold materials. It is also an income that does not 
depend on the price fluctuations of materials. Since it is still based on tons collected, it increases 
the incentives for the recycling cooperatives and their members to cover as much as territory 
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as they can. This is one of the last elements added to the waste regime in Medellín. The 
definition and distribution of value is based on formalisation of informal recycling, and it 
includes a fiscal component by redistribution of the local municipal revenue, and not just by 
market participation in the trade of recycling materials.  
 
Something notable was that interviewees in Medellín never mentioned corruption as an issue. 
Although I directly asked about it, not a single interviewee corruption to be a relevant issue. 
There were conflicts in place, such as claims by some cooperatives that they receive unfair 
treatment by the municipal government, and tensions between trade unions and EPM, the 
municipal public utility company. However, since collection and disposal are in charge of 
EPM, which is owned by the municipal government, and actors have granted participation 
based on political decisions, there seems to be no need for using corruption strategies that, as 
commented in the next section, are associated to competition for public bids in Santiago.  
 
But, how was this waste regime originated? What is the origin of the political settlement that 
sustains it? An answer requires to review the long term peace and state-building process in 
Colombia, which is is still ongoing. 
 
Long lasting violence was one of the main characteristics of Colombia during the 20th century. 
Between 1946 and 1964, there was a period called La Violencia – The Violence –, which 
involved armed clashes between the Conservative and Liberal parties. After more than 200,000 
deaths, the two parties agreed to alternate the presidency without real competition, initiating a 
period called ‘National Front’, which lasted until 1974 (Skidmore & Smith, 2005). The 
consequent lock down of the political system (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) motivated the 
emergence of three left-wing guerrilla groups between 1962 and 1970. The decades after saw 
the emergence of self-defence groups and drug cartels, in an escalation of violence that reached 
its peak in 1990, with the assassination, in hands of the drug cartels, of four candidates for that 
year’s presidential election (Skidmore and Smith, 2005). The crisis was particularly ruthless in 
Medellín, which in 1991 was the home of the deadly Medellín Cartel and had the highest 
murder rates in the world: 375 homicides per 100,000 people (Maclean, 2015). 
 
The high-profile assassinations and unprecedented murder rates were the peak of a crisis that 
different actors where attempting to confront by the end of the 1980s. As part of these attempts, 
in 1988 Colombia experienced its first democratic election of mayors (Maclean, 2015), which 
was seen as a way of giving more legitimacy to formal institutions. Later, political elites agreed 
to call for elections to conform a Constitutional Assembly, which established the basis for 
structuring a democratic peace process in Colombia (Gómez 2011; Garcia-Guadilla and 
Hurtado 2000; Nielson and Shugart 1999). Apart from the democratisation of local 
governments, the call for the Constituent Assembly included offering amnesty and 
participation to the guerrillas. One of them, the M-19, answered positively to the call, managed 
to get almost one third of the total seats, and held the presidency of the Constitutional Assembly 
(Nielson and Shugart, 1999). The assembly led to a new institutional arrangement that favoured 
political participation, decentralisation, and granted unprecedented social rights (Henao, 2012; 
Saffon and García-Villegas, 2011; Fernandez, 2009). Underrepresentation of urban areas and 
exclusion of left-wing groups were seen as major causes of violence and lack of governability 
(Skidmore and Smith, 2005).  
 
Both the local government democratisation of 1988 and the 1991 Constitution are fundamental 
to understand the waste regime in Medellín. Firstly, social and economic development in 
general, and private-public relationships in particular, can not be understood in the Colombian 
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city without paying special attention to EPM (Dávila, 2012). Attempts to privatise it, as it was 
the global trend at the time (Goldman, 2014), faced a new level of local political control after 
democratic election of mayors and city councillors (Maclean, 2015). Proposals for privatisation 
were discussed during years 1996 and 1997, but they were strongly rejected by mobilised 
citizenship groups, trade unions, and crucially, by the majority of the political elites with 
representation in the City Council (Barrios, 2010). 
 
Not only has EPM not been privatised – with the exception of half of its telecommunications 
branch in 2014 –, but it has grown in its pool of services. That is how in 2013 Empresas Varias, 
the municipal waste management company, was incorporated to the EPM Group (Empresas 
Varias de Medellín, 2019). The relevance of EPM, and the opposition to its privatisation 
(Maclean, 2015; Barrios, 2010) can be understood in the context of role that services play in 
integrating the displaced by the armed conflict into the city. As discussed from a compared 
international perspective by Gilbert (2012), Colombian slum dwellers have the peculiarity of 
been granted access to basic services even if they have not secured land tenure. The result in 
Medellin is that local political elites have protected the role of the public sector in managing 
these basic services. In this environment, waste management in Medellin has long ago been 
planned and executed exclusively by the municipal government, which includes managing a 
succession of landfills that have been the only destiny for disposal in the city (Empresas Varias 
de Medellin, 2019). 
 
Secondly, apart from the role of EPM, a fundamental part has been played by the 1991 
Constitution and, in particular, one of the organisms created by it: the Constitutional Court. In 
words of the then president César Gaviria, the aim of the new Constitution was to implement 
a ‘Social State, agreed with different social and political sectors, as well as with guerrilla 
groups’ (Gaceta Constitucional 1991, cited in Henao, 2012). This recognition of demands by 
left-wing guerrillas had the effect of an unprecedented recognition of social rights in the new 
constitution. Although the strength of left wing groups vanished in the following years, the 
rights defined in the constitutional text, and the composition of the Constitutional Court, led to 
decades of progressive rulings (Henao, 2012; Saffon and García-Villegas, 2011; Fernandez, 
2009), 
 
As already mentioned, the Constitutional Court established a new regime for waste 
management and recycling in 2011 (Fernanda-Tovar, 2018). Before that, another relevant 
ruling came in 2003, when the Court explicitly defined that organised waste pickers had to be 
recognised by public authorities and included in recycling efforts. The Constitutional 
foundation of these rulings was the right to work by those groups that had found in recycling a 
way to sustain their livelihoods (Amórtegui, 2018).  
 
The interpretation of the waste pickers’ constitutional rights reached a tipping point after a 
conflict over a public bid for waste management in Bogotá in 2011. The terms for participating 
in the bid included that companies had to be partially owned by recycling cooperatives. 
However, the cooperatives’ share of companies that participated was in some cases as low as 
0.1 per cent of the ownership, and some recycler organisations were accused of only existing 
in paper (Amórtegui, 2018). The ruling not only suspended the public bid in Bogota, but 
ordered measures such as a new census of recycling cooperatives by local authorities, and the 
obligation for national regulators to provide a framework for the effective inclusion of waste 




One of the most notable policy effects in Medellín is the already mentioned payment that waste 
pickers receive according to the weight of recyclables that they hand in designated collection 
centres (Fernanda-Tovar, 2018). In Colombia, public services are funded via differentiated fees 
charged to all households (Murcia and Daza, 2008). Fees are defined according to an official 
social stratification system named ‘strata’ [estrato], and richer households are supposed to 
subsidise poorer ones (Uribe-Mallarino, 2008). Revenue from fees is supposed to cover 
operation costs of public services. In special cases, authorities can decide to subsidise some 
groups according to socio-economic criteria, or to inject additional resources to expand 
coverage (Murcia and Daza, 2008). These municipal waste management fees are the source of 
payments for each waste picker, thanks to a highly organised accounting system executed by 
each cooperative. In contrast, as vividly illustrated by the interviewee at the beginning of this 





In Santiago, it is transnational companies who lead household waste management. According 
to data collected for this research, by 2015, 23 municipalities disposed their waste in two 
landfills owned by transnational companies. One is owned by the Spanish-American Urbaser 
Danner group and concentrates 54.7 per cent of tons disposed. Another is owned by the Chilean 
holding Consorcio Santa Marta and receives 39.5 per cent. A third one is owned by the French 
company Veolia and gets 5.8 per cent of disposed tons. This private solution to a public 
problem has been achieved despite high sunk costs – or, in other words, investments that can 
not be recovered when exiting the market – that would usually lead to establishing a 
government monopoly (Joskow, 2007). The usual model to generate participation of the private 
sector would be to make companies compete for one centralised monopolistic market, but 
instead, in Santiago landfills compete in the market, thanks to disaggregation of disposal 
contracts between municipalities.  
 
In line with the guidelines being put forward internationally by the Washington Consensus 
(Goldman, 2014), devolution of services was accompanied by the possibility of outsourcing 
the different parts of these services, including waste collection and disposal (Adapt Chile, 
2016). This led to the privatisation of waste management in most of the 37 municipalities of 
the Santiago metropolitan area. While a few of them kept collection and transport partially or 
totally in-house, all of them privately contracted disposal (Reyes, 2004). Until the beginning 
of the 1990s, when the new regime was implemented, landfills were planned jointly by regional 
authorities and mayors (Quezada, 2016). After the closure of the last publicly planned landfill 
in 1996, initiatives for creating new disposal facilities were expected to come from private 
capital, which led to an oligopoly in which three landfills compete for each municipality’s 
contracts (Pizarro and Jara, 2015). 
 
It has been under this context that household recycling has emerged as an uncoordinated 
initiative, some times provided by municipalities (Valenzuela-Levi, 2019), and some times by 
private providers that can be formal or informal (Vasquez, 2011). Furthermore, as in other 
Latin American cities, the boundaries between formal and informal are not straightforward 
(Guibrunet, 2019). For instance, while richer municipalities tend to rely on industrial formal 
services, a few poorer municipalities declare to partly or entirely base their separate collection 




Official waste management data on generation and treatment is available for commercial waste 
on the National System of Waste Declaration (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, 2019). 
However, data from municipalities is incomplete. Official figures in Santiago are contradictory 
and tend to come from broad estimates. For instance, the Regional Government launched a 
recycling program, Santiago Recicla, in 2009, which has provided conflicting figures of total 
recycling (see for instance Corporación Nacional de Medio Ambiente Región Metropolitana, 
2005; Intendencia Region Metropolitana de Santiago, 2009; Santiago Recicla, 2017). A study 
paid by the Regional Government itself stated that official figures on household waste 
recycling were unreliable (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso, 2006). 
 
However, since household waste management is a legal responsibility of municipalities – 
bellow the regional level – and thanks to a functioning Transparency and Access to Information 
Law, it was possible to collect primary data on separate household waste collection rates6, and 
complement it with official data from commercial and industrial waste. By 2017, the overall 
separate collection rate was 15 per cent of waste generated in the Santiago Metropolitan Area. 
However, while this rate was 22 per cent for commercial waste, it was 1.1 per cent for 
household waste collected by municipalities. While household waste collected by 
municipalities was one third of total waste collected, it accounted just for 2.5 per cent of tons 
recycled, and for 0.4 per cent of total waste produced in the metropolitan area. 
 
Beyond these overall figures, when it comes to the link between income distribution in the city 
and recycling, actors share similar notions to those found in Medellín. On the one hand, socio-
economic inequality is expressed by territorial segregation between boroughs, and, on the 
other, quantity and quality of recyclable material will be higher in more affluent areas. 
 
However, as a member of waste pickers association told me in Santiago, they recognise 
differences in material but not in pro-environmental behaviour. He dismissed the idea of richer 
people doing better waste separation because of more environmental awareness or education. 
For instance, he highlighted that, many times, in richer households, it is not a member of the 
family who separates waste, but their handmaidens. The same member of the recycler 
association from Santiago describes that, in recent years, waste pickers have seen their access 
restricted in richer boroughs:  
 
Waste pickers used to go to the poshest neighbourhoods. But about eight years ago, 
when all these private security services boomed, they started to be kicked out. 
 
This physical expulsion of waste pickers has occurred at the same time than implementation of 
municipal recycling services in the most affluent boroughs of Santiago. The best example is 
Vitacura, the richest borough of the entire country, which implemented recycling in 2006 and 
has the highest recycling rate within the Metropolitan Area – 8.5 per cent in 2017. Figure 35 
illustrates the relation between autonomous revenue per capita – which is a reflection of income 
level among residents – and recycling rates in Santiago. Despite the exception of one poor 
borough, La Pintana, and many affluent local governments that have not implemented 
recycling, the highest SCRs can only be found among the richest areas of the city. 
 
Figure 2 shows both recycling reproducing existing inequalities, and a general low penetration 
of recycling, with many boroughs lacking any recycling service. To explain this, high-ranking 
                                                
6 I asked the 37 municipalities for their collection data using the Transparency Act, obtaining answers from 36 of them. The 
separate collection rate (SCR) was then calculated for year 2017 using the formula SCR = R / (R + L), where R is Tons 
collected for material recovery (inorganic recycling and/or composting) and L is Tons collected for disposal at the landfill. 
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officials from the waste management sector in Santiago share a common view, according to 
which separate collection rates are low in Santiago not because of unwillingness to participate 
in recycling among people, but because of differences in resources available in each 
municipality. As a member of a Metropolitan Waste Management Association explained me,  
 
There is people that want to participate in recycling, but the supply is clearly 
insufficient and expensive. So, in this case, demand is much higher than supply.  
 
Managers from the oligopoly of landfills express the same vision. As one of them told me,  
 
There is recycling because nobody pays for it. It has nothing to do with intrinsic evilness 
of companies or people. There is no more recycling because somebody has to pay the 
bill. Today municipalities have more needs than money, and recycling is not convenient 
because it is not profitable for companies. 
 
Profitability of the dominant waste management business model in Santiago, immediately 
emerges as a key reason to hold back recycling, and managers from landfills are transparent 
about it. Moreover, as another landfill manager – one that claims that their business is not only 
landfills but also other forms of waste management – told me, inequality, taxation, 
redistribution of resources and the power of the waste management companies themselves were 
part of the explanation:  
 
Taxes do not balance inequalities among municipalities. So you have a couple 
municipalities with many resources and others that simply can’t afford changing their 
system. Moreover, where resources are present, those whose bottom line depend on the 
business-as-usual have power to avoid that the municipalities change their traditional 
way of managing waste. 
 
This fact that big companies ‘have power’ over municipal decisions was present in all 
interviews. There was no interviewee which did not mention corruption and the legal structure 
of waste management contracts as main factors defining how waste is managed in Santiago. 
The two main mechanisms to exercise this power, according to the interviewees, were abusive 
long-term contracts, and bribes to municipal officers during public bids to capture these waste 
collection and disposal contracts.  
 
Income inequality and residential segregation do not only produce concentration of recycling 
among the richest boroughs. For instance, the rare exception at the left of the chart in Figure 
34 is La Pintana7, an emblematic working-class borough that was created in Santiago during 
the Dictatorship by forced displacement of slum-dwellers from more affluent areas (Morales 
et al, 1990). The 2.9 per cent of material recovery reached by La Pintana is not based on 
inorganic recycling, as all the rest of the municipalities, but on composting of vegetable waste. 
This initiative, started in 2005, was possible thanks to the availability of rural land in the 
borough. La Pintana is located in the Southern outskirts of the city, in what by then was the 
less demanded land in the Metropolitan Area, almost two hours away by bus from the city 
centre, and close to old gravel pits and landfills.  
                                                
7 The other outlier is Ñuñoa. However, in this case the separation from the columns on the right is due to the 
use of autonomous revenue per capita. Ñuñoa is a high income municipality adjascent to Providencia, but has a 
more residential use compared to the high density of comercial uses located in the latter. Given that autonomous 
revenue comes mostly from council tax and comercial permits, Ñuñoa, although being a high-income borough, 




The Municipality of La Pintana implemented an in-house composting service, that also aimed 
to create jobs in a context of high structural unemployment in the borough. Remarkably, as one 
public servant from La Pintana explained me, they considered expanding their operation and 
offering composting services to other near-by municipalities. However, as he explains, the 
long-term exclusive contracts between municipalities and landfills, mentioned above, blocked 
the expansion of this service: 
 
We started a network of eleven municipalities to provide composting service for vegetable 
waste. We were ready to sign the contract, but the other municipalities realised that their 
landfill contracts were long term and exclusive: it was compulsory for municipalities to 
send their waste to the landfill. Breach of those contracts meant the Pains of Hell. 
 
All issues of socio-economic segregation between boroughs, distribution of resources among 
municipalities, profitability of the waste management business model, long-term contracts and 
corruption involved in bidding, are integral parts of the waste regime in Santiago. Similar to 
Medellín, the political settlement that can explain this regime is related to conflict and and a 
long term state-building process.   
 
As many other aspects of life in Chile, the waste sector is regulated by neoliberal reforms that 
were implemented during the Military Dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet between 1973 and 
1990 (Atria, 2013; Gárate, 2012). In 1988, a special law for local governments was enacted, 
and many basic services such as school education, primary health care and waste disposal were 
entirely devolved to municipalities (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional, 2016). The 1988 
reforms need to be understood in the context of a process in which a 17 year-long dictatorship 
defined an institutional environment whose acceptance was later, in 1990, the condition to hand 
over power to civil authorities. This process was based on a constitution passed through a first 
fraud referendum in 1980 (Fuentes, 2013) that was later legitimated – after negotiations with 
the opposition – in a second referendum held in 1989 (Andrade Geywitz, 2003). The 
constitution established a set of Organic Laws, whose modification requires 4/7 of the members 
of the parliament. One of those Organic Laws was the one regulating local governments. 
 
The 1973 coup that gave place to the Dictatorship was planned to end a period of strong 
politicisation and hyper-mobilisation of society during the 60s and 70s (Landsberger and 
MacDaniel, 1976). These decades led to Salvador Allende becoming the world’s first 
democratically elected openly revolutionary socialist president in 1970. The constitution, and 
the Organic Laws, implied reinforcing an historically concentrated presidential power 
(Valenzuela, 2015). Furthermore, main urban agglomerations became underrepresented in the 
parliament, and Santiago was fragmented into small municipalities without a metropolitan 
government. A military rationale for the new administrative division was established, based on 
generating smaller socially-homogeneous units that would be easier to control. Following this 
rationale, residents from slums that in the 1950s and 1960s were stablished in higher-income 
areas were evicted and forced to re-settle in newly-created peripheral municipalities, such as 
La Pintana (Valdivia Ortiz de Zarate, 2011; Morales et al, 1990). 
 
Funding from local governments is supposed to come from local taxes. However, these taxes 
depend on property values, commercial activity and car ownership, which are all concentrated 
in richer areas (Livert and Gainza, 2018). Funding from waste management reproduce these 
un-equaliser dynamics. In terms of revenue, municipalities in Chile are allowed to charge 
residents a flat fee, but services are financed by undesignated funds. Social housing dwellers 
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are exempted from waste management fees, and municipalities can add exemptions according 
to their own criteria (Vasquez, 2011; Vasconi, 2004). Interviewees from the waste management 
companies agree in assuming that between 70 and 80 per cent of Chilean households are 
exempted from paying waste management fees, which leads most collection and disposal 
services to run in deficit and to require cross-subsidies within each municipality. Given strong 
levels of territorial segregation (Ruiz-Tagle & López, 2014) the small number of municipalities 
where the majority of people pay both the council tax and the waste management fee are the 
richest ones concentrated in the Eastern areas of Santiago, such as Vitacura, Las Condes, and 
Providencia. 
 
In this context, formal, and informal institutional adjustments have emerged to ensure 
sustainability of profit rates and mitigate risks among private investors. Among formal 
mechanisms, municipalities have granted long term disposal contracts through their bids. The 
most emblematic case is a contract from 1995 to 2027 that ensured disposal from 22 
municipalities at the landfill now owned by Urbaser Danner (Pizarro and Jara, 2015). 
Additionally, vertical integration has been achieved via capturing of collection contracts by the 
same companies that own the landfills (Pizarro and Jara, 2015). This is done through strategies 
that have been deemed illegal, but nonetheless have not been stopped. For instance, the Chilean 
Preventive Antitrust Commission stated in 1995 that the same company – now owned by 
Urbaser Danner – was competing with different subsidiaries to have advantages in collection 
bids, and by 2002 the same subsidiaries shared more than half of the collection contracts in the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region (Reyes, 2004). Finally, corruption, in forms of bribes, is a 
consolidated strategy to capture bids. Corruption cases have been a constant in waste 
management bids from the early 1990s (Rehren, 1996) until the late 2010s – as it is the case of 
an investigation involving mayors of four municipalities, again, accused of colluding with the 
company owned by Urbaser Danner, in detriment of the one owned by Veolia (Pizarro and 
Jara, 2015). 
 
Figure 35. Separate collection for material recovery and autonomous revenue per capita in municipalities that conform the 
Santiago Metropolitan Area. 
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6.4 Final Remarks  
 
Although income inequality and segregation have a lot in common in Santiago and Medellin, 
the differences in the political settlements generate contrasting waste regimes. In Santiago, 
waste management is privatised and dominated by transnational capital, formal services are 
concentrated in specific areas according to profitability or excess of resources, recycling is 
limited by long-term contracts, and waste pickers can not work in some boroughs of the city. 
In Medellin, waste management is led by the municipal public utility company, waste pickers 
have own the right to collect household recyclable materials, their services spread all over the 
city, and part of their income is produced by redistribution of the local tax revenue. Separate 
household waste collection rates are dramatically lower in the Chilean capital, and overall 
recycling figures are higher in the Colombian city. Considering that studies evaluating potential 
of recycling have usually recommended inclusion of informal recyclers, it is plausible to 
hypothesise that lower recycling rates in Santiago are linked to legal restrictions of recycling 
initiatives, and lack of integration of waste pickers.  
 
 
Moreover, the comparison between Santiago and Medellin shows how crucial is to pay 
attention to political settlements as the basis of waste regimes. A crucial environmental 
technology adoption process, such as the municipal recycling services needed to achieve target 
12.5 from the Sustainable Development Goals, will not occur just by mere change in consumer 
behaviour. It depends on collective decisions and the way institutions work. In this sense, at 
least three main points deserve to be highlighted as final remarks. 
 
First, informal institutions are present in both cases, but in very different ways. On the one 
hand, although informality ‘from bellow’ exists in the form of waste pickers in Santiago, it 
involves crucial mechanisms at the elite level, with a consistent long-term presence of 
corruption as a form of making capital investment less risky and more profitable. Informal 
waste picking, on the other hand, will keep playing a role as long as the political settlement 
keeps excluding large territories and communities from formal recycling. In Medellin, labour-
intensive presence of waste pickers in the  collection service might look like what is usually 
understood as informality, but it has been formalised and even incorporated in sophisticated 
cash flow accounts, which enables payments to individual recyclers funded by municipal 
revenue.  
 
Second, we see different business-models of waste management competing, particularly 
landfill disposal and separate collection. In both cities, which business-model prevails does not 
depend primary on the will of consumers, but on political settlements that shape waste regimes. 
The power that each actor holds depends, in both cases, on the more general political settlement 
in each country, which was defined in state-building processes linked to violent conflicts. On 
the one hand, fragmentation of municipal responsibility and privatisation of landfill planning 
in Santiago is a product of a violent conflict in which the neoliberal agenda was imposed and 
political control over public services was reduced to a minimum. The primacy of the landfill 
business-model in Santiago must be understood as a manifestation of primacy of oligopolistic 
capital over local and small-size competitors – as exemplified by exclusion of waste pickers in 
general, and the case of the failing attempt to expand composting services in La Pintana. On 
the other hand, the power of waste pickers in Medellin is only possible because of the 
compromise of the political elite and part of left-wing guerrillas in 1991, which made the 
Constitutional Court a space to enforce strong recognition of social rights. This political 
settlement will be sustained only as long as the political elites see this compromise as the fair 
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price to pay for peace and rule of law in an armed conflict that by the beginning of the 1990s 
did not have clear winners. 
 
Under these circumstances, the key difference between the two cities does not seem to be what 
can be technically achieved in terms of recycling. Moreover, the main difference seems to come 
from exclusion of some communities from service provision. This exclusion leads to service 
disadvantage (See Chapter 5), that is to say, total or partial absence of supply of services, 
regardless of the demand. It is supply-side exclusion from recycling services, and not so much 
consumer preferences, what defines the link between socio-economic inequality and recycling 
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7 Income distribution within urban transport networks: 






There is increasing interest in the measurement and evolution of income inequality within 
mainstream economics. However, although income has always been considered a determinant 
of modal choice and travel behaviour in transport studies, the link between income inequality 
and public transport is less studied. This paper uses mixed-methods to analyse income groups 
and their participation in public transport in Santiago (Chile) and Medellín (Colombia). The 
two cities have similar income distributions, public transport systems composed by fare-
integrated metro and buses, and are part of the two South American countries that are members 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. In both cities, there is almost 
equal shares of public transport as main mode for commuting, and an ‘inverted U’ curve is 
found in terms of ridership according to income group. However, participation of the poor is 
higher in Santiago, and presence of the rich is higher in Medellín. Informal institutional factors, 
such as fare evasion in Santiago, and formalisation of informal transport providers along with 
adherence to ‘good behaviour’ campaigns in Medellín, are proposed as explanations for these 
differences. Informal institutions are analysed using a political settlements approach, and new 
elements are added to theories that aim to integrate institutional economics or political 










After the 2009 financial crisis, distributional and social justice issues have received increasing 
attention by scholars from different fields. In mainstream economics, the answer has been an 
unprecedented surge in studies about income and wealth distribution (Milanovic, 2011; Palma, 
2011, 2014; Piketty, 2014). Among those that study passenger transport, the emphasis has been 
affordability, transport disadvantage and barriers to mobility among vulnerable groups 
(Mattioli, Nicolas and Gertz, 2018). Ideas such the right to the city and spatial justice are 
beginning to permeate transport studies (Verlinghieri and Venturini, 2018).  
 
Moreover, income distribution scholars within the field of economics have brought new 
discussions to the table. Notably, Palma (2011, 2014) has reinforced the idea that ‘it’s about 
the share of the rich’, and not just about what happens with the poor. Among mainstream 
economics and development institutions, efforts by Palma and others like Piketty (2014) 
changed the attention from an almost exclusive focus on the ‘super poor’ into new debates 
about the ‘super rich’. Following this trend, a limited number of studies in the field of transport 
economics have attempted to introduce income distribution as a factor to understand issues 
such as household transport expenditure (Lescaroux, 2010), or supply and demand for public 
transport (Albalate and Bel, 2010).  
 
This research aims to explore the possibilities of applying recent findings from income 
distribution studies into transport studies. In particular, the ‘Palma proposition’ (Cobham et al, 
2016) is used as a departing point to explore integrated public transport systems. This 
proposition states that, across societies, most changes in income distribution happen between 
the ‘tails’, meaning the bottom 40 poorest per cent and the 10 richest per cent of the population 
(Palma 2011, 2014). In turn, the share of the ‘middle’ – percentiles 41 to 90 – tends to remain 
the same across countries. Thus, this article looks at the income distribution groups observed 
by Palma, and their participation in public transport. It also analyses the institutional factors 
that play a role in the interaction between income distribution and urban public transport 
systems. To do so, a mixed methods approach is applied on two Latin American cities: Santiago 
(Chile) and Medellin (Colombia). The results provide the basis for a discussion on the role that 
formal and informal institutions play in defining the presence of different income groups within 
public transport networks.  
 
7.2 Income distribution, transport and institutions 
 
Although explicit accounts of income distribution as an input tend to be absent from transport 
studies, disposable income is central in the general understanding of how passenger travel 
dynamics operate.  At a micro level, models tend to assume the existent of utility-calculator 
individuals who constantly make travel choices according to their needs, desires and available 
resources. Behavioural psychology, for instance, assumes that socio-economic factors 
determine how individuals will evaluate costs of different options, such as private and public 
transport (Collins and Chambers, 2005). In aggregate terms, it is often assumed that there will 
be higher income elasticity of travel demand among low-income groups (Polat, 2012). 
However, more recently, some studies have pointed to transport disadvantage and forced car 
ridership as causes of lower income elasticity among the poor (Mattioli, Wadud and Lucas, 
2018).   
 
Albalate and Bel (2010), who looked at the link between income inequality and both supply 
and demand for public transport, follow the same rationale.  These authors hypothesise that 
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more unequal regions will have more supply and demand for public transport because more 
unequal income distributions will mean to have less people with ability to pay for private 
motorised travel. All these perspectives mentioned so far depart from a neoclassical view of 
how supply and demand operate in transport. A different perspective can come from 
institutional economics. For instance, a classic argument comes from Alesina et al (1999), who 
associate social polarisation to the weakening of funding of public goods. In chapter 3, I argued 
that, more than just a demand-based phenomenon, income distribution is linked to public 
transport provision because income shares are a proxy of power balances between the rich and 
the poor, and those balances shape transport regimes. This position adds up to the broader 
debate around commodification of social interactions and welfare state regimes proposed by 
Esping-Andersen (1990).  
 
Furthermore, in recent years, some scholars have attempted to introduce institutional 
economics debates into transport studies (Rye et al, 2018; Canitez, 2019). Yet, as much 
valuable as these attempts are, they only partially reflect existing debates within institutional 
economics and political economy. Canitez (2019), for instance, notably attempts to provide a 
review of theoretical perspectives from institutional economics and to propose a set of 
applications in transport studies. However, the problem with the view by Canitez is that it only 
focuses on ‘new institutional economics’ (NIE), and dismisses what is called ‘old institutional 
economics’ (OIE) – associated by this author to John Commons, Thorstein Veblen and Daniel 
Bromley. Canitez consequently debates theoretical elements grounded on the works by 
Williamson (1981) on governance arrangements that diminish transition costs, and North 
(1990) on how institutional change influences economic performance. 
 
Nonetheless, by this dismissal of OIE, Canitez discards an entire body of literature within 
economics that criticises NIE. This scholarship aims to continue the legacy of OIE instead. 
Chang (2002), for instance, provides a thorough analysis of post-war institutional approaches 
among mainstream economists, and highlights how incomplete they are in regard to four main 
problems: ‘the definition of the free market; the definition and the implications of market 
failure; the market primacy assumption (namely the view that the market is logically and 
temporally prior to other institutions, including the state); and the analysis of politics’ (Chang, 
2002:557). Chang claims that conceptual downsides in economics are not able to be solved by 
just countering state-interventionist policies with anti-interventionism. Crucially, the problem 
requires developing an ‘institutionalist political economy’ to bring institutions and politics to 
its analytical core.  
 
Criticisms by Chang exemplify what has been called ‘heterodox economics’ (Pike, 2004). 
Particularly after the 2009 financial crisis, this heterodox field has been enriched with new 
theoretical and empirical works, who build on ideas from other authors associated to OIE – a 
broader group that one pointed by Canitez (2019). New examples include building on Karl 
Polany’s ‘network and embeddedness’ approach (Peck, 2013), applying it to real-life case 
studies that introduce the problem of space into the analytical effort (Cahill, 2019). Another 
recent work that accounts for the role of urban agglomerations in current capitalist development 
is the one by Goodfellow (2017), who applied Mushtaq Khan’s (2010) political settlements 
approach to comparative analyses of sub-Saharan cities. In his firsts theoretical propositions, 
Khan departs from an explicit critique of NIE (Khan, 1995), similarly to what was later done 
by Chang (2002).   
 
Two are the main downsides of the omission of OIE. First, NIE provides a limited 
understanding of informal institutions.  Second, NIE neglects the problem of distribution of 
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benefits as a fundamental force shaping institutions.  Interestingly, the political settlements 
approach focuses particularly on these two issues.  
 
In regard to informal institutions, according to Khan (2010), there are three types of informal 
institutions. Firstly, there are patterns of behaviour that are based on internalisation of norms 
and values. Secondly, there are rules that require enforcement but are not written down, and 
therefore, are informally enforced by extra-state or intra-state actors. Thirdly, there are tacit 
institutions that emerge simply because of the need for coordination. According to Khan 
(2010), while NIE focuses on the first type of informal institutions, he proposes to focus on the 
second group, which are those that require enforcement and are so intrinsically rooted in 
balances of power. Similar critiques to those done by Khan to NIE could be done in regard to 
authors attempting to bring institutional economics into transport studies. Examples such as 
Rye et al (2018) and Canitez (2019) tend to focus on informal institutions derived from cultural 
values or ways of improve coordination outside formal rules, but not on more complex issues 
that might involve illegality, such as corruption or fare evasion. 
 
In regard to the issue of distribution of benefits, Khan puts it in the centre of the political 
settlements approach. A political settlement ‘is a combination of power and institutions that is 
mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability’ (Khan, 
2010:4). In this context, ‘the “rent-seeking” activities of powerful groups result in the creation 
of both formal and informal institutions’, which ‘sustain distributions of economic benefits for 
the participants in these institutional arrangements’ (Khan, 2010:25). Distribution of benefits, 
including income, is therefore inherent to institutional arrangements, both formal and informal. 
 
In this research, I build on the useful theoretical efforts by authors such as Canitez (2019), but 
expand them with discussions on empirical findings that come from observing income 
distribution within the case studies, and approaches that are closer to OIE. A particular 
emphasis is put on illegal informal institutions that have to be enforced by active omission of 
formal rules by intra state actors, and on formalisation of the role of informal actors in the 
context of conflict. 
 
 
7.3 Case studies 
 
This analysis uses the cities of Santiago in Chile and Medellín in Colombia as case studies. 
Chile and Colombia are among the most unequal countries in Latin America – the most unequal 
region in the world (Palma, 2011). Both are also part of the broad cultural inheritance of 
Catholic and Hispanic post-colonial norms and values (Khan, 2010). Household data on the 21 
boroughs of Medellin (Alcaldia de Medellin, 2015) and the 37 of the Santiago Metropolitan 
Area (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017) show high levels of income inequality on both 
cities. While the Gini coefficient for total household income was 0.48 Santiago by 2015, it was 
0.44 Medellin by 2017. Equivalent measures in other major cities around the world were 0.39 
for Greater London, 0.33 for Barcelona, 0.42 for New York, and 0.32 as an average within the 
OECD (Barcelona Activa and Barcelona City Council, 2017). Figure 36 shows how similar 




Figure 36. Comparison of standardised income curves in Medellin and Santiago 
Source: The Author based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2017) and Alcaldía de Medellín (2015). 
 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 37, the same household surveys provide data on primary 
modes for work-related trips (see Section 7.4.2 for more details). In both cities, the public 
transport supply is based on a metro network and a fleet of different kind of buses and other 
smaller vehicles that are legally part of public transport (for instance, ‘collective taxis’ in 
Santiago). The share of public transport as primary mode for work-related trips is almost the 
same: 54.3 per cent in Medellin and 54.9 in Santiago. However, differences can be found 
regarding subsets of modes: Santiago has more workers using the metro network compared to 
Medellin. In turn, Medellin has a higher share of commuters using buses to get to their 
workplaces. This is expected to be related to the network supply: as shown in Table 33, the per 
capita area within 700 meters of distance from a metro station in Santiago triples the one in 
































Figure 37. Primary mode for work-related trips in Santiago and Medellin. 
Source: The Author based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2017) and Alcaldía de Medellín (2015). 
 
Metro networks have been part of the public transport supply in these two Latin American 
cities from a couple of decades ago. While in Santiago the first line was inaugurated in 1975 
(Metro de Santiago, 2019), the metro started its operation in Medellin in 1995 (Metro de 
Medellin, 2019). A notable feature in Medellin is the expansion of the metro network into the 
steep slopes of the mountains that surround the central districts, by using cable cars (Dávila, 
2012).  Cable car lines, called Metrocables, have become icons of the city, starting their 
operation in 2004 and later following periodic expansions. Apart from the exceptional presence 
of the Metrocable in Medellin, both public networks work similarly, with an integrated flat fare 
to use a trunk and feeder system. In both cases, there are also some non-integrated bus lines 
connecting the periphery and the centre of the city. 
 
Table 34. Relevant city characteristics 
City Population (millions) Surface (sq. km) Area within 700 meters of a  metro network station 
   Km2 Total Mts2 Per capita 
     
Santiago 6.2 641 178.4 0.03 
     
Medellin* 3.7 380 35.5 0.01 
     
*Population and surface figures from Medellin correspond to the Area Metropolitana del Valle del 
Aburra, while the Comunas and Corregimientos only comprise ‘Medellin Ciudad’.  
 











































Finally, there are differences in the modal share of those work-related trips that are not part of 
the public transport network. Medellin has a higher share of non motorised trips (walk, bicycle, 
animal), and a lower share of private motorised trips (private vehicles, taxi, informal) than 
Santiago. Another feature in Medellin is the high use of motorcycles within private motorised 
trips. While the latter represent the main alternative for just 0.9 per cent of commuters in 
Santiago, the equivalent figure is 14.3 per cent in Medellin.  
 




The mixed-methods empirical approach is based on three methodologies, two of them 
quantitative and one qualitative. Firstly, a descriptive statistical analysis is provided in order to 
distinguish modal shares among the three groups recognised in the Palma proposition (Cobham 
et al, 2016). These groups are the ‘bottom 40 per cent’, comprising percentiles 1 to 40 of the 
total household income distribution, ‘middle 50 per cent’, which ranges from percentiles 41 to 
90, and ‘top 10 per cent’, including percentiles 91 to 100. Additional analyses by deciles are 
provided for some variables.  
Secondly, a binary logit regression model is used to run regressions on the samples provided 
by household surveys for each city. The objective is to analyse whether being part of one of 
the abovementioned income groups – bottom 40, middle 50 or top 10 per cent – is significantly 
linked to the probability of using a specific transport mode.  
 
This type of analysis adds the possibility of controlling by relevant variables, which in this case 
are sex, age, accessibility to the metro network and time distance to the workplace. The 
outcome is a binary variable, T, accounting for the use of a specific mode to commute to work: 
that is, a value 1 if the worker declares it as their main mode or 0 if they do not.  Considering 
the dichotomous nature of T, a logit model is used, as described by the formula 
Pr 𝑇 = 1 𝑥 = 𝐺(𝑥𝛽) = 	 ]^_(`a)
1b]^_(`a)
= 	Λ(𝑥𝛽). Here, 𝑥𝛽 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽:𝑥: + ⋯+ 𝛽N𝑥N, in which 
the intercept 𝛽1, and factor variables plus their respective coefficients are contained. 𝑥1 to 𝑥N 
include sex, age, accessibility to the metro network and time distance to the workplace. 
Average marginal effects are calculated, as well as percentage of correctly predicted values by 
the model. 
 
Thirdly, the qualitative part of this study is based on semi-structured interviews performed in 
Santiago and Medellín. Interviewees were high-level officials (cabinet ministers, heads of 
departments), public servants (specialised professionals from government teams), transport 
consultants, local community-leaders (community boards, local NGOs), managers from public 
transport companies, as well as workers and union leaders from the same companies.  
Fieldwork was conducted in both cities between March and May 2018. A total of 52 interviews 
were carried out: 20 in Santiago and 32 in Medellín. Distribution of interviewees among 
different roles is summarised in Table 34.  
 
In the case of community leaders, as well as municipal level public servants in Santiago, a 
territorial selection criterion was applied. Since both cities are divided in boroughs, interviews 
targeted areas that included emblematic marginalised neighbourhoods in each city, plus 
adjacent zones with diversity of income groups. In the case of Santiago, the emblematic 
marginalised neighbourhoods were La Pincoya in Huechuraba and El Castillo in La Pintana; 
boroughs included were Huechuraba and Recoleta – in the North of the city –, plus La Pintana 
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and La Florida – in the South. In the case of Medellín, marginalised neighbourhoods were Zona 
Nor-Oriental and Comuna 13; boroughs included were Comunas 1-Popular, 2-Santa Cruz and 
3-Manrique – in the East of the city –, as well as 13-San Javier, 12-La América and 14-
Laureles-Estadio – in the West. 
 
An interview schedule was utilised to organise semi-structured interviews. Depending on each 
interviewee, some topics were developed in more depth and extension. Interviews were 
conducted in Spanish, recorded in audio and transcribed for analysis. Quotations are translated 
to English by the author. A set of codes was preliminary stablished based on pilot interviews. 
These codes were confirmed after transcription and used for content analysis. Given the limited 
space of this paper, only a small number of representative quotes are reproduced in Section 
7.5.3 in order to help to discuss main findings.  
 
Table 35. Summary of interviews. 
Type of interviewee Medellín Santiago Total 
Provision  
board member /managers 3 3 6 
workers/union leaders 4 5 9 
Constituency  
Community leaders 17 7 24 
Policy  
high level authorities 2 4 6 
public servants / consultants 6 1 7 
Total 28 22 52 
Gender    
female 16 3 19 
male 16 17 33 
 
 
7.4.2 Quantitative Data 
 
Quantitative data for transport modes, household income and time-distance to the workplace 
comes from household surveys collected by governments in each city. In the case of Santiago, 
the survey is the Encuesta de Caracterización Socio-Económica Nacional in its 2017 version 
(Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017). The analysis isolated data from 37 municipalities that 
are considered part of the Santiago Metropolitan Area. For Medellín, the survey utilised is the 
Encuesta de Calidad de Vida Urbana de Medellín in its 2015 version (Alcaldía de Medellín, 
2015). The data includes the 16 boroughs that are part of the urban jurisdiction of the Alcaldía 
de Medellín, plus five semi-rural areas called corregimientos. Summary statistics for each city 
can be found in Tables 35 and 36. 
 
Given that accessibility to metro stations should be a relevant factor for modal share within 
each public transport network, a variable of km2 within 700 mts of distance to stations was 
calculated at borough level for both cities. This calculation was made using a Geographic 
Information Systems software, on the basis of shapefiles of borough limits that are publicly 
available in each city (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2019; Alcaldía de Medellin, 2019b), 
and locations of stations provided by OpenStreetMap. Figure 3 shows how the geometries of 
the buffer generated by the 700 mts distances from the stations and the borough boundaries 
interact in each city. Since both household surveys indicate the borough where every person 




Transport modes are measured by percentage of total workers. This limitation to work-related 
trips leaves outside other relevant type of trips. However, although the survey from Medellin 
included other trips, the one from Santiago only asks about the main mode to commute to work, 
and therefore I limited the analysis for the sake of comparability. However, acknowledging 
that this analysis leaves outside fundamental dynamics related to ‘invisible work’ and might 
have a gender bias (Díaz-Olvera et al, 2013), work-related travel is still useful to open a debate 
on relevant socio-economic phenomena, which might impact activities outside work. Total 
household income is measured by each local currency, and was later used to define deciles. 




Figure 38. Geometric interaction between borough boundaries and buffers generated by 700 mts distance to Metro and 
Metrocable stations. 




Table 36. Summary Statistics for Santiago. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Metro + Metrotren as main mode 8,576 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Buses + colectivo as main mode 8,576 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
top 10 income 8,576 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
mid 50 income 8,576 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
bottom 40 income 8,576 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
bottom 10 income 8,576 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
sex (1=men 0=women) 8,576 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
age 8,576 42.31 14.27 15.00 98.00 
minutes to work 8,576 79.24 19.77 60.00 100.00 






Table 37. Summary Statistics for Medellin. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Metro + metrocable as main mode 12,993 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Buses + colectivo as main mode 12,993 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
top 10 income 12,993 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
mid 50 income 12,993 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
bottom 40 income 12,993 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
bottom 10 income 12,993 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
sex (1=men 0=women) 12,993 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
age 12,993 38.92 13.44 5.00 99.00 
minutes to work 12,765 39.90 19.28 20.00 100.00 




7.5.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure 39 shows modal share of aggregate public transport, metro networks, and buses in both 
cities. Aggregate percentages illustrate how income distribution within public transport differs 
between the two cases: use of public transport is skewed toward lower income in Santiago 
compared to Medellin. Furthermore, while the middle 50 has almost the same participation in 
public transport in both cities, the top 10 group has lower ridership the Chilean city compared 
to the Colombian one. Disaggregated figures by mode (Figures 41 to 44) allow us to highlight 
that the explanation for the overrepresentation of the bottom 40 per cent poorest group in 
Santiago is higher use of buses.  
 
Figure 39. Share by income groups in aggregate public transport. 






























Figure 40. Share by income deciles in aggregate public transport. 
Source: The Author based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2017) and Alcaldía de Medellín (2015). 
 
 
Figure 41. Share by income deciles in metro networks. 























































Figure 42. Share by income deciles in the bus fleet. 
Source: The Author based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2017) and Alcaldía de Medellín (2015). 
 
 
Figure 43. Share by income deciles in motorised private transport. 
























































Figure 44. Share by income deciles in non motorised transport. 
Source: The Author based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2017) and Alcaldía de Medellín (2015). 
 
 
Moreover, a disaggregated account of income groups from Figure 40 shows that although there 
is an ‘inverted U’ shape in public transport commuters by decile in both cases, the slope of the 
tails is different in each city, and the curve moves to the left in Santiago compared to Medellin: 
in the former, the poor are more present and the rich are more absent in public transport than 
in the latter. As figure 41 illustrates, these divergences are not due to participation in the metro 
systems, but, as clearly seen in Figure 42, it is mostly due to a different use pattern of buses. 
On the one hand, the drop in use of buses in the poorest decile in Medellin is not as steep in 
Santiago. On the other hand, the continuous drop in use of buses from deciles 6 to 10 in 
Santiago does nor occur in Medellin, where a remarkably stable presence between 40 and 50 
per cent can be observed between deciles 2 to 9, but similar drops to around 35 per cent can be 
seen in both deciles 1 and 10. Figures 43 and 44 show that the decrease in bus commuters 
between deciles 6 and 10 in Santiago is mirrored by an increase of use of private motorised 
vehicles. Conversely, the drop in bus commuters within the poorest decile in Medellin is 
matched with increases in both walking and use of private motorised vehicles. 
 
Figures 45 and 46 allow us to complete the picture. They compare standardised values of 
commuter share for bus and metro systems within each city. The use of standardised values, 
also called standard scores or normal deviates, helps to compare how far from the mean are 
variations by decile in each mode. On the one hand, figure 10 shows clearly how the variance 
by deciles of shares within both metro and buses follows a similar path in Medellin. On the 
other hand, figure 11 shows how the metro network and buses follow almost opposite paths in 
Santiago. What these curves show is a metro network and bus fleet that has a similar presence 
of different income groups in Medellin, while, in contrast, presence of the poor is stronger in 
buses and weaker in the metro network in Santiago.  This occurs in two similar contexts of 
































Figure 45. Standarised share by income deciles in metro and buses, Medellin 
Source: The Author based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2017) and Alcaldía de Medellín (2015). 
 
 
Figure 46. Standarised share by income deciles in metro and buses, Santiago 
Source: The Author based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2017) and Alcaldía de Medellín (2015). 
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I use logit regressions to observe likelihood of commuting on buses or metro among the three 
income groups from the Palma proposition, as well as in the bottom 10 per cent – as seen in 
the descriptive results, this group seems to behave differently from the rest 40 bottom percent, 
especially in Santiago. The models allow to observe these likelihoods after controlling for sex, 
age, distance to the workplace and accessibility of metro stations by borough of residence. 
Results are summarised in Table 37, showing marginal effects and significance by mode, city 
and income group.  
 
In the case of the Metro, results are similar in sign and significance in both cities for the top 
10, middle 50 and bottom 10 groups. Nevertheless, marginal effects tend to be higher in 
Santiago, meaning that differences in use of each mode for commuting to work between 
income groups are starker in the Chilean city. Yet, the biggest contrast is seen when observing 
the bottom 40 group. Being part of this group means to be significantly less likely to use the 
metro only in Santiago, but not in Medellin.  
 
Contrasts are more remarkable in the case of buses. Being part of the top 10 group is associated 
to significant negative likelihood of using buses in both cities. However, the richest decile is 
three times less likely to use buses in Santiago than in Medellin. In contrast, the middle 50 is 
significantly and positively more likely to use buses in Medellin, but no significance is found 
for this group in Santiago. The opposite occurs in the bottom 40: being part of this group is 
significantly linked to higher likelihood of using buses in Santiago, but belonging to this group 
is not significant in Medellin. Finally, the most remarkable contrast is found in results for the 
bottom 10 group: although significance is high in both cities, the sign is the opposite. While 
likelihood of using buses is negative in Medellin, it is positive in Santiago. 
 
Table 38. . Summary of logit regression results. 
 Metro Bus 
 Medellin Santiago Medellin Santiago 
 dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. 
             
top 10 -0.022 (0.009) ** -0.034 (0.012) *** -0.104 (0.014) *** -0.296 (0.023) *** 
Pseudo R2 0.044   0.139   0.080   0.120   
Correctly classified 88.57%   82.96%   64.74%   71.35%   
             
middle 50 0.012 (0.005) ** 0.025 (0.007) *** 0.038 (0.009) *** -0.009 (0.010)  
Pseudo R2 0.043   0.139   0.078   0.100   
Correctly classified 88.57%   83.14%   64.52%   70.77%   
             
bottom 40 -0.004 (0.006)  -0.015 (0.007) ** 0.008 (0.010)  0.100 (0.011) *** 
Pseudo R2 0.043   0.138   0.077   0.108   
Correctly classified 88.57%   83.08%   63.30%   71.46%   
             
bottom 10 -0.027 (0.010) *** -0.047 (0.015) *** -0.065 (0.017) *** 0.062 (0.020) *** 
Pseudo R2 0.044   0.139   0.078   0.101   
Correctly classified 88.57%   83.02%   63.89%   71.01%   
             
dy/dx = average marginal effect 
Observations / Medellin = 12,733 / Santiago = 8,576.  
Control variables applied: sex, age, time-distance to workplace , km2 within 700 mts to metro stations by borough of residence  
 
*p-value ≤ 0.1; **p-value ≤ 0.05; ***p-value ≤ 0.01 
 
Comparing the results within cities provides a similar result to what was observed using 
descriptive statistics. For instance, the significance and signs of each group for both metro and 
buses are similar in Medellin. In contrast, they only coincide in sign and significance for the 
top 10 group in Santiago, meaning that they tend to be absent from public transport – although 
much more strongly absent from buses than from the metro network –, but differ in signs and 




Summarising, regression results show that what can be observed from the descriptive analysis 
holds after controlling for variables such as sex, age, distance to the workplace and accessibility 
of metro stations by borough of residence.  
 
7.5.3 The role of formal and informal institutions: possibilities raised in interviews 
 
The main finding from the quantitative analysis is that, although Santiago and Medellin have 
similar city-level income distributions and percentages of commuters using public transport as 
their main mode to get to work, income distribution within public transport is different. There 
are two main features. First, overall, the presence of different income groups within the public 
transport network is skewed towards the poor in Santiago compared to Medellin. The main 
difference has to do with a higher presence of the poorest of the poor in Santiago, and a less 
pronounced absence of the rich in Medellin. Second, the metro lines and the bus fleet compare 
to each other differently in the two cases regarding income groups. While both subsystems 
have similar income distributions in Medellin, the metro in Santiago is more used by middle 
and upper-middle income groups, whereas buses are strongly populated by the poor.  
 
Are there institutional factors that can explain these differences? With institutional factors here 
I intend to go beyond those that can be embedded in the planning and decision-making process 
behind infrastructure investment. Obviously, supply of infrastructure and access to it is 
fundamental for the use of the metro networks, in a much more critical sense than buses, whose 
supply is more flexible. This is the reason why controls of time-distance and accessibility of 
metro stations by borough of residence were included in logit regressions.  
 
Indeed, interviews allow us to focus in two main differences between public transport in 
Santiago and Medellin, both of which have to do with informal institutions, and can enrich the 
debate about institutions and transport. These are the role of fare evasion in Santiago, and a 
mixture between formalisation of informal providers in Medellin and attempts to use messages 
to promote certain behaviours in Medellin. Although the latter could be discussed under the 
light of existent institutionalist (Rye et al, 2018; Canitez, 2019) literature from transport 
studies, the former requires a wider theoretical framework that includes illegal institutions and 
distribution of benefits (Khan, 2010; Goodfellow, 2017).  
 
Before going into detail, it is worth mentioning that the differences between cities shown by 
quantitative data is also supported by interviews. On the one hand, actors in Medellin see that 
socio economic groups are similarly represented in buses and the metro, with the exception of 
the richest people. As a union leader from Metro de Medellín told me, ‘the metro service in 
Medellín focuses on all income groups’. The same interviewee highlighted that the authorities 
were able to enforce a monopoly of mass transport in most areas of the city, in which people 
are forced to use integrated buses that work as feeders for metro lines and some BRTs. As a 
manager from a public transport company explained, ‘the metropolitan area has for 25 years 
had a concept of penetrating all social strata with the transport system’. All actors, however, 
recognise a very small participation among the rich. As a union leader puts it, the rich ‘do not 
use the mass system, precisely because it is massive’. A high ranked public official adds that 
‘of course, the highest strata today do not want us to bring them metrocables and those sort of 
things’.  However, there does not seem to be a perception of different participation of income 




On the other hand, the difference between metro and buses is evident for all actors in Santiago: 
metro workers, bus drivers, metro managers, public officials and community leaders. While 
the metro is seen as socially mixed, buses are seen as a space in which the poor are more present 
than other groups. However, this socioeconomic differentiation between metro and buses in 
Santiago is accompanied by a particular role attributed to fare evasion in buses. Since its 
implementation in 2007, fare evasion has been considered by authorities as one of the main 
problems of Transantiago, the integrated public transport system (Ureta, 2014; Guarda et al, 
2016; Troncoso and de Grange, 2017; Tamblay et al, 2017). A review of studies focusing on 
fare evasion, written by Delbosc and Currie (2018), stated that Santiago had the highest fare 
evasion in the world, 28 per cent of total trips, and that it is the case study more extensively 
covered by recent literature. In contrast, authorities from Medellin claim to have one of the 
lowest fare evasion rates in Colombia, reaching figures below one percent (El Tiempo, 2019). 
 
A former Chilean cabinet minister explained it in a way that matches the quantitative data 
observed in Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2. ‘If you look at the statistics in other countries, there is an 
inverted U curve, in the sense that when you have very low income you have fewer trips. Trips 
grow with income levels, but when you have too much income there are again fewer trips on 
public transport. Now, with evasion in Santiago, which makes transport to be almost free for 
many people, that does not necessarily happen that way. Not at least on buses. On the metro 
you have lower evasion, so you have to pay to travel. But on buses you can avoid paying: you 
evade’.  A similar explanation was given by other actors, including managers from the Metro, 
which are not included here because of the limited available space.  
 
As it becomes evident, there is an unresolved contradiction between years of official discourses 
attacking evasion as the main problem from Transantiago, and a recognition that, among the 
poorest of the poor, evasion enables trips that otherwise would be supressed. The ‘public order’ 
and ‘social inclusion’ dimensions of evasion are in constant tension in the voices of many 
interviewees.  A community leader from La Pincoya explained it eloquently:  
 
‘every time they can they rise the fares… but buses are falling apart, drivers are 
exhausted, passengers are overwhelmed because of long trips in gigantic articulated 
buses where you can fit a bunch of people inside, and frequencies are low (…) I think 
that is the reason why nobody pays, what they have done is to punish people, charging 
fines, rising the fares even more, putting fences in the access of the buses… but that 
does not solve anything… people still doesn’t pay’… they have included all types of 
turnstiles to control access… people already broke them. They try to use brute 
measures, punish people… instead of saying you know what, guys? We are going to 
improve the service, buses will be bright and shiny, and fares will be lower (…) or… 
you could still charge fines, but… at least improve the service!’ 
 
This leader was emphatic to point that ‘they’ are the elites: government authorities and private 
concessionaires. Part of the measures that authorities have implemented to control fare evasion, 
include the use of the police force to control buses. They stop buses in peak hours, when people 
is commuting to work. A tension that goes beyond transport operation becomes evident. People 
feel targeted and punished. As the same community leader told me, ‘they use policemen to 
control us… I got a fine the other day! I was doing a short trip because of my job and I thought, 
why should I pay?’. He then explains: ‘the policemen were proud of how many fines they 
passed… I told one of them “you have a lot”, and he answered “yes, and it’s just the morning. 
I have all day long” … so they even defy people… they were counting out loud how many fine 
tickets they had, and people around were sad enough already…’. He concludes that the attitude 
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among users ends up being far from collaborative: ‘we feel so punished, we are so 
overwhelmed… that the only thing we want is to destroy turnstiles… if the bus is falling apart, 
let’s make it even worse!’. 
 
The perception of a divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is strongly present in the discourse 
regarding buses. This applies not only to users, but also to drivers. On the one hand, in the 
voice of another community leader, the perception is that ‘the system is fed by people with low 
or middle income, because we have no other alternatives for transport (…) in richer areas, is 
people from here that goes to work there… buses are also scarce in those neighbourhoods, 
because they know that people from there does not use buses… but who needs buses there are 
those who arrive to work… they do not provide a good service there either… because they 
know that the service is for us, for those from poorer areas’. On the other hand, bus drivers also 
complained that residents from rich areas do not only reject bus lines, but also the infrastructure 
that they need to work under basic conditions. An emblematic case is the resistance by rich 
municipalities, where bus lines end, to allow installation of sanitary services for the drivers. 
The latter claim to lack proper spaces for going to the toilet or eating, let alone have a proper 
rest between shifts.  
 
Drivers and users feel similarly abused on buses. If fare evasion is a key problem of 
Transantiago, bus drivers are straight forward in saying that their job is to drive and not to risk 
their lives arguing with angry masses. As a union leader from Transantiago told me, measures 
planned by companies and authorities do not work: turnstiles are located in the first out of four 
doors.  During peak hours, the stop is full with people trying to get to their work or home, and 
the turnstile delays boarding. ‘They open all the doors and get on the bus’. Drivers state that 
although they see paying fares as a civic obligation, they will not confront people because if 
they do so, the risk of being abused is high. As another union leader told me, ‘the drivers that 
bother are the ones that end in hospital’. 
 
 This risk of abuse does not keep drivers from sympathising with users. They share the socio 
economic explanation for evasion, which ‘is now part of the family budgets. A culture of 
evasion was generated. (…) The money that they would spend on fares… they need it… maybe 
levelling income, things would be different… but imagine a family of four people earning CLP 
500,000 a month… if I can save CLP 70,000 per person… of course I won’t pay’. Other union 
leader concludes: ‘everybody has access to buses, because paying or not paying, people get on 
buses anyway’ (…) ‘if somebody pays, the rest will cheer… congratulations, you are the only 
one!’.  
 
Given the conditions of the labour market, specially wages, the extension of the city, the 
location of housing for the poorest population in the most distant land, and concentration of 
jobs in richer areas (Rodriguez, 2007; Figueroa et al, 2017), different actors from Santiago see 
evasion as having a fundamental role in making working viable for the poorest of the poor. 
This is how fare evasion emerges as an informal institution that is a fundamental part of how 
Transantiago operates, as a mechanism which oddly equilibrates interests from different actors.  
 
A very different relationship with informality can be seen in Medellin, one which has to do 
with the formalisation of informal bus providers, and with an active effort to promote 
behaviours associated with cultural values.  
 
In Santiago, it was the capillary fabric in the periphery of the city which was most affected by 
the top-down ‘big bang’ of Transantiago, in 2007. Before that moment, a complex network of 
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316 lines was based on 119 operators, conformed by bus-owner associations, driver unions, 
and small companies (Díaz et al, 2004). Despite protests of the old operators, who responded 
with strikes and blockades (Díaz et al, 2004), the new system was later divided into seven 
business units, operated by large national and transnational companies (Directorio de 
Transporte de Santiago, 2018).  
 
In Medellin, in contrast, recognition and formalisation of local informal providers enabled a 
special responsiveness to how local services should operate at the lowest scale. As a manager 
from a public transport provider in Medellín told me, they found a way to allow ‘those people 
or companies that have a good knowledge of the territory to be those defining the routes’.  
Furthermore, this local openness has a role supporting the establishment of the rule of law in 
the city. The periphery of Medellin was one of the main stages of violence in the times of drug 
cartels, during the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s (Dávila, 2012). Even today, attacks to buses 
are part of clashes between criminal gangs and public authorities. As a leader from a bus 
drivers’ union told me ‘if public transport arrived to a certain part of a borough, is because 
criminals allowed it. And if they don’t allow the public service to reach a certain area, there is 
a reason for it’. The incorporation of informal transport providers, who are also local 
entrepreneurs, are part of a broader process of negotiation and power balancing which aims to 
increase the presence of legitimised activities over criminal organisations.  
 
This legitimation strategy also includes the idea of extending the ‘Metro Culture’ from the 
metro to the buses. Managers from the transport system in Medellin see this culture as the main 
reason why evasion is almost inexistent (El Tiempo, 2019). As a manager from Metro told me, 
Cultura Metro ‘is a civic behaviour which has been voluntarily adopted by citizens’. This 
includes a permanent reinforcement, via audio and visual messages that are constantly reaching 
users. As a community leader told me ‘Cultura Metro works… it is about constant, constant 
messages… it is like a method of Neuro-Linguistic Programming… they are all day long telling 
you “don’t drink water on the Metro”, “don’t eat on the metro”, “keep the Metro clean” … you 
hear those messages all day long, everyday, until you start saying them by yourself… or you 
sing the songs they use in the advertisements’.  
 
This is how two institutional aspects emerge in each city, both linked to informality and fare 
evasion. In the case of Santiago, it is the permanent role of fare evasion as an illegal institution 
that allows to balance tensions between different actors, and to make working possible for the 
poorest of the poor. In the case of Medellin, it is formalisation of formerly informal transport 
providers, and their incorporation into the core of ‘Cultura Metro’, what emerges as keys to 
both service quality and legitimisation of legal activities to confront criminal organisations in 




As we can see, the relationship with illegality emerges as a relevant element in institutional 
analysis, in a way that can enrich theoretical approaches to institutions and transport (such as 
those by Rye et al, 2018, and Canitez, 2019). While fare evasion, an illegal doing, is a relevant 
informal institution in Transantiago, formalisation of previously informal transport providers 
is motivated by a broader strategy to reinforce rule of law against territorial control by criminal 
organisations in Medellin. 
  
In practice, fare enforcement mechanisms are in the centre of the institutional differences 
between both cases, but they also point to a broader role of public transport in the social 
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contract. Fare evasion might ‘open the door’ of public transport to the poorest of the poor in 
Santiago, by letting them ride on buses. However, at the same time, part of what can be 
observed in Santiago is an acceptance of poor quality of bus services. It is worth asking whether 
the lower presence of the richest groups on buses in Santiago, compared to Medellin, has to do 
with fare evasion and tacit agreements on how buses operate. An inclusiveness which is 
achieved through an absence of ‘rule of law’ probably brings a reinforcement, among the rich, 
of the rejection of the kind of interactions to which they would be exposed on buses. They 
might use the metro, but not the buses. A strong notion of ‘order’ as part of the history of the 
metro system in Santiago has recently been discussed by transport historians (Castillo et al, 
2017). It would be extremely difficult to assign a causal direction in this link between 
enforcement or lack of order, and presence or absence of the rich. They most likely reinforce 
each other in a complex and continuous interplay.   
 
In contrast, the same income distribution of the metro lines and buses in Medellin is paired 
with an attempt to implement the same ‘Cultura Metro’ in both components of the integrated 
public transport system. ‘Good behaviour’ and collective vigilance are constantly reinforced 
by authorities in Medellin, explicitly attempting to reproduce conditions from the metro on the 
buses that are part of the integrated fare system. An analogue question emerges to the one 
inspired by fare evasion in Santiago: is this effort to reinforce an experience of civility and 
control on the buses something that at the same time excludes the poorest of the poor and 
attracts more workers from richer groups?  
 
A hypothesis can be stablished on the basis of findings from this study. Although use of public 
transport among income groups tend to follow an inverted-U trend – that is to say, use increases 
among middle income groups but drops among the tails (as previously studied by Serebrisky 
et al, 2009) – there are institutional factors that can influence how much the poorest and richest 
ride on buses and metros. In the case of the poor, alleviation of the fare burden – which in 
Santiago occurs via evasion – can integrate more people. In the case of the rich, reinforcement 
of order, control and safety can persuade more people to use public transport instead of private 
motorised vehicles. In Santiago and Medellin, these options take place in the form of a trade-
off between social order and inclusion. However, further research would be needed to establish 
whether this trade-off is real and unavoidable.  
 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the use of the Palma proposition (Cobham et al, 2016) and the 
groups observed by Palma (2011, 2014) as a departing point for the analysis. Firstly, it is clear 
that looking at income distribution within transport modes, beyond aggregate figures, provides 
insightful new perspectives on socio-technical systems such as public transport networks. 
Secondly, it is evident that income distribution does not only affect individual travel decisions, 
but is embedded in power balances and institutions that are part of these socio-technical 
systems. Thirdly, it seems that although using the segments discussed by Palma opens the 
debate about different groups – especially the richest and the poorest –, a more detailed look is 
required to understand dynamics happening on buses and metros. For instance, in this analysis, 
it is the bottom poorest decile, more than the aggregate bottom 40, which offers the most 
insightful findings, along with the richest decile. Nevertheless, it seems that a more relational 
view of socio-economic issues in transport, one which does not only look at the poor but also 






The new emphasis on income inequality instead of just poverty, found in part of mainstream 
economics, can be a useful lens to approach transport systems. This research illustrates why a 
look into different income groups can illustrate relevant dynamics regarding how public 
transport operates. However, the link between income distribution and adoption of transport 
modes is not just a matter of consumer preferences or individual ability-to-pay. It is 
fundamentally mediated by institutions, which are rooted in balances of power.  
 
The fields of institutional economics and political economy provide useful tools to incorporate 
institutions into the analysis of the link between income distribution and transport. However, 
efforts to integrate these tools in transport studies have so far been limited in their view on 
informal institutions. The political settlements approach is used here as a way to expand our 
analytical capacities for paying attention to illegal institutions and formalisation of informal 
transport providers. 
 
Evidence found here can be used to hypothesise that there could be trade-offs between the 
presence of the poor and the rich in public transport. More research should be needed to 
understand how possible socio-economic integration is. Also, more case studies could help to 
refine these first observations, while, of course, much more complex and extensive data 
collection would be needed to arrive to conclusions that can be applicable to transport systems 
in general. However, this research provides novel elements that deserve attention in further 
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This research included a thorough review of existent peer-reviewed literature, econometric 
modelling of aggregate country and borough level data, and a mixed-methods analysis of two 
specific cases. I provided evidence of the negative influence of income inequality on network 
technology adoption in regards to recycling, rail passenger transport and broadband internet. 
While the literature offers evidence of this link for broadband, results are novel in the cases of 
recycling and railway passenger transport. In these two latter cases, the income shares of 
specific groups within the bottom 40 per cent poorest population matter more than the overall 
income distribution. 
 
Inequality can be a barrier for network technology adoption because of both demand-side and 
supply-side causal mechanisms. In the case of transport, the evidence suggests the idea that 
inequality is a proxy of power balances that determine institutional supply-side definitions of 
how transport regimes operate. In the case of recycling and broadband internet, demand-side 
or consumer-based explanations seem to be more plausible. In any case, be it because of 
supply-side decisions taken in favour of the rich, or because income distribution affecting 
aggregate ability-to-pay among consumers, inequality is a barrier for sustainable technology 
adoption within network industry sectors. Challenges regarding reduction of inequality and 
Climate Action, as included in the Sustainable Development Goals, need to be confronted in 
an integrated way. 
 
Income generation also usually conditions individual or household level adoption of recycling, 
railway passenger transport and broadband internet, as well as differences in aggregates at a 
borough level within cities. However, the extent to which this relationship holds depends on 
institutional factors. The mixed-methods analysis of two specific cases allowed to discuss 
elements that should be considered when interrogating these institutional factors in the context 
of highly income-unequal cities. 
 
In the case of recycling, for instance, case-studies from Santiago and Medellin, from the Global 
South, were complemented by a comparison of Barcelona and London, from the Global North. 
The four cases show that institutions can make recycling rates to depend on or to decouple 
from income. On the one hand, waste management funding regimes can be regressive, neutral 
or progressive in terms of income distribution. On the other hand, informal institutions such as 
corruption, as well as formalisation of waste pickers, can lead to different patterns of separate 
collection in cities. If demand-side causal mechanisms have to do with ability to pay for quality 
recyclable products, their influence on who ends up participating in recycling will be mediated 
by supply-side factors, which can be subject of policy decisions.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of railway passenger transport in Medellin and Santiago confirms a 
‘inverted-U’ relationship between income generation and likelihood of ridership, as some of 
the theory predicts. However, the curve can be skewed according to institutional arrangements 
that are part of transport regimes in each city. Since metro systems are fare-integrated with bus 
fleets in the two cities, these institutional factors also affect how income determines adoption 
between both public transport sub-modes. The detailed account of these two cases provides 
illustrations of the role that informal institutions such as fare evasion in Santiago and effects 
of behavioural campaigns in Medellin can be playing in how the inverted-U skews towards the 
rich or the poor. Another element that is common to the transport and recycling sectors is the 
presence of policies to formalise informal providers, which in Medellin have been crucial to 




Finally, although internet studies see adoption as an eminently demand-based phenomenon, 
according to which income tends to be linearly linked to connectedness, the case-studies 
provide elements to expect an influence of both local and informal institutions. Tax exemption 
policies and strong presence of local public service provision seem to lessen the influence of 
income generation on likelihood of adopting household broadband internet in Medellin. In turn, 
an informal enforcement of redlining by big telecommunication companies seems to 
disproportionally affect the 20 poorest percent of the population in Santiago, regardless of the 
ability and willingness to pay for broadband services among households.  
 
Overall, the detailed case-studies provide elements that should be incorporated into an 
institutionalist political economy approach to network industries. On the one hand, a role of 
informal institutions can be found in the three analysed sectors. One fundamental conclusion 
is the usefulness of having a relational approach to informality, and of avoiding just paying 
attention to ‘informality of the poor’. The examples of redlining in telecommunications, and 
corruption in waste management, should not be taken as isolated cases, but as informal 
institutions that are often structural parts of the functioning of each sector. 
 
In this sense, institutionally produced network disadvantage should be considered as a 
phenomenon that is most likely present, in diverse forms, all across the globe. This means that 
formal and informal institutions are determining exclusion of segments of the population from 
adoption of network technologies. These institutions emerge from complex interactions 
between national political settlements and local service regimes within cities. However, 
although it is possible to observe many ways by which network disadvantage is induced by 
local institutional factors, intervening through policy and new political pacts is also proven to 
be possible in order to include new groups in the emerging dimensions of connectivity. 
 
This institutionally produced network disadvantage is not neutral, in two ways. On the one 
hand, the evidence from this research shows that it tends to target specific groups within the 
bottom 40 per cent poorest population. This is shown both by the country level analysis of 
adoption of recycling and railway passenger transport, and by the case-studies. On the other 
hand, institutional factors driving network disadvantage are supported by political settlements 
that favour the rich. Existent formal and informal institutions are sustainable when they 
distribute benefits according to the balance of power. Particularly in the cases of redlining in 
telecommunications and corruption in waste management, informal institutions that 
marginalise the poor are implemented as ways to benefit the super rich trough securing profit 
rates and diminishing financial risks. In the case of transport, the virtual absence of the 10 
richest per cent from public transport resonates with the correlation of income concentration 
by the same group and presence of private-oriented transport regimes, as shown by national-
level data. Institutionally produced network disadvantage must be understood as a phenomenon 
that involves both the rich and the poor: network service regimes are a reflection of the balance 
of power between them. 
 
Results from this research have the limitation of available OECD and World Bank quantitative 
data in Part I, and a lack of time to conduct additional interviews beyond the two case-study 
cities analysed in Part II. However, I believe they are robust enough to open new discussions, 
first, about the role if income inequality in adoption of sustainable technologies within network 
industry sectors, and second, to point to the importance of incorporating institutionalist political 




Opening the box of institutional factors means, of course, also allowing complexity to permeate 
all our analyses. I am deeply interested in continuing learning more about the role of formal 
and informal institutions as mediators between income inequality and network technology 
adoption. The elements that emerge from mixed-method case studies could be further analysed 
in broader samples if data were available. Although it might seem as a difficult enterprise, the 
increasing attention to institutions as a key for development, and a rebirth of political economy 
scholarship in recent years, make me feel hopeful about findings that could be made in the 
future.  
 
Particularly in the Global South, imagining new futures requires to comprehend how 
interconnectedness is unfolding in cities and across the world. As explained in several parts of 
this thesis, the Sustainable Development Goals already include challenges that deeply involve 
network industries. I expect to have illustrated the importance of considering inequality as a 
fundamental problem for that sustainable development. Much effort remains to be spent in 















The Circular Economy is a term that is mostly used in environmental science and industrial 
ecology. It refers to an economic system that increases efficiency of resource use, by adopting 
production patterns that close the loop in terms of primary resources, manufacture, 
commercialisation, use and waste disposal. A fully closed loop would involve less consumption 
of natural resources, and fully recycle or re-use of materials, without incineration or landfill 




Climate Action comes from the discussion in the fields of environmental policy and urban 
planning. It is usually named as Climate Action Plans that are generated in a country, a region 
or a city. It refers to some form of identifiable action that it is considered to produce an advance 
towards mitigation of the effects of the Climate Crisis, or reduction of greenhouse emissions 




Crimate Crisis has become a new term used to replace the previously extended notion of 
Climate Change. This evolution of the sense of urgency - to refer to the same phenomenon - 
has significant presence in the field of social environmental science and environmental studies, 
due to new evidence of the effects of planetary warming and the lack of effective policies to 




By environmental technologies, ecological economists refer to technologies that are associated 
to environmental policy (i.e. pollution abatement, recycling, emission reduction). Technology 
is named in this study in the context of adoption processes, which mean the introduction of a 
previously inexistent product or service into consumption by users (Magnani, 2000; Vona and 
Patriarca, 2011).  
 
Sustainibility and sustainable change 
 
Sustainability is understood here as a quality inherent to sustainable development, as first 
defined by Brundtland (1987): ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. 
Sustainable change is thus significant change, predominantly in the form of technology 
adoption and policy, that entails a significant advance towards sustainability.  
 
Sustainable network technologies 
 
Sustainable network technologies refer to technologies that, when adopted, are considered as a 
significant advance towards sustainability in a given sector. The difference between sustainable 
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technology and environmental technology is that the former involves other dimensions of 
sustainability, and not just the environmental dimension. Sustainable network technologies are 
sustainable technologies that are adopted within the network industry sectors: 
telecommunications, transport, energy, water, waste. In this work, ‘sustainable network 
technologies’ are those technologies that, if adopted in the network industry sectors, involve 
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